If God seeks maximum enhancement of value within the realm of
finite occasions, then he would not seem to favor some value realizations over others.
What does follow is that in some sense God relishes the realization of value by
all finite occasions and societies of occasions and the maximization of value for the whole world community.
Although Whitehead has successfully avoided the traditional problem of evil by his dipolar doctrine of God, he seems to have presented us with another problem of evil in the sense that God is not only unavoidably implicated in the actions of
finite occasions, but to the extent that pleasure is realized by occasions God derives enjoyment in his consequent nature also.
On the other hand,
finite occasions are absolutely transcended by subsequent actualities, having no other being than that afforded by their objective status in the transcendent creativity.
As Whitehead conceives it, the primordial nature embraces all eternal objects as the source from whence all initial aims for
finite occasions are derived.
Nor is this contention weakened by Whitehead's statement that God's experience originates from conceptual feelings while the experience of
finite occasions originates from physical feelings.
This line of reasoning, however, applies only to actual occasions God's feelings do not employ negative prehensions to effect perspectival elimination.6
Finite occasions prehend other occasions from spatiotemporal standpoints which are different from those occupied by the occasions prehended, and therefore their prehending must be perspectival.
This has been widely recognized, but we wish to go further and claim that the actuality required is provided supremely by, the living immediacy of
the finite occasions, the exclusive sharpness of the very act of decision whereby one value becomes actual.
Having none of his own, he must utilize the decisions of
finite occasions to provide him with the means for temporal experience.
God and only God is able to prehend another occasion completely;
finite occasions necessarily «murder to dissect,» and are capable of prehending only a portion of a predecessor's satisfaction.
To comment on such happenings by saying that God always provides the information needed to make the better outcome possible, but
finite occasions willfully and freely ignore that information — to make this claim is ridiculous.
This is a very natural modification, since it is the same way
finite occasions interact with one another.
Only
finite occasions are capable of actualizing, i.e., of reducing the manifold alternatives of what might be to one single determinate fact.
It is true that God provides the initial aim for
every finite occasion, which means that God originates the process toward self - realization.
Even though the prehensions in question are not conscious, surely one would be hesitant to attribute to
a finite occasion the envisagement of a nondenumerable multitude of possibilities from which to select its subjective aim.
To say that God is God is to say that he is always active, living, «moving out» to express his nature, rejoicing in every expression of it, tenderly and compassionately entering into relationship with
every finite occasion to give it a similar joy in actualizing all that may possibly be available for it, and accepting into himself all that is achieved in the world.
Therefore, only when a satisfaction is concerned with the partial envisagement of
a finite occasion would the fundamental principles of process break down; in the completeness of God's vision such a breakdown can not occur.
Not exact matches
A prehension likewise is «a prehensive
occasion; and a prehensive
occasion is the most concrete
finite entity, conceived as what it is in itself and for itself, and not from its aspect, in the essence of another such
occasion» (SMW 104f).
Infinite concrescent activity creates only that which is infinite (the domain of real possibilities, which is infinitely diverse for every
occasion), and requires the
finite to create the finitely determinate, which is the final terminus of the creative thrust.
Vast as the actual world is, and insistent as actual
occasions are upon realizing novelty, the potential variety contained in the actual situation is
finite.
The problem with the mathematical continuum is that there is no immediate successor to any temporal instant in the continuum; hence, the need for
occasions of
finite duration, the coming to be of which is at once, indivisible.2
We maintain that the actual
occasions coming to be at once are
finite, without an internal past, present, or future.
Once a
finite quantum of space - time has been actualized by the concrescence of a new
occasion, the quantum may be divided into smaller parts in accordance with the mathematics of the continuum.
Hence by «actual entity» I shall mean «
finite actual entity» (i.e., «actual
occasion»).
But the newspapers are full of strolling women / falling piano - type incidents that just would not come to pass were God to operate in the world by providing information about the world, information not otherwise available, through the subjective aims he offers to
finite actual
occasions.
Whitehead's reconciliation involved combining the earlier point, that all actualities in the world are
occasions of experience, with the idea that God is the chief exemplification, not the exception to, the metaphysical principles applicable to all
finite actualities.
First, God prehends every component of the satisfaction of every actual
occasion; nothing in the domain of
finite actuality is excluded.
Their alternative speculative suggestion is that a realm of
finite actual
occasions has always existed, that it exists as necessarily as does God, and that the basic God - world relation belongs to the very nature of things.
If so, our endeavor becomes once more interpretive, hopefully illuminating such passages as: «In this way God is completed by the individual, fluent satisfactions of
finite fact, and the temporal
occasions are completed by their everlasting union with their transformed selves, purged into conformation with the eternal order which is the final absolute «wisdom»» (PR 527; italics added).
The relationship of the
finite creature with the supremely worshipful and unsurpassable deity is being affirmed; and along with it there is also affirmed the possibility of its becoming on
occasion a matter of conscious knowledge on the part of the human, as it is always a present reality in the very nature of God himself.
God is the chief actual entity, yet by his reversal of the ordering of physical to conceptual feeling, he maintains a necessary, systematic contrast to all
finite actual
occasions.
Whitehead asserts that «every
occasion of actuality is in its own nature
finite.
The fact remains the actual
occasion — the ingression of the associated (infinite) hierarchy together with various
finite hierarchies in the modes of memory, imagination, and anticipation (SMW 170f.
And the many temporal
occasions giving fluency to the
finite world are completed and gain permanence by their everlasting union in the consequent nature of God.
Man is a
finite cognitive being who is immanently present to himself precisely because, on the
occasion of any particular
finite being that manifests itself to him as he encounters it in experience, his cognition is intrinsically orientated and tends towards being in general.
This additional factor can not be an enabling factor, since the totality of
finite causal factors was sufficient in itself to allow the
occasion to actualize itself.
Hence each
occasion (and more particularly every «good»
occasion) may be seen as an «incarnation» of deity under the conditions of
finite creativity.
11 More precisely, Whitehead specifies the two different terms as follows: the phrase «actual entity» includes both the infinite entity which is God and also
finite entities, while the phrase «actual
occasion» is only used when statements about God are excluded.
A
finite actuality or
occasion of experience exhausts its creativity (its only power of transcendence) in a momentary act of self - unification, to be superseded by others.
In line with previous publications (e.g., Society and Spirit 127 - 29 and The Divine Matrix 57), I also argue that God is the source of the creativity at work in the self - constitution of the concrescing actual
occasion since creativity is in the first place the principle of activity for the divine being and only by God's gracious free choice likewise the principle of activity for
finite actual
occasions.
I argue that God exists in all three time - dimensions simultaneously: as a determinate past actuality in virtue of the divine consequent nature, as an indeterminate future reality in virtue of the divine primordial nature, and as a concrescing present reality in virtue of the ongoing integration of the divine primordial and consequent natures.1 Yet, while I agree with Ford that there is no way for
finite actual
occasions objectively to prehend that integration of the primordial and consequent natures within God even in terms of their own self - constitution here and now, I would also contend that
finite actual
occasions still feel the feelings of God toward themselves as a result of that integration of the primordial and consequent natures within the divine being.
There's a moral grandeur to these
finite creatures [concrescing actual
occasions] recognizing the contributions others make to what they achieve, thus recognizing the ways their achievements might contribute to what others make, and shaping their own efforts in the light of these interoccasional dependencies.
Yet, given the logical problems connected with the notion of a
finite actual entity somehow prehending the objective integration of the primordial and consequent natures within God (as indicated above), it makes sense to think of God's influence on the concrescing actual
occasion simply in terms of divine feelings vis - à - vis objective possibilities already present in the world as a common field of activity for God and all
finite actual
occasions.
Where I differ from Oomen is in my proposal that a
finite actual
occasion does not directly prehend the objective integration of the primordial and consequent natures within God but only the results of that integration, namely, God's feelings toward itself as mediated in and through the
occasion's prehension of the objective structure of the world within which it is concrescing.
To be honest, I, too, have on
occasion found comfort in such facile explanations for the nation's abject failure to deal with so many glaring problems, including several of interest to readers of car magazines: the pervasive failure to address global warming and
finite supplies of fossil fuels; tens of thousands of road fatalities year in and year out; the burgeoning safety risk caused by in - car communications and telematics; the failure to maintain the roads we've got while creating better ones and efficient alternatives; and, of course, our continued inability to buy new Peugeots in the United States.