Sentences with phrase «for omnipotence»

There was a gradual substitution of tenderness for sheer power, of goodness for omnipotence, and of deep and intimate concern for arbitrary dictatorship.

As for omnipotence, a being that is the first cause of any change that takes place in the universe, and which causes such a change effortlessly because without changing in itself, can hardly be denied this attribute.

Not exact matches

Hamann critiqued this as a pathetic, prideful parody of God's fiat in creation: «For what is the highly touted reason with its omnipotence, infallibility, effusiveness, certainty, and evidence?

You also misunderstand what omnipotence (all powerful) means, allowing an enti ty under your omnipotence to do something that is contrary to your desire for them, does not mean God isnt omnipotent.

if the Christian god had all the omnipotence his followers proclaimed, he would have designed our brains more like sheep or lemmings, rather than giving us smart inquisitive minds that look for proof... and then not give us any proof.

On the other hand, the proponent of «C» omnipotence maintains that it is not logically possible for God to unilaterally control the activities of self determining beings, even if such activities are intrinsically possible, and, accordingly, can acknowledge that genuine evil is possible (GPE 269f).

For «I» omnipotence, as it is first defined by Griffin, is a universal statement, and universal statements obviously admit of no exception.

Unfortunately, Plantinga, himself, has not explicitly acknowledged the fact that his analysis of the relationship between divine sovereignty and human freedom is basically an attack upon, not a defense of, the view of omnipotence that most classical theists seem to hold; moreover, many such classical theists seem not yet to have perceived this tension for themselves.

Henry also praises Barth for returning divine omnipotence to its proper, preeminent place in Christian dogmatics.

The classical response to nonmoral evil we have been discussing begins by affirming «C» omnipotence in relation to humans and then argues that there do exist good reasons to believe that such a moral world would include instances of genuine nonmoral evil and plausible reasons for assuming that such a world would have the types and amount of genuine nonmoral evil we presently experience.

The process theist indicts the classical theist for proposing a view of divine omnipotence that makes the problem of evil unsolvable — i.e., renders the notion of divine goodness incoherent.

The basic reason for this feeling of superiority is the fact that most influential classical theists — e.g., Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin — have affirmed «I» omnipotence.

The classical theist indicts the process theist for «solving» the problem of evil by forfeiting a meaningful notion of divine omnipotence while the process theist indicts the classical theist for proposing a view of divine omnipotence that makes the problem of evil unsolvable.

The establishment of the doctrine of divine omnipotence has set the stage for problematic attempts to shoehorn love back into the portrayal of divinity without doing injustices either to the notion of love or the understandings of power.

This supplies the context for Ireneaus» unequivocal insistence on the all - encompassing omnipotence of the true God of Christianity.

If there is an eternal torment, it would have to be created by God for the express purpose of punishment, and only by His divine omnipotence would anyone ever be contained within.

«The experience of absolute control over another being, of omnipotence so far as he, she or it is concerned, creates the illusion of transcending the limitations of human existence, particularly for those whose lives are deprived of productivity and joy.

Rather, we find the ground of God's omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence in Jesus» «being there for others».

Omnipotence (alas, our only word for perfection of power!)

For the classical fusion of goodness with omnipotence creates in fact not unity but a profoundly conflicted entity... To heal the internally contradictory religious combination of love and power, power itself first needs recoding.58

Other concepts are also discussed: The meaning of the Word «God, Monotheism, «God» defined, God's existence, Polytheism, Arguments for existence of God, Omnipotence, Omniscience, Immanence and Transcendence, Creation, and God as personal.

The existence of evil, its cause, God's attitude to it, the relation of God's omnipotence to it — these are all matters for an irrelevant metaphysical dissertation.

Even so, Schleiermacher surrendered very little, and his own consciousness's appropriation of God's being, «in relation to us» of course, included and emphasized the traditional attributes of omnipotence, eternity, omnipresence, and omniscience.5 And for him, «immutability» is already contained within the notion of God's eternity.6 Causality within the entire system of nature can be exhaustively accounted for by God's causal activity.7 Following the lead of Aquinas, Schleiermacher declared that there is no distinction between potential and actual in God.8

The redefinition of omnipotence and omniscience provide the groundwork for process thought's unique treatment of theodicy, the question of how the concept of an all powerful yet loving God can be reconciled with the existence of evil in the world.

I am simply saying that omnipotence is a theological compliment Jesus wants you to take back for four reason:

On the other hand, the proponent of «C» omnipotence maintains that it is not logically possible for God to unilaterally control the activities of self - determining beings, even if such activities are intrinsically possible.

Laszlo and others hold a «Semite» model for God (PR 95/146), in which God is understood as absolutely transcendent of the world and, thanks to omnipotence, the determiner of its destiny.

For the attainment of such an end it was necessary that such a being «can in the exercise of its freedom resist and withstand Omnipotence» (DN 20).

A being x has I - omnipotence, you recall, if for every possible state of affairs 5, it is within x's power to cause S to be actual.

If one asks why God imposed such limitations on his omnipotence, the first reply would be: for the sake of humanity (FG 206).

(2) The classical conception of divine omnipotence is found to be faulty in that it concludes that in order for God to be omnipotent that whatever happens must be divinely caused to happen.

Take any traditional objection to accepting the old Platonic analogy of God as the World Soul and it can be shown that the objection stands or falls with aspects of a tradition which philosophy has been moving away from since the middle ages — for instance ideas of sheer infinity, sheer immutability, also what is usually meant by omnipotence.

They are quite right, for example, in pointing out that I enthusiastically reject what David Griffin calls «I - omnipotence.»

But unlike his ability to go around the theological mistake of omnipotence to find a new way of defining divine power, he never transcended his view of a defective immortality to discover the possibilities inherent in the completeness of God's prehensions for providing a more adequate view of a defective immortality to discover the possibilities inherent in the completeness of God's prehensions for providing a more adequate view of immortality.

By «God», of course you mean the deity character in the collection of mythologies known as the bible and by «His Word», you clearly mean the words written by men (but of course they were magically dictated by the deity character because, despite its omnipotence, it was incapable of simply «poofing» «His Word» into existence in the same manner alleged for the rest of the universe).

There is lively debate on the extent, if any to which process thought is an advance on more traditional ways of thinking about omnipotence; for example, see the recent exchange between David Griffin and William Hasker in this journal (29:194 - 236).

They recovered the classical experience of reason as the potential infinity of human questions, showing how this dynamic «ratio» as a desire for understanding is healed and transformed by the paschal - metanoetic experience of faith in the Sophia - Cod of compassion and love.4 Aquinas, for example, understood God as «intimately present within everything that exists since God is existence» and that Cod's omnipotence — Aquinas wrote very little about it — regards not actualities but possibilities, and is best manifested in forgiveness and compassionate mercy.5

For God's omnipotence can create a free responsible being without diminishing created freedom, because divine omnipotence and creaturely responsibility increase together.

It's true that Chad's God has not provided him with enough material to frame an argument for its existence, much less its identity as Creator, or qualities of omnipotence and omniscience, or even status as a necessary being.

For Israel, God was the ultimate reality, he was all power (though that is very different from the concept of omnipotence of later centuries), and he was good — not a being concerned with selfish interests, but his character was grace and love.

For as God is love, so that the affirmation of His love is no afterthought or addendum to a series of propositions about His omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, transcendence, etc.; in similar manner in respect to human nature and activity, to human becoming, to human existence as such, love is no addendum, no afterthought, no extra, but the central reality itself.

If one rejects classical omnipotence, then God is not 0mm - responsible for the evils in the world.

Let us now turn back the pages of time and visit another kind of challenge to the theistic consensus that has accompanied what we have just been observing, as a concomitant undercurrent — namely, that the God of unqualified and opposable omnipotence is, in fact, not the living God of scripture at all but is, for all...

See for example, Hartshorne, Charles, The Logic of Perfection (La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1973), and Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984).

Let us now turn back the pages of time and visit another kind of challenge to the theistic consensus that has accompanied what we have just been observing, as a concomitant undercurrent — namely, that the God of unqualified and opposable omnipotence is, in fact, not the living God of scripture at all but is, for all intents and purposes, no less than dead.

But I have found him minimally making what seems the obvious statement to be explored, namely, that the doctrine of omnipotence is the projection onto God of the wish for absolute, controlling power among human beings.

What is confusion for us is order for Him, what we call chance is designed by Him, thought out from eternity and executed with omnipotence.

This phrase, «God can do all things,» is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent... God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely... everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it can not have the aspect of possibility.

Instead, faith is for him the power, in particular moments of life, to take seriously the conviction of the omnipotence of God; it is the certainty that in such particular moments God's activity is really experienced; it is the conviction that the distant God is really the God near at hand, if man will only relinquish his usual attitude and be ready to see the nearness of God.

The assertion of God's omnipotence is thus no universally valid proposition, to be applied at will, which may be presupposed as a starting - point for a world view.