I'm trying to gather anecdotal information as to whether the SCC decision in Resurfice v Hanke, 2007 SCC 7 and the «material contribution» doctrine mentioned in the case are helping plaintiffs get before - trial settlements — by using the Resurfice «material contribution» notion to get them past difficulties in proving
factual causation using the «but - for» test — which are settlements that they might not have been able to get before Resurfice.
Not exact matches
The result of that, for all practical purposes — it took about a year — was that an «Ivory Snow pure» number of trial judges stopped formally
using Athey material contribution to decide whether
factual causation was established on the balance of probability.
But, then, if
factual causation in law is all about imposing responsibility, it's not so much conflating — because that implies error the way the term is usually
used — as failing to adequately define the various steps involved in the process of imposing liability.
Getting back to my point, which relates to the
use of «clarify», in Resurfice [Resurfice v Hanke, 2007 SCC 7] McLachlin CJ didn't seem to think that there was all that much confusion «in this area» — meaning the area of
factual causation.
OK, but in your duplicative
causation cases, I don't quite understand how you are
using «
factual»
causation.
That line held that the Snell common sense approach can't be
used where expert evidence is adduced on the
factual causation issue.
For now, Resurfice material contribution applies only in the situations described by Clements in para. 39, where the Court provided an explanation of the meaning of Resurfice «s «impossible to establish
factual causation on the balance of probability
using the but - for test.»
There are BCCA decisions which suggest that where the parties have lead expert evidence on the issue of
factual causation — certainly where both sides do, perhaps even where just one side «leads» the evidence, the robust and pragmatic approach can not be
used.
To establish
factual causation in a cause of action in negligence, the plaintiff will have to
use, and satisfy, the but - for test, except in claims arising out of the negligent screening of blood donors.
We also haven't seen any cases where a judge said that he or she, before Resurfice, would have found the
factual causation issue in favour of the plaintiff
using Athey material contribution — finding
factual causation on the balance of probability — but, as a result of Resurfice, is now required to
use the but - for test and, on the facts, must find the plaintiff failed to establish
factual causation on the balance of probability.
The trial judge noted the distinction between the «but for» test for
factual causation and the «material contribution to the risk of injury» test, but ultimately found this case not to be the exceptional one in which the material contribution test to determine cause - in - fact should be
used.