The court affirmed the trial court judgment holding in
favor of defendant because plaintiff failed to allege or show that: (1) landlord had actual knowledge or reason to know of the presence of chipping, peeling, and flaking lead paint and that such condition was hazardous, and (2) landlord was given reasonable opportunity to correct hazard.
In Brown v. Wheeler, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court judgment holding in
favor of defendant because plaintiff failed to allege or show that: (1) landlord had actual knowledge or reason to know of the presence of chipping, peeling, and flaking lead paint and that such condition was hazardous, and (2) landlord was given reasonable opportunity to correct hazard.
Not exact matches
The Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005 was
favored by businesses likely to be
defendants in future class action lawsuits (such as manufacturers),
because state civil procedure law in some U.S. states such as California, is more favorable to class action plaintiffs than federal civil procedure laws related to class actions.
Believing this evidence to be crucial to his case, Schaefer asked the court to enter judgment in his
favor because the evidence had been in the sole control
of the
defendant, and it was their duty to preserve it.
The arbitrator granted summary disposition in
favor of the
defendants, finding that: (1) CHSI was not a proper respondent to the action and that Weirton failed to state claims against CHSI; (2) all
of Weirton's claims, except for the breach -
of - contract claim against Quorum, were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel; (3) Weirton's breach -
of - contract claim against Quorum was time - barred under the applicable Tennessee statute
of limitations; (4) Weirton's tort claims were alternatively barred by the gist -
of - the - action doctrine; and (5) Weirton's unjust enrichment claim was barred
because of the parties» contracts (the «Second Award»).
Acting on a motion for summary judgment filed by Hueston Hennigan, U.S. District Court Judge William H. Orrick held that although courts «sparingly grant summary judgment in trademark cases
because they are so fact - intensive,» the evidence here tilted so heavily in
favor of the
defendants as to make summary judgment appropriate.
This is
because the award
of zero dollars may mean that the jury intended to find in
favor of the
defendant.
The plaintiff thereupon brought his writ
of error, and this court reversed the judgment given in
favor of the
defendant and remanded the case with directions to dismiss it
because it did not appear by the transcript that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction.
Court reversed trial court judgment in
favor of plaintiffs, holding that
defendants could not be held liable for conspiring to interfere with contractual relations
because they were a party to the contract.