Sentences with phrase «factual causation which»

Maybe it would be open on the evidence for the trier of fact to make that inference, but it wouldn't amount to a hill of beans, even a campfire's worth, unless the inference was of a necessary connection in which case «substantial» is meaningless, if the issue is factual causation which is clearly what's referred to in para. 10 of Clements.

Not exact matches

1) Circular causation involves factual situations where it is impossible for the plaintiff to prove which one of two or more possible tortious causes are the cause of the plaintiff's harm;

There's at least a half - dozen, maybe more, cases released since March 2007 in which the lawyers have argued about factual causation, and the judges have written reasons dealing with factual causation issues, not mentioning the SCC's decision in Resurfice v Hanke 2007 SCC 7 and clearly argued and decided based on the case law predating Resurfice.

As the SCC just repeated in R. v. Maybin, 2012 SCC 24 at para. 16: «Legal causation, however, is a narrowing concept which funnels a wider range of factual causes into those which are sufficiently connected to a harm to warrant legal responsibility.»

At least one of the negligent persons» conduct was, for law, not a cause not a probable factual cause, at least based on a valid application of the but - for test which we are told, again, is the only approved method of establishing factual causation.

I am still trying to get my head around your earlier objection when you said «But the SCC has now suggested that some cases which ARE factual causation are going to be treated as material contribution cases where there isn't factual causation?»

Getting back to my point, which relates to the use of «clarify», in Resurfice [Resurfice v Hanke, 2007 SCC 7] McLachlin CJ didn't seem to think that there was all that much confusion «in this area» — meaning the area of factual causation.

I also still think that you were wrong when you said «But the SCC has now suggested that some cases which ARE factual causation are going to be treated as material contribution cases where there isn't factual causation?»

As I've said to others, were I a trial judge who sat on civil trials before Resurfice, I'd not know whether to be bemused or astounded at the suggested that the version of material contribution I applied then — which would have been the Athey version — was NOT a test for proof of factual causation on the balance of probability.

I've not spilled quite as much real ink (online is different) about the recent SCC decision in Resurfice v. Hanke which has one of those «out of the blue» pronouncements of law that had nothing to do with the disposition of the issues in case: the SCC's declaration that fault and increased risk may sometimes be enough to satisfy tort's causation requirement, even though the injured person can not establish, on the balance of probability, that the fault was a (factual) cause of the injury.

Resurfice seemingly declared an entirely different meaning for material contribution or materially contributed which eliminated the need, under that that test, to prove factual causation on the balance of probability and, in so doing, removed the concept of «material contribution» or «materially contributes» from the but - for lexicon.

There are BCCA decisions which suggest that where the parties have lead expert evidence on the issue of factual causation — certainly where both sides do, perhaps even where just one side «leads» the evidence, the robust and pragmatic approach can not be used.

And if it's not about factual causation, then it couldn't have been intended as a replacement for Athey material contribution which (whatever it meant) was, seemingly, about factual causation, right?

I'm trying to gather anecdotal information as to whether the SCC decision in Resurfice v Hanke, 2007 SCC 7 and the «material contribution» doctrine mentioned in the case are helping plaintiffs get before - trial settlements — by using the Resurfice «material contribution» notion to get them past difficulties in proving factual causation using the «but - for» test — which are settlements that they might not have been able to get before Resurfice.

There is now a limited category of case in which Canadian common law doctrine holds that a finding of fact that there is a possibility of factual causation is sufficient for that aspect of the causation requirement.

The trial judge noted the distinction between the «but for» test for factual causation and the «material contribution to the risk of injury» test, but ultimately found this case not to be the exceptional one in which the material contribution test to determine cause - in - fact should be used.