The contrarian approach is to look
for mean reversion in both fundamentals and valuation.
De Bondt and Thaler's findings stand the conventional wisdom on its head and show compelling evidence
for mean reversion in stocks in a variety of forms.
It seems like that diminishes the opportunities
for mean reversion in larger, more liquid names.
Not exact matches
This
means that materials could be ripe
for mean reversion, representing one of the most attractive entry points
in recent memory.
I'm actively looking at my debt and determining if it makes more sense to pay down mortgages (locking
in a guaranteed ~ 4 % return) or investing
in bonds (~ 1 % returns if held to maturity) or stocks (uncertain, but I just wrote an article about the current PE ratio and the inevitable
reversion to the
mean and I believe we are likely headed
for 10 years of low single digit returns).
Understanding margins
in a historical context and investigating the opportunity
for mean reversion is also very important.
From a «consensual positioning» perspective which touches on this current «
mean -
reversion dynamic
in the marketplace: say this big bond rally were to gather steam into a much more punishing squeeze of the «all - time» UST short base (largely due to the previously mentioned lack of «tolerance»
for beginning of year performance pain).
Bogle, 87, called me from his Vanguard office at Valley Forge, Pa., on Wednesday to discuss the hedge - fund redemptions, which he attributes to a surge of competition
in the sector and the inevitable «
reversion to the
mean»
for returns.
I operated
in the world of supply and demand which translates into
reversion to the
mean for an investor.
The mechanism
for the lower returns,
in my view, is not going to be some kind of sustained
mean -
reversion to old - school valuations, as the more bearishly inclined would predict.
The current case
for non-US versus US equities supposes an eventual
mean reversion in historically divergent performance and valuation trends.
For more on standard deviation and
mean reversion, I invite you to download my whitepaper, «Managing Expectations: Anticipate Before You Participate
in the Market.»
Because of a rougher - looking schedule than
in years (I
mean, who really knows until halfway through the season — it was a big surprise to most that the AFCW wasn't tougher
in 2017
for instance, or that the NYG would suck so epically), and no Shazier, and general
reversion to the
mean, and no particular reason to think Ben will be available
for every game... I'll say 10 -5-1 with losses @ Tampa, @ Cin, Carolina, @ Denver, LAC.
In the case of YouGov, this is actually within the normal range of their recent polling (they had the Tory lead at 7 and 8 points in August too) and the MORI poll is probably at least partially a reversion to the mean after an anomalously high 45 % score for the Tories their previous pol
In the case of YouGov, this is actually within the normal range of their recent polling (they had the Tory lead at 7 and 8 points
in August too) and the MORI poll is probably at least partially a reversion to the mean after an anomalously high 45 % score for the Tories their previous pol
in August too) and the MORI poll is probably at least partially a
reversion to the
mean after an anomalously high 45 % score
for the Tories their previous poll.
For now inflation remains tame, but work by the BlackRock Investment Institute suggests some
mean reversion in U.S. core inflation during the course of the year.
John Hussman has a method
for calculating 10 - year expected returns from Shiller PEs that assumes
mean reversion in the PE over the 10 years.
If I were back
in early 1987, would I think that the
mean reversion target
for the VIX should be 18.94?
Given the strength of the
mean reversion effect
in volatility,
for the VIX to stay elevated
for a long period of time requires a series of crises akin to what we had
in 1998 - 2002.
Claugus is also very interesting
in that he generally trades against the market, looking
for mean reversion situations.
Hi Professor Damodaran,
In discussing mean reversion for broad equity indexes, here are a few factors that seem potentially relevant, which I didn't find mention of in your post: 1) Technology network effect: technology revolutions (electricity, transistor, computer, internet, etc) engender decades - long streaks of further invention and commercializatio
In discussing
mean reversion for broad equity indexes, here are a few factors that seem potentially relevant, which I didn't find mention of
in your post: 1) Technology network effect: technology revolutions (electricity, transistor, computer, internet, etc) engender decades - long streaks of further invention and commercializatio
in your post: 1) Technology network effect: technology revolutions (electricity, transistor, computer, internet, etc) engender decades - long streaks of further invention and commercialization.
I think your point about using CAPE across countries as a way of allocating money across global equity markets is a good one but it does draw on the cross sectional version of
mean reversion, not the time version that many
in the market are using CAPE
for right now.
Looking at this data, at least, the evidence seems strong that a high CAPE today goes with lower stock returns
in future periods, with the
mean reversion becoming stronger
for longer time periods.
The current case
for non-US versus US equities supposes an eventual
mean reversion in historically divergent performance and valuation trends.
All these things look ripe
for mean reversion, which seems to be a key skill
in deep value investing.
In general
for mean reversion adding any kind of stop seems to make the numbers worse.
3) You need to add
in some momentum and weak
mean reversion for asset prices.
Mean -
reversion is involved
in value investing,
in the sense that return on equity
for firms tends to
mean - revert over time.
Perhaps
mean reversion for these strategies still lies
in their future, at which point the typical negative relationship will become evident.
Most of the explanations we have discussed
for the rise
in the CAPE ratio are inherently temporary and are subject to the risk of
mean reversion The CAPE naysayers tend to focus on the reasons why a high CAPE ratio can support a high return and tend to ignore the reasons this may not be the case.
Each of these factors is likely to be temporary; if the rationale
for high multiples goes away, then we'll get
mean reversion in CAPE, possibly as a severe market downturn.
It demonstrates that variance ratios are among the most powerful tests
for detecting
mean reversion in stock prices, but that they have little power against the principal interesting alternatives to the random walk hypothesis.
With asset allocation, you're using the recent performance of you portfolio as a whole to identify the under - performing areas, then to increase your investment
in them
in the expectation that there will be a
reversion to
mean (i.e. the index is selling
for cheaper than what they're «worth»).
I've posted here regularly about the implications of
mean reversion in elevated profit margins (see, for example, The Temptation To Abandon Proven Models In Speculative and Fearful Markets: Why This Time Isn't Different, What Record Corporate Profit Margins Imply For Future Profitability and The Stock Market, Warren Buffett, Jeremy Grantham, and John Hussman on Profit, GDP and Competition
in elevated profit margins (see,
for example, The Temptation To Abandon Proven Models In Speculative and Fearful Markets: Why This Time Isn't Different, What Record Corporate Profit Margins Imply For Future Profitability and The Stock Market, Warren Buffett, Jeremy Grantham, and John Hussman on Profit, GDP and Competitio
for example, The Temptation To Abandon Proven Models
In Speculative and Fearful Markets: Why This Time Isn't Different, What Record Corporate Profit Margins Imply For Future Profitability and The Stock Market, Warren Buffett, Jeremy Grantham, and John Hussman on Profit, GDP and Competition
In Speculative and Fearful Markets: Why This Time Isn't Different, What Record Corporate Profit Margins Imply
For Future Profitability and The Stock Market, Warren Buffett, Jeremy Grantham, and John Hussman on Profit, GDP and Competitio
For Future Profitability and The Stock Market, Warren Buffett, Jeremy Grantham, and John Hussman on Profit, GDP and Competition).
«We are impressed by the inexorable tendency
for reversion to the
mean in security returns.
Unlike asset prices
in general,
for which
mean reversion is a multi-year phenomenon, deviations
in market liquidity away from normal levels are very short lived, often lasting only weeks or months.
Meanwhile, Vince's models find
mean -
reversion in over-extended stocks
for short - term trades of the type Chris did.
That said, the risk premium factor shows that the largest gains tend to come
in the southwest quadrant: low equity valuations and high Baa bond yields, which is a perfect set - up
for mean reversion.
I've studied
mean reversion for years, and it exists
in almost all markets as a weak factor.
-LSB-...] paper also discusses
in some detail a phenomenon that I find deeply fascinating,
mean reversion in earnings predicted by low price - to - book values: Research (
in Fama and French 1992,
for example) shows that -LSB-...]
By Jack Forehand, CFA (@practicalquant) «Importantly,
reversion to the
mean in the investment business extends well beyond the results
for mutual funds.
I don't have a lot of faith
in the market as a whole, so I am biased toward the green zone, looking
for mean -
reversion, rather than momentum persisting.
Also normalize
for the Operating / reported EPS ratio «
mean reversion» if you believe
in mean reversion.
My approach was to play
for the weaker
mean -
reversion effect, and have a lower turnover rate than would be needed
in a value plus momentum strategy.
Trading infrequently, play
in the green zone — don't look
for momentum, look
for mean reversion.
Of course, it does imply
mean reversion & economic flexibility — so you always want to watch out
for the exception: A secular / permanent step - change
in a country's circumstances, and / or an inability to adjust to changing circumstances.
PIMCO wrote that positioning
for mean reversion will be a less compelling investment theme
in a world where realized returns cluster nearer the tails and away from the
mean.
The inherent randomness present
in the natural process of falling sick and healing back makes it an obvious candidate
for mean reversion.
I operated
in the world of supply and demand which translates into
reversion to the
mean for an investor.
The research we present
in this article provides evidence that valuations are a key reason
for this
mean reversion: underperforming managers tend to hold cheaper assets, with cheaper factor loadings, setting them up
for good subsequent performance, whereas recently winning managers tend to hold more - expensive assets.
Because we are pooling across time,
mean reversion in market performance is likely responsible
for a significant portion of this result.