Value managers are usually looking
for a reversion to a mean; trying to identify assets that they consider undervalued at this point but that they think are going to come back.
There is a BIG «when factor
for reversion to the mean.
The infatuation with growth at any price has reached an historic extreme, as shown, and sets up
for a reversion to the mean, which should be meaningful for value investors.
«We are impressed by the inexorable tendency
for reversion to the mean in security returns.
So if you are looking at something like professional swimming and recording the lap time for Michael Phelps, it won't be a revelation that the outcome (lap timings) stays pretty much consistent with very little scope
for reversion to the mean.
Not exact matches
I'm actively looking at my debt and determining if it makes more sense
to pay down mortgages (locking in a guaranteed ~ 4 % return) or investing in bonds (~ 1 % returns if held
to maturity) or stocks (uncertain, but I just wrote an article about the current PE ratio and the inevitable
reversion to the
mean and I believe we are likely headed
for 10 years of low single digit returns).
For mean reversion to occur, either the gold price needs
to appreciate or share prices need
to fall.
Several years ago, we began working with Jack after discovering that his short - term «
reversion to the
mean» ETF system greatly complimented the Morpheus momentum trading strategy
for individual stocks.
This recent turn of events favoring international equities over U.S. equities could point
to the early makings of a
mean -
reversion following years of outsized gains
for U.S. equities.
From a «consensual positioning» perspective which touches on this current «
mean -
reversion dynamic in the marketplace: say this big bond rally were
to gather steam into a much more punishing squeeze of the «all - time» UST short base (largely due
to the previously mentioned lack of «tolerance»
for beginning of year performance pain).
Bogle, 87, called me from his Vanguard office at Valley Forge, Pa., on Wednesday
to discuss the hedge - fund redemptions, which he attributes
to a surge of competition in the sector and the inevitable «
reversion to the
mean»
for returns.
I operated in the world of supply and demand which translates into
reversion to the
mean for an investor.
The mechanism
for the lower returns, in my view, is not going
to be some kind of sustained
mean -
reversion to old - school valuations, as the more bearishly inclined would predict.
I give Grantham credit
for coming
to this realization (something he has done before) but I wonder how his investors feel about it after years of playing the
mean reversion waiting game.
For more on standard deviation and
mean reversion, I invite you
to download my whitepaper, «Managing Expectations: Anticipate Before You Participate in the Market.»
Because of a rougher - looking schedule than in years (I
mean, who really knows until halfway through the season — it was a big surprise
to most that the AFCW wasn't tougher in 2017
for instance, or that the NYG would suck so epically), and no Shazier, and general
reversion to the
mean, and no particular reason
to think Ben will be available
for every game... I'll say 10 -5-1 with losses @ Tampa, @ Cin, Carolina, @ Denver, LAC.
In the case of YouGov, this is actually within the normal range of their recent polling (they had the Tory lead at 7 and 8 points in August too) and the MORI poll is probably at least partially a
reversion to the
mean after an anomalously high 45 % score
for the Tories their previous poll.
The title has a sly double
meaning, referring both
to protagonist Léo's penchant
for getting horizontal with nearly every person he encounters while tooling around the French countryside, seeking inspiration
for a screenplay he never quite gets around
to writing, and
to the inherent difficulty of just being human, which Guiraudie imagines as a constant battle against
reversion to an animal state.
(Note
for wonks: I estimated the
mean reversion level (which is very close
to the historic
mean, no surprise) by regressing the one - day lagged Old VIX on the Old VIX itself.
Given the strength of the
mean reversion effect in volatility,
for the VIX
to stay elevated
for a long period of time requires a series of crises akin
to what we had in 1998 - 2002.
He credits much of the success of the «formula»
for this but attributes it
to «
reversion to the
mean».
If I use 2002
to 2006 as my OOS sample data
for a
mean reversion test, is that cheating?
I trace my awakening
to the dangers of
mean reversion to the 2008 crisis but I believe that the signs of structural change were around me
for at least a decade prior.
For mean reversion, the two best rankings I have found are 100 - day Historical Volatility (ranking from high
to low) and Rate of Return (3,5,7 day) ranking from most sold off
to least.
But we were very comfortable that the big - picture trends around food consumption were a long - term tailwind that argued
for even better than a
reversion to the
mean.
All these things look ripe
for mean reversion, which seems
to be a key skill in deep value investing.
In general
for mean reversion adding any kind of stop seems
to make the numbers worse.
To paraphrase Mr. Varadi, most of the opportunities arise at the same time so it is really no better than trading a stock index
for mean reversion.
3) You need
to add in some momentum and weak
mean reversion for asset prices.
When it over-or under - shoots it accounts
for this with the assumption of
mean reversion to 15x.
As
for the Treasury market — the yield on the securities will always serve as an aid
to mean -
reversion, and if there is no fundamental change, it will happen quickly.
Mean -
reversion is involved in value investing, in the sense that return on equity
for firms tends
to mean - revert over time.
Most of the explanations we have discussed
for the rise in the CAPE ratio are inherently temporary and are subject
to the risk of
mean reversion The CAPE naysayers tend
to focus on the reasons why a high CAPE ratio can support a high return and tend
to ignore the reasons this may not be the case.
Each of these factors is likely
to be temporary; if the rationale
for high multiples goes away, then we'll get
mean reversion in CAPE, possibly as a severe market downturn.
Valuation - based tactical asset allocation has proven very hard
to execute over time,
for a simple reason: Asset - class valuations do not exhibit much
mean reversion.
The last part of the paper discusses two possible explanations
for mean reversion: time varying required returns, and slowly - decaying «price fads» that cause stock prices
to deviate from fundamental values
for periods of several years.
It demonstrates that variance ratios are among the most powerful tests
for detecting
mean reversion in stock prices, but that they have little power against the principal interesting alternatives
to the random walk hypothesis.
With asset allocation, you're using the recent performance of you portfolio as a whole
to identify the under - performing areas, then
to increase your investment in them in the expectation that there will be a
reversion to mean (i.e. the index is selling
for cheaper than what they're «worth»).
If that's the case, we're at what can be considered a local max
for Apple but it's more likely that as time goes by — and random events pile on — things will never
to the
mean (this is quasi-
mean reversion).
I've posted here regularly about the implications of
mean reversion in elevated profit margins (see,
for example, The Temptation To Abandon Proven Models In Speculative and Fearful Markets: Why This Time Isn't Different, What Record Corporate Profit Margins Imply For Future Profitability and The Stock Market, Warren Buffett, Jeremy Grantham, and John Hussman on Profit, GDP and Competitio
for example, The Temptation
To Abandon Proven Models In Speculative and Fearful Markets: Why This Time Isn't Different, What Record Corporate Profit Margins Imply
For Future Profitability and The Stock Market, Warren Buffett, Jeremy Grantham, and John Hussman on Profit, GDP and Competitio
For Future Profitability and The Stock Market, Warren Buffett, Jeremy Grantham, and John Hussman on Profit, GDP and Competition).
The contrarian approach is
to look
for mean reversion in both fundamentals and valuation.
That said, the risk premium factor shows that the largest gains tend
to come in the southwest quadrant: low equity valuations and high Baa bond yields, which is a perfect set - up
for mean reversion.
It also gives ideas time
to develop;
mean reversion is typically a 3 - 5 year process, so allow time
for this.
This would seem
to somewhat explain
mean reversion of stock prices of low p / b value firms (once Mr. Market realizes he can pay less
for income - generating assets), but doesn't explain earnings growth.
-LSB-...] paper also discusses in some detail a phenomenon that I find deeply fascinating,
mean reversion in earnings predicted by low price -
to - book values: Research (in Fama and French 1992,
for example) shows that -LSB-...]
By Jack Forehand, CFA (@practicalquant) «Importantly,
reversion to the
mean in the investment business extends well beyond the results
for mutual funds.
This goes
to show that
mean reversion is a powerful force
for a proven, repeatable process.
For us though, based on over two decades of data, the sweet spot for mean reversion equity trading tends to be 3 - 7 da
For us though, based on over two decades of data, the sweet spot
for mean reversion equity trading tends to be 3 - 7 da
for mean reversion equity trading tends
to be 3 - 7 days.
We find that what constitutes «excellence»
for managers is most often not the case
for investors... While financial «excellence» is defined by Watermann and Peters is a laudable management achievement, we find that it tends
to produce a high - priced stock with potential
for downward
mean reversion.
My approach was
to play
for the weaker
mean -
reversion effect, and have a lower turnover rate than would be needed in a value plus momentum strategy.