Some people, perhaps even some judges, at least those outside of British Columbia, might now find the suggestion that «materially contributed» contributed under Athey is sufficient for proof of
factual causation under the balance of probability, if that's what the trial judge meant, controversial.
Not exact matches
Putting aside that no case has ever claimed that contribution applies only to but - for causes — good thing because there's many a defendant held liable who received contribution where the conduct wasn't a but - for cause and there's no reason to read any of the apportionment statutes that way — I suppose the conclusion that contribution is limited to but - for
causation does follow if the Court believes that the only way there can ever be
factual causation is
under the but - for test.
Where there exists
factual findings of risk and injury, due to material contributions of a complex environment (where people interact), and in the absence of direct
causation under the but - for test, would «all» be deemed indivisible in establishing
causation under this ruling?
Resurfice seemingly declared an entirely different meaning for material contribution or materially contributed which eliminated the need,
under that that test, to prove
factual causation on the balance of probability and, in so doing, removed the concept of «material contribution» or «materially contributes» from the but - for lexicon.
Did the trial judge make a serious
factual error when she found that Kiskadee had failed to show that the telephone cable servicing its units ran
under the basement floor of 216 and hence could not prove
causation?