Sentences with phrase «feelings of other actualities»

Not exact matches

But his insistence that» [t] he envisaging creativity, the continuum of extension, B's anticipatory feeling of C, the disjunctive plurality of attained actualities, the multiplicity of eternal objects, and the primordial nature of God are all alike involved in the creation of C's dative [i.e., purely receptive] phase» (326) would lead one to believe that some sort of objective medium must he present to facilitate the transmission to the new occasion of so many non-objective factors in its self - constitution (e g creativity, the anticipatory feelings of B and other past occasions, the multiplicity of eternal objects, the divine primordial nature, etc.).

By virtue of this felt quality, we know ourselves as actualities within a world of other actualities.

The sense of the presence of the other involves a feeling of the concrete actuality of the other, of being truly present to another, of being less concerned to shape and control the other, of letting the other be himself in his concrete freedom.

What is at least analogical in the scheme is the idea of prehension as dependence of an actuality on other actualities, or of participation, feeling of feeling, experience of experience, together with sense of futurity.

The objective content of conformal feelings constitutes reality as experienced, for it embodies our direct confrontation with other actualities (Adventures of Ideas 269).

Given his dipolar theism, Hartshorne must also be interpreted in this passage as affirming not that the «eternal abstractor» has an immutable vision of the categories in every actuality but that each divine feeling recognizes anew that it bears a categorial essence which will also have been borne by all other divine feelings.

As Charles Hartshorne has suggested, it may be that feeling of feeling is an ultimate principle, applicable to deity and every other singular actuality.

Finally, Whitehead's methodology of descriptive generalization would, on the micrological view, be seen as belonging within a particular tradition, i.e., as involving what might be called a «metaphysical reduction» of the empirical world to some foundational and actual element, on the same methodological lines as Leibniz's monads, Bradley's substrative feeling, Alexander's space - time matrix, or Heidegger's Being.12 In other words, Whitehead's actual entities are conceived as having a special kind of actuality of their own as the ground or foundation from which the empirical world derives.

Exclusive attention to the integration of physical feeling, on the other hand, can ignore the way these are originally rooted in a multiplicity of past actuality.