Sentences with phrase «finite entity»

Having felt the sting of an oil crisis a few years prior and realizing that, indeed, fossil fuel is a finite entity, Americans began seriously considering (and buying) small, economical cars.
If we say it can only contain a finite number, then we must adopt one psychological theory or another to provide a description of consciousness as some sort of finite entity.
This gives us an interpretation of Whitehead's otherwise mysterious comments that each finite entity is prehended into God's (consequent) nature without the loss of immediacy — or in different words, without the loss of the «unison of immediacy,» of «mutual immediacy;» or of the «unison of becoming» (Process 340, 346, 349, 350, 351).
Therefore, even on Whitehead's original understanding, God and each finite entity mutually prehend each other which means, on the definition provided above, that God is contemporaneous with every actual entity.
First, the finite entity experiences the objective - case creativity of the past actual entities in its actual world.
Perhaps God may not be able to coerce or even perfectly predict the decisions of each finite entity and yet, given the conceptual resources of the primordial nature, God may know the general outcome in the long run.
Thus, we might say that God knows only the range of possibilities toward which his own concrescence is headed at any moment and the range of possibilities toward which the concrescence of some finite entity is headed.
It is the desire to realize in a finite entity the ideal of unity; to express in a specific conditioned social order the ideal of unconditioned unity (MT 102f.)
It does mean, however, that while every future finite entity» will prehend and thus «know» that finite entity only as a completed concrescence, God will prehend and thus «know» the concrescence in its subjectivity.
God knows only that the outcome of a concrescence (his own or some finite entity's) will be similar to X (or perhaps similar to X or to Y or to Z, etc.).
Because God is fully creative in all senses and, thus, the model of subjectivity and vivid feelings, and because God feels the finite entity during its concrescence (and not just after it has achieved its stasis), it follows that God feels the world with a constant freshness and rich intensity that Whitehead's own position prevented him from fully articulating.
That means that God is present throughout all stages of the finite entity's concrescence.
Thus, God not only» knows perfectly, and preserves perfectly; the finite entity's final satisfaction, but in addition God knows and preserves the entity's joys and sorrows, hopes and fears as they happen.
The finite entity may lack consciousness and may want the powers of thought and language to become aware of this experience, or the finite entity may suppress that foundational experience during its concrescence as it develops its «normal» modes of consciousness and articulates its «practical» and «secular» concerns, but the experience of God's eternity is never wholly absent.
God prehends each finite entity and is prehended by each finite entity.
Second, the finite entity» prehends God at the beginning of its concrescence.
The divine concrescence contains many parts, specifically it includes the prehensions of each finite entity.
There are some technical problems with the claim that God is contemporaneous or simultaneous with every other entity; 26 I will propose, however, two definitions of contemporaneity that apply to the relation of God and a finite entity.
I can explain this as follows: each finite entity; in experiencing God during God's concrescence, has a direct access to the divine eternity itself.
Second, as I also argue in the main text, each finite entity, because it derives its creativity - esse from God, actually makes contact with God's eternity I confess, however, that this contact takes place adverbially; that is, behind our backs and in the corner of our eye — not directly before us.
Moreover, in the case of God, the finite entity prehends God during God's concrescence.
In short, God and the finite entity must be contemporaneous.
With respect to the second point, it is also clear that no finite entity is able to have more than a perspectival prehension of the society to which it belongs.
For this myth does not assume that the universe is a self - subsistent, finite entity, as does the secular myth.
The definite finite entity is the selected mode which is the shaping of attainment; apart from such shaping into individual matter of fact there is no attainment.
That which can give being to everything that is can not be understood as one finite entity among others, or as merely the first in a long series of causal agents.
So long as the existence of any finite entity is acknowledged, the basic argument follows from its insufficiency to a self - sufficient existent.
A prehension likewise is «a prehensive occasion; and a prehensive occasion is the most concrete finite entity, conceived as what it is in itself and for itself, and not from its aspect, in the essence of another such occasion» (SMW 104f).
Leibniz saw clearly that this definition of substance means that finite entities must also then be devoid of any power to affect other entities.
It is the simple recognition that there are finite entities and subsequent reflection on what this means.
On the other hand, many sophisticated intellectuals are prevented by their theories from recognizing the simple fact that there are finite entities.
Philosophically this may be stated as the fact that the essence of finite entities does not imply their existence.
Nevertheless, Mascall's own procedure is to argue first for the existence of objective finite entities.
Furthermore, it must differ from all finite entities in having the ground or power of its being in itself, for otherwise we would have to posit an infinite regression of beings deriving their being from other beings.
Mascall sees that if he is to establish his case for natural theology in the context of modern philosophy, he must refute those epistemological views that lead to the denial of the existence of finite entities.
Presumably Hare and Madden are in reality advocating a kind of quasi-coercive power which would not so much frustrate the desires of finite entities that already are in the scheme of things as prevent new desires and aims from coming into being if they do not stand a very strung chance of gaining satisfaction or if they greatly disrupt the harmony and rhythm by which desires are guaranteed a better chance of satisfaction.
Likewise implied are belief in God as one who is both supremely loving and universally loved and the existence of a world of finite entities as the dialectical counterpart to the reality of a loving God.
Humanity, nation, wealth, industry — these are all hut finite entities, neither good nor bad in themselves; in their rightful place they become ministers to the best; regarded and treated as self - sufficient and self - justifying they become destructive to self and others.
11 More precisely, Whitehead specifies the two different terms as follows: the phrase «actual entity» includes both the infinite entity which is God and also finite entities, while the phrase «actual occasion» is only used when statements about God are excluded.
At the same time, however, God eliminates no choice ever made by the finite entities, which are themselves infinite in number.
In part — and here Whitehead differs profoundly from the deconstructionists — the new options come from the past finite entities, but ultimately they come from God who is the womb of potentiality.
But God is eternal in the sense that these finite entities are taken up into the divine concrescence where each stage and each element in the divine life is co-present with every other.
For example, even God's gift of an initial subjective aim for the new concrescence depends on the character of the past finite entities, that is, on the character of the new entity's actual world.
Rather, Whitehead worked out a sophisticated account of concrescence that (a) allows the use of «before» and «after» in reference to the various stages of concrescence while (b) also affirming that each stage of the concrescence is fully present to every other stage.30 In finite entities, the concrescence has «bounds,» that is, we can assign temporal limits «within which» a finite concrescence takes place.31 God's concrescence is not so bounded.
The finite entities chose some options and excluded others, which is a type of finitude.
A similar argument could be made in relation to the need for novel characteristics not found in the past in order to account for the emergence of genuine novelty Neither the past nor the present finite entities can provide that novelty.
God, in contrast to the finite entities, originates from the conceptual or mental pole (Whitehead, Process 87, 224, etc.).
At the level of creativity - characterization, the new entity is related to God in a way no different in principle than its relation to finite entities in its past.

Not exact matches

Plantinga does believe that God has the power to create or not create finite, self - determining entities, but he strongly denies that the relationship between finite, self - determining entities and God's control over them is, therefore, not a necessary one.
Every entity has a finite period — for a mind, a microgeny — over which it becomes.
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