We've spent billions of dollars, locked up so many people we have a higher rate of incarceration than the Soviet Union did, done real harm to some of our most
fundamental Constitutional protections, and for what?
Not exact matches
It will, accordingly, afford
constitutional protection (or the equivalent, among the rights tacitly retained by the people) to the
fundamental human right to personal initiative, including economic initiative.
Conflict may ensue between
constitutional courts and the CJEU, especially in cases where the former are required by the latter to decrease the level of
protection of
fundamental rights afforded by their constitutions.
The scope of EU
fundamental rights protection and the influence of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on this scope is a much discussed topic among EU constitution
fundamental rights
protection and the influence of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights on this scope is a much discussed topic among EU constitution
Fundamental Rights on this scope is a much discussed topic among EU
constitutional lawyers.
In 2013, a couple of months after these decisions were issued, the German Federal
Constitutional Court took the opportunity in a
fundamental rights case to mention the Fransson judgment to openly warn legal operators (the CJEU included) that the CJEU's doctrine «must not be read in a way that would view it as an apparent ultra vires act or as if it endangered the
protection and enforcement of the
fundamental rights in the Member States» (Judgment of the First Senate of 24 April 2013 — 1 BvR 1215/07 — para. 91).
The most fascinating question is whether for the first time the ECJ will authorise a national court to disapply an EU legal provision to protect its national
constitutional identity or higher national standards of
fundamental rights»
protection.
It did so to anticipate challenges to the primacy of EU law by national
constitutional courts and the Court therefore took great care in stressing the autonomous nature of EU
fundamental rights
protection.
[1] On a higher level of abstraction, the plausibility of the Court's reasoning also depends on the view one has of the EU in general: is it an autonomous
constitutional order based on the
protection of
fundamental rights and certain foundational values?
Second, I will explore whether the ECJ can still withdraw from its stance taken in Taricco I without opening the Pandora's box of exceptions to the EU law primacy: either due to national
constitutional identity (Article 4 (2) TEU) or higher national standards of
fundamental rights» protection (Article 53 of the Charter of Fundament
fundamental rights»
protection (Article 53 of the Charter of
FundamentalFundamental Rights).
Essentially, the national court asks whether Simmenthal II applies to the ECHR now that article 6 (3) TEU states that «
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law».
In addition, he states that «a concept demanding
protection for a
fundamental right must not be confused with an attack on the national identity or, more specifically the national
constitutional identity of a Member State.»
If we reach agreement on the
fundamental rights of the citizen, on their definition and
protection in all parts of Canada, we shall have taken a major step towards basic
constitutional reform.
Uniformity or deference to national
constitutional traditions in the
protection of
fundamental rights?
We are dedicated to providing zealous advocacy, community oriented defense and
protection of
fundamental constitutional and human rights.
The Court of Justice reached this decision, which was highly controversial, after conducting a review of the scope of the
protection afforded to communications with in - house counsel across the member states of the EU, and finding there not to be a sufficiently broad consensus on this point to justify the extension of the privilege, given that it was identified as being one of the
fundamental principles of law common to the
constitutional traditions of the member states.
The
protection of communications between attorney and client ultimately relies on
fundamental constitutional rights, such as the right to freedom and confidentiality of correspondence and of every other form of communication (article 15 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic) and the right of defence (article 24 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic).
The Union shall respect
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Com
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Com
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.
Not all judges — not all Supreme Court judges — accept that interpretive
protection of
fundamental constitutional norms is as far as the courts may legitimately go.
Indeed, as noted recently by L.S. Rossi, the ECJ has never identified the
constitutional identity clause enshrined in Article 4 (2) TEU as the privileged arena to deal the multilevel
protection fundamental rights in its case law on the application of.
[39] These are very broad principles, of course, but in Canadian administrative law they tend to equate with, respectively, the
protection of
constitutional fundamentals (including rights) and giving effect to legislative intent.
The use of the
constitutional identity clause, then, should be revisited, in primis among those scholars who have overweighed the respect of the national identity as a «problem - solver», i.e. a means to reconcile the differences between Member States and the Union as far as a different degree of
protection of
fundamental rights is concerned.