He had found the plaintiff had established
factual causation applying the but - for test.
Not exact matches
Putting aside that no case has ever claimed that contribution
applies only to but - for causes — good thing because there's many a defendant held liable who received contribution where the conduct wasn't a but - for cause and there's no reason to read any of the apportionment statutes that way — I suppose the conclusion that contribution is limited to but - for
causation does follow if the Court believes that the only way there can ever be
factual causation is under the but - for test.
Also, in B.C., since Resurfice some appellate judges seem to have expressed the view (not in dissenting reasons) that the Athey material contribution test was never a separate test for proof of
factual causation in negligence but merely a causal «yardstick» explaining when the but - for test
applies.
As I've said to others, were I a trial judge who sat on civil trials before Resurfice, I'd not know whether to be bemused or astounded at the suggested that the version of material contribution I
applied then — which would have been the Athey version — was NOT a test for proof of
factual causation on the balance of probability.
For now, Resurfice material contribution
applies only in the situations described by Clements in para. 39, where the Court provided an explanation of the meaning of Resurfice «s «impossible to establish
factual causation on the balance of probability using the but - for test.»
Resurfice material contribution, if
applied, does not produce a finding of
factual causation on the balance of probability.
The appellate reasons do not contain a discussion of why the common sense approach to
factual causation, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Snell v Farrell, did not
apply in favour of the Ms. Clements.