Sentences with phrase «factual causation as»

Not exact matches

So you have to lead them through a scientific, logical, factual chain of explanation and causation as to why that matters.

(At least so long as we're speaking just about factual causation, and not remoteness aka factual cause.)

As you will see from the balance of the trial judge's discussion of causation law, it seems that the trial judge thought that Resurfice material contribution is merely a restatement of Athey material contribution, therefore a test for factual causation.

The panel also misstated the current meaning of the but - for test for factual causation, as explained by the Supreme Court of Canada.

As with proving negligence, factual evidence is important in proving causation.

As the SCC just repeated in R. v. Maybin, 2012 SCC 24 at para. 16: «Legal causation, however, is a narrowing concept which funnels a wider range of factual causes into those which are sufficiently connected to a harm to warrant legal responsibility.»

I'll provide what I think you'd accept as a precise answer to the question as you posed it, bearing in mind that I think your question is about legal responsibility, not merely factual causation.

But, then, if factual causation in law is all about imposing responsibility, it's not so much conflating — because that implies error the way the term is usually used — as failing to adequately define the various steps involved in the process of imposing liability.

I am still trying to get my head around your earlier objection when you said «But the SCC has now suggested that some cases which ARE factual causation are going to be treated as material contribution cases where there isn't factual causation?»

As some of you know, my particular (legal) research interest is factual causation in tort, particularly negligence.

And statutory compensation schemes — think workers» comp or motor vehicle accident accident benefits — where the Athey material contribution to injury test (understood as a method of establishing factual causation on the balance of probability) was adopted as the meaning of the causation terminology in the statute were wrong in justifying their decisions based on Athey, even if decision on the meaning of the statute was correct?

I also still think that you were wrong when you said «But the SCC has now suggested that some cases which ARE factual causation are going to be treated as material contribution cases where there isn't factual causation?»

As I've said to others, were I a trial judge who sat on civil trials before Resurfice, I'd not know whether to be bemused or astounded at the suggested that the version of material contribution I applied then — which would have been the Athey version — was NOT a test for proof of factual causation on the balance of probability.

I've not spilled quite as much real ink (online is different) about the recent SCC decision in Resurfice v. Hanke which has one of those «out of the blue» pronouncements of law that had nothing to do with the disposition of the issues in case: the SCC's declaration that fault and increased risk may sometimes be enough to satisfy tort's causation requirement, even though the injured person can not establish, on the balance of probability, that the fault was a (factual) cause of the injury.

It seems to me that it is an other way of expressing the remoteness problem, but I struggle to come up with a factual example that you could not brush aside easily as a «standard of care» issue dressed up as causation (the liability of the person who left the paper in the wastebasket, for example)

Whatever Athey material contribution meant before Resurfice (2007) and before Clements, it was (then) understood as an alternative method for establishing factual causation on the balance of probability.

The provincial and territorial trial and appellate judges of Canada, and many commentators, adopted this alternative approach to proof of factual causation with some relish (of many varieties), describing this approach as the Athey material contribution test.

in reasons written by McLachlin CJ seemingly rejected, killed, and buried the Athey meaning of material contribution or materially contributed as a test for proof of factual causation on the balance of probability.

One might suppose that that Clements would have fixed the stake in Athey material contribution's heart; that is, material contribution, by any name or any version such as «materially contributes», as a method of proof of factual causation on the balance of probability where the meaning is anything less than «necessity».

As written, Athey's material contribution test is a separate test for the existence of factual causation.

Some of you will recognize this as the factual causation problem sometimes described as the «indeterminate wrongdoer» or «indeterminate defendant» problem.

The appellate reasons do not contain a discussion of why the common sense approach to factual causation, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Snell v Farrell, did not apply in favour of the Ms. Clements.

And if it's not about factual causation, then it couldn't have been intended as a replacement for Athey material contribution which (whatever it meant) was, seemingly, about factual causation, right?

I'm trying to gather anecdotal information as to whether the SCC decision in Resurfice v Hanke, 2007 SCC 7 and the «material contribution» doctrine mentioned in the case are helping plaintiffs get before - trial settlements — by using the Resurfice «material contribution» notion to get them past difficulties in proving factual causation using the «but - for» test — which are settlements that they might not have been able to get before Resurfice.

The SCC was, and is, correct in stating that if the ABCA's view was correct, the Athey material contribution test, as the ABCA understood it, had become the default test for proof of factual causation on the balance of probability in negligence actions.

It necessarily follows, although the the Supreme Court did not explicitly say this so, that Athey material contribution, whatever it meant before 2007 as a method for establishing factual causation on the balance of probability, is as dead as the proverbial Monty Python Norweigian blue parrot.

We also haven't seen any cases where a judge said that he or she, before Resurfice, would have found the factual causation issue in favour of the plaintiff using Athey material contribution — finding factual causation on the balance of probability — but, as a result of Resurfice, is now required to use the but - for test and, on the facts, must find the plaintiff failed to establish factual causation on the balance of probability.