Sentences with phrase «finite beings»

It's such a curse to have that knowledge, but have only the filters of our finite beings with which to attempt to deal with that knowledge.
6) Finally, for Suarez essence and existence are really the same and only conceptually distinct, even in finite beings, while for Aquinas they are really distinct in all finite beings, and really the same only in God.
The awesomeness of the world requires that finite beings «partialize» it in order to relate to it at all.
(It is questionable, therefore, whether even an eschatological fulfillment for finite beings could be one in which the divine presence completely obliterates the futurity (mystery) of God.)
ANy higher being who doesn't have severe psychological issues of his own to worry about would know who and what he is and not care what any finite beings think one way or the other about him.
In order to anticipate for the reader the line of argument to be followed and so to facilitate progress, it will first be urged that the concept of God's operation as an enduring, active support of cosmic reality, must be elaborated in such a way that this divine operation itself is envisaged as actively enabling finite beings themselves by their own activity to transcend themselves, and this in such a way that if the concept holds good in general, it will also hold good for the «creation of the spiritual soul» (see below, section 3a).
And for the same reason, causality can in this perspective of movement from within by being as such, be attributed to finite beings in regard to what is more than themselves.
God's operation in regard to the human soul loses its predicamental, intra-mundane appearance when it is recognized as exemplifying the concept which we have attempted to work out as appropriate to the relation between God and finite beings in their activities and change.
It has given infinite consequences to the acts of finite beings, crushing the soul with a responsibility too great for mortals to bear.
The nominalists concluded that our speech about God could only be equivocal: As finite beings, we can have no concepts that capture the infinite being of the infinitely transcendent God.
Nevertheless it is true that Hartshorne's position on creation, according to which it is metaphysically necessary that there be contingent finite beings, entails that it is not within divine power to bring it about that nothing exists other than God.
But Hartshorne effectively replies that, even if finite beings depend for their existence on the creative activity of God, it still remains true that if God had created a different world then He would have been somewhat different from the way He actually is by virtue of the fact that His perfect knowledge would have been of that world rather than of this world; and so the point still holds that divine cognitive relations to the creatures are partially constitutive of God.7
In short, as finite beings, possessing a combination of personality assets and liabilities, all of us fall short of these ideals
ah, yes... two finite beings made an infinte being so angry that it's been punishing us ever since.
Having said this, we must not forget, however, that it is also appropriate to think of ourselves as finite beings, limited by biological and historical constraints.
Everything in this world has a cause for its existance outside itself because we are finite beings.
If we were simply finite beings, interchangeable members of a species that perpetuated itself through our reproduction, death might simply be a component — even a necessary component — of life.
Based on the evidence that we as finite beings with finite perception have gathered, it is a pretty good guess.
It would seem, therefore, that we can understand historically why persons find themselves talking in this context without supposing that they are forced to do so by the nature of things or by their apprehension of God as the cause of finite beings.
The third shows that the totality of finite beings must still remain contingent and hence dependent for its being on that which possesses being in itself and by necessity.
For me, believing that I am a finite being makes that time more precious, not pointless.
As J. I. Packer has put it, «Scriptures expressing the reality of God's emotions (joy, sorrow, anger, delight, love, hate, etc.) abound, and it is a great mistake to forget that God feels — though in a way of necessity that transcends a finite being's experience of emotions.»
In his presentation, the argument that God exists as self - existent cause of all finite being is established first, and the problem of analogical predication follows.
The finite is grounded in the Infinite in its being, knowing and acting.
To be concretely finite is no predicament we should wish to escape, no bondage from which to yearn a liberation; it is simply not to be God.
Either way, the concept that the universe is finite is nothing new, this is just more evidence in favor of it.
If god is that powerful, he could choose not to do what you (the finite being with a small amount of brain power) think is right.
Descartes conceives that the idea of a perfect and infinite being can not come from him, an imperfect and finite being, and consequently that this conception must come from God.
For one thing, that Whitehead's God is in no sense the ground of finite being, as Neville holds, is by no means undisputed.
I can, to some degree, sympathize with the agnostics, but for a finite being whose life is here and gone like a vapor, to KNOW and PRONOUNCE that there is no God, well that's just silly.
Here God's eternal character and purpose refer to his personal attributes which can to some extent be embodied by a finite being sharing the same character and purpose, in contradistinction to God's metaphysical attributes, which indicate his uniqueness from all finite beings (PC, pp. 191 - 92).
Consequently it would transgress the principle of sufficient reason if we were to attempt to imagine that a finite being could give itself this true increase of being which is not a mere modification.
The genuine causality of finite being would be endangered, and all the problems would arise regarding the correct understanding of the ontological relation between infinite being and finite beings which we have already indicated as the starting - point of all these reflections.
16 That does not mean that any operation at all of a finite being must or can be regarded as self - transcendence.
If this is all that is said, an explanation is given (in the sense of course in which metaphysical statements aim at «explaining» anything) of the aspect in which the act is more, but not how the act founded and sustained in that way, is not only the act of the finite being because it is received in it, as Aquinas puts it, but also because it is posited by it as a cause.
Man is a finite cognitive being who is immanently present to himself precisely because, on the occasion of any particular finite being that manifests itself to him as he encounters it in experience, his cognition is intrinsically orientated and tends towards being in general.
here everything depends on the fact that God is already given through the transcendence, and precisely where something finite is the object of knowledge.
In that case it is hard to see why such a created entity, communicated to the faculty of the finite being, could not lastingly belong to it, and why, therefore, we may not consider as conceivable the very thing that defenders of physical premotion attack as metaphysically meaningless, namely, that a faculty or power, understood to be an active power, could bring itself from potency to act, of itself, of course on the basis of conservatio and concursus, which latter, however, would not create some intermediary between potency and act but simply posit potency and act.
For precisely all that has been said can also be objected to the doctrine of the immediate creation of every human soul in the course of history, if this creation makes of God's action in a special manner a member of the chain of created causes, even if only in regard to a particular finite being, which in contrast to others and by its special individual and temporal features has no intra - mundane ground and basis.
If it is taken to consist in a finite being's operation having its ground in the universal causality of God, because every reality of being must be sustained by God's creative omnipotence, then the concursus appears to be merely an application and extension of conservation.
Nor however can the production of a new increasing reality and being by a finite cause be understood as the act of the finite being alone, with the divine causality understood as a conservation and as a concursus which only continues the conservation in the order of act.
They realise that Catholic faith has an inherent intelligibility and structure in which the Infinite and the finite are reconciled, not played off against each other.»
Therefor those that think would realize that a finite being as yourself would not be in a good position to question an infitine being on matters of morality.
The finite is the concrete, the concrete includes the abstract.
And what is interesting here, I think, is that while the standard view of omnipotence does not appear to entail that beings other than God are devoid of power, it does entail that the exercise of power on the part of any finite being is importantly conditioned, i.e., it is contingent upon God's willingness to refrain from exercising some power of his own.
Backing away from the monopolistic and standard views, I should think that the first diminutive would be this: With respect to any finite being, an omnipotent being has power to completely determine some of its activities (e.g., its walking activities), but does not have power sufficient to completely determine all of its activities (e.g., not its talking activities).
it does not allow for the possibility that the Infinite might reveal itself to the finite (or assumes that the finite is all there is — a closed system).
God is necessary to every finite being, but no particular finite being is necessary to God, Love in God must involve what is required for love among the creatures and between God and the creatures, yet God remains God, involved in the history of the creatures as the being upon whom they all depend.
The ritual act withdraws us from the ordinary world of mortality and limitation into a special space, time and action in which the mundane and finite is transformed into something of eternal quality.
«Consequently, since existence is nothing else than an essence constituted in act, just as an actual essence is formally limited by itself, or by its intrinsic principles, so, too, created existence has limitation from its very essence, not as it is a potency in which it is received, but because, in reality, it is nothing else than the very actual essence itself» (On the Essence of Finite Being as Such.
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