Iceland responded that such an obligation of result can not be accepted as inherent in the Directive; in such a case, there would in fact be no remaining discretion for a State to implement the Directive, as in an extreme situation, the State itself would always have to step in to ensure the payment of compensation — at least in cases where the deposit -
guarantee scheme failed (para 102).
Again, however, the provision could not be read as containing an obligation for a state to ensure compensation if a deposit -
guarantee scheme failed «under exceptional circumstances such as in a systemic crisis» (para 147).
For the EFTA Court, the Directive is only made for bankruptcies of individual banks, and therefore it is a normal consequence of a systemic crisis that deposit -
guarantee schemes fail in such situations, leaving the depositors unprotected.
Not exact matches
On points 1 and 2 I'd say I can somewhat see the Court's point that there may be crises of «systemic» magnitude that even a deposit -
guarantee scheme will
fail.
Deposit -
guarantee schemes reimburse a limited amount of deposits to depositors where their bank has
failed.
Based on emergency legislation, domestic deposits had been transferred to a newly created «good» bank after the collapse of the Icelandic Landsbanki but before the Icelandic deposit -
guarantee scheme was activated — and
failed (para 211).