Sentences with phrase «general warrant»
A general warrant is a legal term that refers to a type of search or arrest warrant that does not specify the person or place to be searched or the items to be seized. It gives authorities broad and unrestricted power to search and seize anything or anyone they want. This type of warrant is considered unconstitutional in many countries because it violates individuals' rights to privacy and protection against unreasonable searches. Full definition
[10] General warrants under s. 487.01 authorize the use of investigative techniques, procedures or devices, or other things to be done, that would otherwise constitute unreasonable searches.
slaw.ca
Citing R. v. TELUS Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16 (CanLII), the Court of Appeal confirmed that, in particular, s. 487.01 (c) is meant to restrict the use of general warrants in circumstances where alternative investigative techniques are available.
«The plain view exception should be narrowed or even eliminated in digital evidence cases to ensure that digital warrants that are narrow in theory do not devolve into general warrants in practice.»
Subsection 487.01 (c) restricts general warrants to cases where «there is no other [legislation] that would provide for a warrant, authorization or order permitting the technique, procedure or device to be used or the thing to be done.»
The central issue in this case is whether general warrants can be used to seize the content of private text messages from telecommunication service providers.
For the Court of Appeal, general warrants under s. 487.01 are to be used «sparingly» as they authorize the use of investigative techniques, procedures or devices, or other things to be done, that would otherwise constitute unreasonable searches.
That privacy interest can not be eroded by the use of general warrants or production orders where the police do not have to establish investigative necessity.
In Clemenza, which did involve serious criminal allegations, the RCMP obtained a general warrant.
Through the «general warrant» power, a judge can authorize police to surreptitiously interfere with private property and engage in conduct that would otherwise be illegal.
And, unlike the execution of a traditional search warrant, where the homeowner is given a copy of the warrant and is aware of the search being conducted, «general warrant» searches are ordinarily carried out in secret, only to be revealed when eventual arrests are made and the investigation is concluded.
Justice Moldaver explained, at para. 80, that this requirement ensures that general warrants are to be used «sparingly» when the «investigative technique is truly different in substance from an investigative technique accounted for by another legislative provision.»
He explained that s. 487.01 (c) serves to ensure that «general warrants may not be used as a means to circumvent other authorization provisions that are available but contain more onerous pre-conditions.»
The recent litigation in Canada regarding production orders that were issued before the amendment to s. 487.012 began with R v Telus Communications Co., [2013] 2 SCR 3 where the Supreme Court of Canada held that a general warrant under s. 487.01 of the Code could not be used to compel a telecommunication company to provide prospective text messages to the police.
A general warrant is governed by s. 487.01 of the Code.
These motions in Croft fell on the heels of the decision in R. v. Telus Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16 where the Supreme Court of Canada held that a general warrant could not be used to authorize the police to seize prospective text messages.
In a case reported as R. v. Telus Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16 the police wanted to seize text messages stored in the databases of Telus under a general warrant.
In the cases I reviewed here, every official in the justice system failed the test — a governing body of the legal profession that released documents to the police without a warrant, a judge who granted a wiretap authorization with a general warrant to search mobile devices without limitation other than a temporal one and a Crown attorney who released privileged information after presumptively reviewing it for disclosure purposes under the Stinchcombe regime.
In this unreported case in the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Q.B. No.: 160544938Q1, at Calgary, the police obtained a general warrant under s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code to search mobile telephones for text messages and other data.
A warrant under s. 487.01 is a general warrant under which a judge can authorize the search and seizure of property.
On February 21, 2017, an application was filed before Justice Glen Poelman, a case management judge under s. 551.1 of the Code, asserting that the general warrant was invalid because it authorized a search and seizure that was overly broad and in breach of ss.
Therefore, the general warrant was invalid and the Crown lost.
As such, the Court of Appeal determined the police had used or attempted to use the general warrant for the «impermissible purpose» of circumventing the standard requirements to obtain the s. 11 warrant.
Mr. Christiansen's convictions were set aside; the Crown «appropriately conceded» that, if the general warrant is found to be invalid (and if the evidence obtained as a result of that warrant were excluded) the convictions against Mr. Christiansen could not stand.
The general warrant was issued, in substance, to search the «Limited Edition» store — in other words, for the same investigative technique which was otherwise available under s. 11 of the CDSA (less the more demanding or «onerous» requirements of that section).
In Telus, Moldaver J. explained at para. 80 that the general warrant should only be used in circumstances where the «investigative technique is truly different in substance from an investigative technique accounted for by another legislative provision» and, further, that 487.01 (c) serves to ensure that «general warrants may not be used as a means to circumvent other authorization provisions that are available but contain more onerous pre-conditions.»
The controversy in Webster stems from the interaction of the general warrant provisions at Section 487.01 (1)(c) and Part VI of the Criminal Code of Canada as they apply to text messages stored on a carrier's server.
For this reason, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Trial Judge had erred in not quashing the general warrant.
In other words, where authorization under Part VI (another provision of the Code) is the appropriate course, a warrant pursuant to the general warrant provisions is invalid.
The language of Section 487.01 (1) suggests that the authority to issue a general warrant is conditional: the word «if» precedes subsection (c) which reads: «there is no other provision in this or any other Act of Parliament that would provide a warrant...»
As such, the general warrant was valid and the defence lost.
On appeal, Mr. Christiansen argues the Trial Judge erred in upholding the general warrant.
R. v. TELUS Communications Co. 2013 SCC 16 Criminal Law — Special powers — Search warrants — Validity of — General TELUS Communications, a wireless telephone service provider, sought to quash a general warrant obliging it to produce, on a prospective daily basis, all future text messages sent and received by two TELUS subscribers that were stored in the TELUS computer database.
The motions judge upheld the general warrant except for the part requiring Telus to reproduce the text messages.
Criminal law: Telus is seeking to quash a general warrant and assistance order, which required the company to produce copies of all text messages sent and received by two of its subscribers over a 14 - day period.
TELUS applied to quash the warrant, arguing that the general warrant was invalid because the police had failed to satisfy the requirement under s. 487.01 (1)(c) of the...
«The general warrant achieved the legitimate aims of the police investigation in a much more convenient and cost - effective manner than any other provision would have allowed,» stated Cromwell.
The two judges disagreed there was a greater privacy infringement as a result of the issuing of a general warrant and noted it was «more responsive» to the needs of police.
They must know — with certainty — that general warrants may not be used as a means to circumvent other authorization provisions that are available but contain more onerous pre-conditions,» said Moldaver.
«The general warrant did not require Telus to intercept communications, but to provide copies of communications that it had previously intercepted for its own lawful purposes,» wrote Cromwell.
The decision written by Abella was joined by only two other judges (Justice Michael Moldaver wrote a concurring judgment, joined by Justice Andromache Karakatsanis, which was more narrow in scope, while Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin and Justice Thomas Cromwell were in dissent and concluded a general warrant was sufficient even for seizure of prospective text messages, because they are stored on the databases of service providers).
In dissent, Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin and Justice Thomas Cromwell concluded a general warrant was sufficient, because Telus legally made copies of the texts.
Police obtained a general warrant, which Telus challenged but was dismissed by the applications judge.
This is tantamount to a general warrant for digital data prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.