Sentences with phrase «fact for an appellate court»

In fact, considering the volume of the opinion dedicated to it, the company stock accounting may well have been the most compelling triable issue of fact for the appellate court.

Because of the erroneous analytical framework applied at trial, the trial judge did not make the necessary findings of fact for an appellate court to find Mr. Katigbak guilty of the offence.

Not exact matches

A state appellate court has determined the Board of Parole erred in rejecting a 54 - year - old convict's 2014 request for release when it failed to weigh the significance of the fact that he was 16 when he committed the murder that landed him in prison 37 years ago.

Senator Mark's counsel, Ken Ikonne and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) lawyer Johnson Usman as well as the People's Democratic Party (PDP) counsel, Chris Alechenu had told the Court that section 285 (5) of the 1999 constitution was clear on the fact the day of declaration of an election result should be included in the days allowed for the filing of a petition before a court, urging the appellate court to dismiss the appeal and award cost against the appelCourt that section 285 (5) of the 1999 constitution was clear on the fact the day of declaration of an election result should be included in the days allowed for the filing of a petition before a court, urging the appellate court to dismiss the appeal and award cost against the appelcourt, urging the appellate court to dismiss the appeal and award cost against the appelcourt to dismiss the appeal and award cost against the appellate.

The underlying issue for an appeal is simple: the appellate court (AC), ie Court of Appeal; a High Court judge; a circuit judge etc) may only allow an appeal if it considers the decision below was «wrong» (r 52.11 (3)-RRB-: wrong in law, wrong on the facts or because the judge exercised his discretion wrongly («plainly wrong»: Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360, [1999] 2 FLR 763); or unjust because of a procedural irregulacourt (AC), ie Court of Appeal; a High Court judge; a circuit judge etc) may only allow an appeal if it considers the decision below was «wrong» (r 52.11 (3)-RRB-: wrong in law, wrong on the facts or because the judge exercised his discretion wrongly («plainly wrong»: Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360, [1999] 2 FLR 763); or unjust because of a procedural irregulaCourt of Appeal; a High Court judge; a circuit judge etc) may only allow an appeal if it considers the decision below was «wrong» (r 52.11 (3)-RRB-: wrong in law, wrong on the facts or because the judge exercised his discretion wrongly («plainly wrong»: Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360, [1999] 2 FLR 763); or unjust because of a procedural irregulaCourt judge; a circuit judge etc) may only allow an appeal if it considers the decision below was «wrong» (r 52.11 (3)-RRB-: wrong in law, wrong on the facts or because the judge exercised his discretion wrongly («plainly wrong»: Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360, [1999] 2 FLR 763); or unjust because of a procedural irregularity.

The book is a «how - to» guide for drafting all types of documents common to trial and appellate courts, including bench memos, orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, jury instructions, statements of reasons for imposing sentence, appellate opinions, correspondence, and speeches.

As Souter points out, though, to call this an «appellate presumption» is to turn a blind eye to the fact that the trial courts are all keenly aware of what their Court of Appeals is looking for — a within - Guidelines sentence.

In Carr v. Cinnamon, a California appellate court applied the same rule we have here in Maryland: the finder of fact can award whatever they want for noneconomic damages, including zero even when it seems preposterous that a person could suffer medical bills and have no pain and suffering.

Recently, in Sattva Capital Corporation v Creston Moly Corporation et al [2014] 2 SCR 633, the court confirmed that the appellate jurisdiction to review written construction cases must necessarily be limited given the legal requirement for the first instance court to reach its decision as a mixed question of law and fact.

A decision as to whether or not acts attributable to a body such as a school or college amount to occupation of premises for VAT purposes is a question of degree, sensitive to the particular facts, and one in which an appellate court has to pay considerable respect to the opinion of the fact - finding body.

The trial court ruled that the statute of limitations had run out, but the appellate court ruled there were material fact issues regarding whether or not the plaintiff either knew, or should have known, that he had a cause of action for the injuries he suffered due to asbestos exposure.

«I readily appreciate that the deference owed to a trial court's findings of fact must not become a pretext for an appellate court to evade its responsibility to set aside an unreasonable verdict.

Ultimately, the appellate court would probably have to say, «This sentence would be substantively unreasonable * but for * the findings related to Ball's other conduct,» — which (based on Scalia's reasoning) would mean that the sentence couldn't be lawfully imposed without the presence of those facts, which in turn would mean that they were subject to the Sixth Amendment's jury - trial right.

However — with one exception I know about — in Reilly v. Lynn 2003 BCCA 49 (Southin J.A. dissenting — though this wasn't the point of the dissent) when discussing the scope of appellate power to review lower court findings of fact, said that once upon a time it was important for that court to take into account which judge the appeal came from because of the quality of the judge — nobody says that openly.

Although I have previously argued that the Piresferreira decision was legally wrong and, in fact, contrary to other appellate decisions including Sulz v. Canada, 2006 BCCA 582 and Queen v. Cognos, (the Supreme Court of Canada did not disturb or address the trial judge's award of $ 5,000 in damages for «emotional stress» in its decision in Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 SCR 87,) this post will focus on a different issue: whether the decision highlights the differences to which claims of a hostile work environment can be put.

Hopefully such changes also would enhance the ability of appellate courts to make «a sensible decision» based on all of the «important facts» for such a decision.

3 It quoted a 1988 decision of the First District reprimanding a lawyer who sought to «amend» the record to include matters not before the trial court, and declaring in this regard that the fact «an appellate court may not consider matters outside the record is so elemental there is no excuse for an attorney to attempt to bring such matters before the court.»

Trial courts, where the essential findings of fact and drawing of inferences are done, can only be held properly to account if the reasons for their adjudication are transparent and accessible to the public and the appellate courts.»

Moreover, as the Supreme Court explained, «a circuit court appellate decision made according to the forms of law and the rules prescribed for rendering it, although it may be erroneous in its conclusion as to what the law is as applied to facts, is not a departure from the essential requirements of law remediable by certiorari.&rCourt explained, «a circuit court appellate decision made according to the forms of law and the rules prescribed for rendering it, although it may be erroneous in its conclusion as to what the law is as applied to facts, is not a departure from the essential requirements of law remediable by certiorari.&rcourt appellate decision made according to the forms of law and the rules prescribed for rendering it, although it may be erroneous in its conclusion as to what the law is as applied to facts, is not a departure from the essential requirements of law remediable by certiorari.»

The SCC's decision did not allow for much flexibility and went against one of the usual practices of appellate courts — to give deference to the Copyright Board in findings of fact (fairness in claims of fair dealings is one such finding of fact).

The standard of review for findings of mixed law and fact is highly deferential, requiring a palpable and overriding error before an appellate court will intervene.

Before Campbell, it was well established that a good character direction will be of some value in every case in which it should be given (see R v Fulcher [1995] 2 Cr App R 251 at 260) and therefore, although a failure to give the direction will not necessarily render a conviction unsafe, with each case to be reviewed in the light of its own facts (see Singh v The State [2005] UKPC 35, [2005] 4 All ER 781), it will rarely be possible for an appellate court to say that such a failure could not have affected the outcome of the trial (see R v Kamar (1999) The Times, 14 May).

However, in determining whether the correct standard has indeed been applied, an appellate court must take care not to substitute its own view of the facts for that of the trial judge.

Florida appellate court finds that fact issues remained as to whether the broker ratified the salesperson's conduct and made the brokerage vicariously liable for his actions.

A federal appellate court has considered whether an individual was personally responsible when her company failed to pay taxes for mortgage lending business that she owned but was in fact run by her «significant other.»

In an unreported decision, a California appellate court reversed an award made in favor of the former property owner because it determined that a commercial real estate broker was not responsible for property sale not closing, despite the fact the broker erroneously valued the property and also acted as an undisclosed dual agent.