Steib said it's been proven that «if you have a lot of stress, at
the extreme end of the range, you become a poorer decision maker, you have a very hard time performing tasks, and you underperform other people in cognitive and physical feats when you're highly stressed out,» Steib said.
The more
extreme end of that range is considered by some to be «normal» in some breeds (to name some more: Corgis, Basset, Lhasa Apso, and Pekingese).
I stand by the points I made regarding the use of the extreme scenarios to drive policy without any clarification that they are both hypothetical and at
the extreme end of the range.
Only because the constant volume case brackets one
extreme end of a range that the constant pressure case brackets at the other end.
Not exact matches
For instance, a portfolio with an allocation
of 49 % domestic stocks, 21 % international stocks, 25 % bonds, and 5 % short - term investments would have generated average annual returns
of almost 9 % over the same period, albeit with a narrower
range of extremes on the high and low
end.
The UN's 17 Sustainable Development Goals are aimed at achieving equality, securing global peace and
ending extreme poverty — an ambitious agenda that will require a wide -
range of conditions to be met.
What seems to be happening is that we in the U.K. are getting more
extremes of weather at either
end of our normal
range.
In summary, all placental and negative control samples were at the
extreme low
end of the
range detectable by qPCR (Additional file 2: Figure S1A — C).
By the
end of the week, the Northeast is likely to feel the effects
of the cold snap, though temperatures will be a little less
extreme and likely in the 8 ° -14 °F below normal
range.
There is a concern for injury when athletes who have hyper - mobile joints reach their
end range of motion during weightlifting because the body is not maximally stable in these
extreme positions.
The Land Rover Discovery and
Range Rover are closer to the
extreme off - road
end of the scale.
At World Climate Report, we believe, that instead
of having an equal likelihood
of occurrence, that the temperature rise during the next 50 to 100 years will lie closer to the low
end of the IPCC projected
range than to the high
end of the
range and thus the overall impacts will tend towards the modest rather than the
extreme.
Secondly, the
range of solar changes from 1700 is from 0.05 % to at the
extreme end 0.5 %, however, the potential
range from 1850 onwards is smaller, and since 1950 has probably declined or stayed steady.
Gavin also identified the time dependant inconsistencies between solar insolation and measured temperatures: 1st response: «Secondly, the
range of solar changes from 1700 is from 0.05 % to at the
extreme end 0.5 %, however, the potential
range from 1850 onwards is smaller, and since 1950 has probably declined or stayed steady.»
Extremes are the infrequent events at the high and low
end of the
range of values
of a particular variable.
The result would be changed by a prior with a singularity at the
end point
of either
range or some other really
extreme prior, but not by any prior considered plausible by most.
Curry not only takes the
extreme range of this — which is illogical since, contorted arguments to argue otherwise aside, she even goes beyond it: to, as quoted above, ludicrously conclude from all this that not only is it not just «reasonably possible» that half could be due to natural variation that just happens to coincide with what we would expect to see from the atmospheric alteration inadvertently undertaken, but that rather than it being somewhere in the middle
of up to half being due to variability, or a similarly large portion in fact being veiled, but all
of what «could» on the one
end of the
range be, in fact, IS, but then goes beyond that.
In other words,
of the possible variation which Curry first suggests, off
of the
extreme reading that the «could be» one
end of the equation = - the one that just happens to have the maximum plausible natural variability that the IPCC could even reasonably conceive, in Curry's estimation, be exactly what the natural variability here in fact IS, but then from there goes
extreme again, and concludes that within her own plus minus 20 %
range — guess what — IT ALSO goes in the
extreme direction, away from the mean
of natural variability averaging out and the change we see is our influence (which assuredly it is not, but the point is it is impossible to pinpoint any small
range, though Curry here does it anyway) so that in effect IT IS 50 % to 60 % (or 70 % when she adds on that «anthropogenic is 50 % or less.
In essence, Curry takes that
extreme, or the
extreme but reasonably plausible, although not likely
end of the
range, as the new mean, narrows he total
range from there, and then adds more to that
extreme by opting in the directin
of even more «coincidental» natural variability on top
of that.
Not only that, Curry goes past it, to, somewhat fantastically, conclude that «My assessment is that it is > 2/3 likely that there is such an
extreme end «coincidental» natural variability mimicking effect (just as laid out above) and then on to say — after limiting the
range of possible natural variability («coincidentally» enough) to only that which is close to this high «could» be (acc» to the IPCC) state
of 50 %» natural» effect (that is, giving that itself only a 20 percent
range in either direction (meaning, depending on interpretation, either a positive40 % or 30 % floor to the input
of «natural» and a ceiling
of 60 to 70 %)-RRB-, and thereby negating any possibility
of the opposite — TO, again, the new mean representing the one directional and full extent
of what, could plausibly be natural variability, and then concluding from there that «At this point, I think anthropogenic is 50 % or less.»
Over its 350 year instrumental course, it has swung wildly between these
extremes seen at either
end of the record, encompassing decadal figures
ranging from -0.7 C to plus 0.45 C along the way (figure 3) These
extremes are not replicated in figure 2, whose results are unrecognisable when compared to the actual CET temperature statistics.
The problem was that «the moment that one talks
of a «
range» or «band»
of reasonable responses one is conjuring up the possibility
of extreme views at either
end of the band or
range».
Recent judicial experience suggests that wide application
of the protean concept
of proportionality would require the development
of additional doctrinal tools (such as deference) in order to ensure that the proportionality test is applied with appropriate intensity across the wide spectrum
of administrative law cases,
ranging from fundamental rights on one
end to purely economic interests at the other
extreme.
However, if it is understood that if Bitcoin succeeds there will also be many other altcoins, then Bitcoin's value might only
end up between $ 2,000 and $ 200,000 in the case
of extreme success — creating a lower «ceiling» on what the price can be and thus narrowing the
range within which estimates
of Bitcoin's value can take place.