The other
fundamental type of entity in Whitehead's philosophy is called the eternal object.
This, after all, is what we should expect, given that eternal objects and actual entities are
the fundamental types of entities in Whitehead's ontology and that «the other types of entities only express how all entities of the two fundamental types are in community with each other, in the actual world» (PR 37).
Not exact matches
My point is that the repetition
of entities of the
fundamental types necessarily carries with it the repetition
of entities of the derivative
types.
The quite
fundamental issue and that which specially concerns us here — for it is that which Professor Buchler's discussion has brought to the fore — is the problem
of the basis upon which a distinction into «kinds» or «
types»
of «
entities» or «existence» is made at all.
Thus, just as in Whitehead's categoreal system the two first - mentioned elements, absolute concreteness and unique occurrence, are united in the concept
of a determinate,
fundamental, categoreal existence (the concept
of an occasion or actual
entity), so the corresponding counter-elements, absolute abstractness and the character
of abiding existence [lmmer - Gewesen - Sein], are joined together in another concept
of an opposite categoreal
type, that
of an utterly abstract
entity, which always was and always is, which Whitehead calls an eternal object.