Sentences with phrase «guideline sentence because»

While the Crown presented several questions in its appeal, the dispositive one was whether Judge Paul erred in concluding that Ms. Giroux's actions did not attract the guideline sentence because they were not commercial in nature owing to her lack of anticipated financial gain and / or her lack of knowledge of the exact nature or amount of the drugs in her purse (at para 7).
July 20, 2007)(available here), the Sixth Circuit affirms a district judge's choice of a within - guideline sentence because the «district court offered clear reasons for its sentence [having] articulated the various § 3553 (a) factors and then identified the two factors it found most relevant.»
Does this mean that in some states people should get a below - guidelines sentence because isn't that bad?

Not exact matches

Clearly he got what prisoners might call «a touch» because that sentence is very lenient and well below the usual guideline used by judges in cases involving illegal firearms.
«The guidelines range is high because the United States Sentencing Commission explicitly has recognized the «threat to the integrity of democratic processes» caused by public corruption offenses,» the feds wrote.
It also states that this tends to happen because judges deviate from sentencing guidelines more often when sentencing females.
It makes me very, very sad to think of the number of incredible books we have all missed because of this stupid one - sentence guideline.
July 20, 2007)(available here), the DC Circuit has to vacate and remand a sentence because «the record is muddled as to whether the district court considered [a particular guideline range as the] starting point for its analysis.»
See Vonner, 516 F. 3d at 387 (explaining that a «lengthy explanation» of the sentence chosen may not be required in all cases «because «circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission's own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence»» (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007)-RRB-; see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 356 («The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances.»).
As some may recall (and as detailed in posts here and here), Cavera is the fascinating case in which Judge Sifton decided to enhance a sentence above the guideline range in a gun case because he viewed gun possession in urban spots like NYC to be especially bad.
Federal sentencing fanatics know that the Paul case in the Ninth Circuit is significant because it was arguably the first (and might still be considered the only) circuit ruling that a within - guideline sentence should be reversed as substantively unreasonable.
Because these guidelines are quite broad, judges are given wide latitude when imposing sentences.
The absence of a Justice Department representative was both telling and disappointing, especially because it is very hard to predict how federal prosecutors would view proposals to abolish the US Sentencing Commission or to have a Blakely - compliant mandatory guideline system.
Tomorrow, as detailed on this USSC webpage, the United States Sentencing Commission in scheduled to conduct another public hearing on these topics (in part because the USSC never formally moved forward with any guidelines amendments on these topics because of an incomplete membership).
In Beckles, the Court held that the career - offender guideline's residual clause was not unconstitutionally vague because the advisory federal Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges.
-- arguments that a «Guidelines sentence is not reasonable under § 3553 (a) because it expressly declines to consider various personal characteristics of the defendant.»
But in her submissions, law society discipline counsel Deborah McPhadden urged the panel to ignore the idea, claiming Robinson's case would not have met the guidelines for sentencing circles in criminal matters because of the seriousness of his offence.
The Gage Report into sentencing guidelines in England and Wales has found that some causes of prison overcrowding can not be affected in any way by guidelines and that it is impossible to predict the effect of guidelines because of inadequate data collection.
Because the Sentencing Commission, in enacting the 100:1, did not «exemplify the Commission's exerceise of is characteristic institutional role, it may be that «closer review [of a sentence] may be order when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidleines range based solely on the judge's view that the Guidelines range fails properly to refelct the 3553 (a) considerations even in a mine - run caSentencing Commission, in enacting the 100:1, did not «exemplify the Commission's exerceise of is characteristic institutional role, it may be that «closer review [of a sentence] may be order when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidleines range based solely on the judge's view that the Guidelines range fails properly to refelct the 3553 (a) considerations even in a mine - run casentencing judge varies from the Guidleines range based solely on the judge's view that the Guidelines range fails properly to refelct the 3553 (a) considerations even in a mine - run case.»
He thus would have reversed because the judge should not have sentenced outside the guidelines range.
You may be right that judges tend overwhelmingly to sentence within the guidelines, because they believe that extraordinary circumstances are required to do otherwise.
On the applicability of Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines: The logic of the SG's argument now seems to be that applying Blakely to the guidelines would essentially convert all guideline enhancement into elements, which is constitutionally problematic because only Congress can pass criminal statutes that create elements.
The Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), should apply equally to statutory mandatory minimums as to mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, because the animating principle in Booker is separation of powers, and the mandatory guidelines that Booker rendered advisory had, per Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the same legislative authority as statutory provisions in the United StGuidelines, because the animating principle in Booker is separation of powers, and the mandatory guidelines that Booker rendered advisory had, per Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the same legislative authority as statutory provisions in the United Stguidelines that Booker rendered advisory had, per Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the same legislative authority as statutory provisions in the United States Code.
Sentencing range enhancements based on facts alleged in charges of which a defendant has been acquitted («acquitted conduct») have long been among the most controversial features of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in part because acquitted conduct enhancements effectively nullify the jury's determination in a criminal case.
Because of the potentially harsh penalties associated with a conviction for a federal crime, it is particularly important that you have a Los Angeles federal defense attorney who has a comprehensive knowledge of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
By contrast, an advisory guideline system survives constitutional review, because the legislature and the commission haven't determined the maximum sentence that can be imposed based solely on the verdict.
The [Enron] Task Force says the district court was prohibited from considering the sentence imposed on former Enron CAO Richard Causey because the Guidelines and sentencing statutes concern «nationwide» disparities rather than those among co-defendants.
One (unnamed) commentor assails me for a a lack of «objectivity» because I critique this affirmance of an above - guideline sentence but often praise affirmances of below - guidelines sentences.
This reformulation would explain why (as the Court held) a binding guidelines system violates the Constitution, but an advisory guidelines system does not: A binding guideline system (such as the prior federal sentencing system) would violate Apprendi because — and to the extent that — it allows the judiciary to increase the sentence beyond the maximum sentence established by the legislature or Commission, pursuant to facts the legislature or Commission has prescribed as important.
We don't know what his true guideline range was because, as the USSC sentencing table shows, there is no guideline range of 8 - 12 months.
Thus, district courts say they are sentencing based on 3553 (a), but because of the presumption, they sentence within the Guidelines.
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