According to the court, «in approving minimization procedures the Court is to ensure that the intrusiveness of foreign intelligence surveillances and searches on the privacy of U.S. persons is «consistent» with the need of the United States to collect
foreign intelligence information from foreign powers and their agents.»
Writing in an article in the FT only yesterday, Litt argued that the NSA's Prism data harvesting program «does not give the US «unrestricted access» to data», claiming: «Rather, the US may obtain communications only relating to specific identifiers, such as an email address or telephone number; only if the US believes those identifiers are being used to communicate
foreign intelligence information; and only with the legally compelled assistance of communications service providers under the supervision of an independent court.»
In its ruling, the court cited the constitutional right to privacy of U.S. citizens, saying Ashcroft's policy «was not reasonably designed or «consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, or disseminate
foreign intelligence information»» as mandated by FISA.
The act also required that «the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain
foreign intelligence information.»
Not exact matches
The NSA may then seek warrants from the secretive courts created by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in order to compel these companies to hand over pertinent
information on terrorism suspects and affiliates.
Your identity has by now been logged into some vast spy database in a
foreign country (probably China), where an
intelligence agency is building up a profile around your persona — sourced from personal
information available on social media and through breached health insurers, airlines, government offices, and the like.
According to the Democrats» memo, the DOJ provided the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court with «contemporaneous evidence» of Russia's interference in the 2016 election;
information about «concerning Russian links and outreach to Trump campaign officials,»; Page's history with Russia - linked individuals and entities; and Page's «suspicious activities in 2016,» including those during a trip he took to Moscow in July of that year, during which he met with high - ranking Russian officials.
In particular, it alleges that the DOJ relied primarily on what it characterized as insufficient and unreliable
information in the so - called Steele dossier to support their application for a
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant targeting Page.
The indictment provided a lengthy list of documents Martin is alleged to have stolen from multiple
intelligence agencies starting in August 1996, including 2014 NSA reports detailing
intelligence information «regarding
foreign cyber issues» that contained targeting
information and «
foreign cyber intrusion techniques.»
More broadly, the Cuba problem has raised questions within the national security community about how the Trump administration is using
intelligence information to guide its
foreign policy.
Rep. Bob Goodlatte has sent requests to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Justice Department seeking information about the surveillance of former Trump foreign policy adviser Carte
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Justice Department seeking
information about the surveillance of former Trump
foreign policy adviser Carte
foreign policy adviser Carter Page.
A FISA warrant application for Page would have included any and all
information the FBI felt a
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) judge should see in order to grant a warrant in the first place.
Though Trump has the power to declassify the
information in the memo (and the underlying
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act documentation), it's unclear as to whether or not he's reviewed it.
The argument is that the warrant, submitted to a
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, relied on dubious
information from the Trump - Russia dossier compiled by former British spy Christopher Steele — and that the judge was not informed about the actual source of the
information.
Carney then reassured reporters that they are only interested in gathering
information on «
foreign intelligence targets» (you know, the kinds that play Angry Birds) not ordinary Americans.
President Trump revealed highly classified
intelligence information to the Russian
foreign minister and ambassador while meeting with them last week at the White House.
That data would also be open to an
information sharing order, potentially to private companies or
foreign intelligence agencies.
«What the United States said, and it appears in the open documents of this case, is that the disclosure of these documents by order of our courts would be «likely to result in serious damage to US national security and could harm existing
intelligence information - sharing between our two governments»,» the
foreign secretary said.
Foreign Secretary David Miliband today lost his attempt to block public disclosure of
intelligence information relating to torture allegations in the case of former Guantanamo detainee Binyam Mohamed.
Apart from that there is the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)[which] is a civilian foreign intelligence agency of the U.S. Government, tasked with gathering, processing and analyzing national security information from aroun
Intelligence Agency (CIA)[which] is a civilian
foreign intelligence agency of the U.S. Government, tasked with gathering, processing and analyzing national security information from aroun
intelligence agency of the U.S. Government, tasked with gathering, processing and analyzing national security
information from around the world.
(7) records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or
information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or to an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local or
foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished
information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or
information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation,
information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual; [the law enforcement exemption]
The memo says the Justice Department relied partly on
information compiled by Christopher Steele when it initially persuaded the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to approve surveillance of Page, according to three anonymous sources who spoke with the New York Times.
Meanwhile, the presiding judge of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court said she had no objection to disclosing legal orders and opinions about the program that targets people linked to al - Qaida, but the Bush administration would have to approve release of the
information.»
Among other things, it establishes the Canadian Security Establishment, and the Minister of Defense's power to order it to sweep the «global
information infrastructure» for «
foreign intelligence».
It is responsible for
foreign signals
intelligence (SIGNIT) and the protection of government electronic
information and communication networks.
The legislation raises a plethora of issues and significantly alters the security landscape: It gives the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS) powers beyond intelligence gathering (to actively target threats and derail plots); creates new offences (criminalizing «terrorist propaganda» and the «promotion of terror»); lowers the legal threshold to trigger detention to those who may carry out an offence from the existing standard of will carry out to may carry out; extends preventive detention for «suspected» terrorists from three days to seven days (inconsistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence); legally entrenches a no fly list; and grants government agencies explicit authority to share private information with domestic and forei
Intelligence Service (CSIS) powers beyond
intelligence gathering (to actively target threats and derail plots); creates new offences (criminalizing «terrorist propaganda» and the «promotion of terror»); lowers the legal threshold to trigger detention to those who may carry out an offence from the existing standard of will carry out to may carry out; extends preventive detention for «suspected» terrorists from three days to seven days (inconsistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence); legally entrenches a no fly list; and grants government agencies explicit authority to share private information with domestic and forei
intelligence gathering (to actively target threats and derail plots); creates new offences (criminalizing «terrorist propaganda» and the «promotion of terror»); lowers the legal threshold to trigger detention to those who may carry out an offence from the existing standard of will carry out to may carry out; extends preventive detention for «suspected» terrorists from three days to seven days (inconsistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence); legally entrenches a no fly list; and grants government agencies explicit authority to share private
information with domestic and
foreign entities.
The NPRM included a provision, in § 164.510 (f)-- Disclosure for Law Enforcement Purposes — that would allow covered entities to disclose protected health
information without consent for the conduct of lawful
intelligence activities under the National Security Act, and in connection with providing protective services to the President or to
foreign heads of state pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3056 and 22 U.S.C. 2709 (a)(3) respectively.
He also concluded that Canadian officials had shared unfounded, unverified and inaccurate
information with
foreign intelligence agencies, setting off the chain of events that ended with him being tortured in a Syrian jail cell.
Maher Arar's case and the cases of Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou - Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin, who were the subject of a subsequent judicial inquiry conducted by former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Frank Iacobucci, also uncovered problems with
intelligence information flowing in the other direction: into Canada from
foreign sources.
«To be clear, FISA's purpose is to collect
foreign intelligence, but without additional meaningful constraints, Congress is allowing the government to use
information collected without a warrant against Americans in domestic court proceedings,» four Senators wrote.