Does this mean that in some states people should get a below -
guidelines sentence because isn't that bad?
July 20, 2007)(available here), the Sixth Circuit affirms a district judge's choice of a within -
guideline sentence because the «district court offered clear reasons for its sentence [having] articulated the various § 3553 (a) factors and then identified the two factors it found most relevant.»
While the Crown presented several questions in its appeal, the dispositive one was whether Judge Paul erred in concluding that Ms. Giroux's actions did not attract
the guideline sentence because they were not commercial in nature owing to her lack of anticipated financial gain and / or her lack of knowledge of the exact nature or amount of the drugs in her purse (at para 7).
Not exact matches
Clearly he got what prisoners might call «a touch»
because that
sentence is very lenient and well below the usual
guideline used by judges in cases involving illegal firearms.
«The
guidelines range is high
because the United States
Sentencing Commission explicitly has recognized the «threat to the integrity of democratic processes» caused by public corruption offenses,» the feds wrote.
It also states that this tends to happen
because judges deviate from
sentencing guidelines more often when
sentencing females.
It makes me very, very sad to think of the number of incredible books we have all missed
because of this stupid one -
sentence guideline.
July 20, 2007)(available here), the DC Circuit has to vacate and remand a
sentence because «the record is muddled as to whether the district court considered [a particular
guideline range as the] starting point for its analysis.»
See Vonner, 516 F. 3d at 387 (explaining that a «lengthy explanation» of the
sentence chosen may not be required in all cases «
because «circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission's own reasoning that the
Guidelines sentence is a proper
sentence»» (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007)-RRB-; see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 356 («The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances.»).
As some may recall (and as detailed in posts here and here), Cavera is the fascinating case in which Judge Sifton decided to enhance a
sentence above the
guideline range in a gun case
because he viewed gun possession in urban spots like NYC to be especially bad.
Federal
sentencing fanatics know that the Paul case in the Ninth Circuit is significant
because it was arguably the first (and might still be considered the only) circuit ruling that a within -
guideline sentence should be reversed as substantively unreasonable.
Because these
guidelines are quite broad, judges are given wide latitude when imposing
sentences.
The absence of a Justice Department representative was both telling and disappointing, especially
because it is very hard to predict how federal prosecutors would view proposals to abolish the US
Sentencing Commission or to have a Blakely - compliant mandatory
guideline system.
Tomorrow, as detailed on this USSC webpage, the United States
Sentencing Commission in scheduled to conduct another public hearing on these topics (in part
because the USSC never formally moved forward with any
guidelines amendments on these topics
because of an incomplete membership).
In Beckles, the Court held that the career - offender
guideline's residual clause was not unconstitutionally vague
because the advisory federal
Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges.
-- arguments that a «
Guidelines sentence is not reasonable under § 3553 (a)
because it expressly declines to consider various personal characteristics of the defendant.»
But in her submissions, law society discipline counsel Deborah McPhadden urged the panel to ignore the idea, claiming Robinson's case would not have met the
guidelines for
sentencing circles in criminal matters
because of the seriousness of his offence.
The Gage Report into
sentencing guidelines in England and Wales has found that some causes of prison overcrowding can not be affected in any way by
guidelines and that it is impossible to predict the effect of
guidelines because of inadequate data collection.
Because the
Sentencing Commission, in enacting the 100:1, did not «exemplify the Commission's exerceise of is characteristic institutional role, it may be that «closer review [of a sentence] may be order when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidleines range based solely on the judge's view that the Guidelines range fails properly to refelct the 3553 (a) considerations even in a mine - run ca
Sentencing Commission, in enacting the 100:1, did not «exemplify the Commission's exerceise of is characteristic institutional role, it may be that «closer review [of a
sentence] may be order when the
sentencing judge varies from the Guidleines range based solely on the judge's view that the Guidelines range fails properly to refelct the 3553 (a) considerations even in a mine - run ca
sentencing judge varies from the Guidleines range based solely on the judge's view that the
Guidelines range fails properly to refelct the 3553 (a) considerations even in a mine - run case.»
He thus would have reversed
because the judge should not have
sentenced outside the
guidelines range.
You may be right that judges tend overwhelmingly to
sentence within the
guidelines,
because they believe that extraordinary circumstances are required to do otherwise.
On the applicability of Blakely to the federal
sentencing guidelines: The logic of the SG's argument now seems to be that applying Blakely to the
guidelines would essentially convert all
guideline enhancement into elements, which is constitutionally problematic
because only Congress can pass criminal statutes that create elements.
The Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), should apply equally to statutory mandatory minimums as to mandatory
Sentencing Guidelines, because the animating principle in Booker is separation of powers, and the mandatory guidelines that Booker rendered advisory had, per Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the same legislative authority as statutory provisions in the United St
Guidelines,
because the animating principle in Booker is separation of powers, and the mandatory
guidelines that Booker rendered advisory had, per Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the same legislative authority as statutory provisions in the United St
guidelines that Booker rendered advisory had, per Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the same legislative authority as statutory provisions in the United States Code.
Sentencing range enhancements based on facts alleged in charges of which a defendant has been acquitted («acquitted conduct») have long been among the most controversial features of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, in part
because acquitted conduct enhancements effectively nullify the jury's determination in a criminal case.
Because of the potentially harsh penalties associated with a conviction for a federal crime, it is particularly important that you have a Los Angeles federal defense attorney who has a comprehensive knowledge of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
By contrast, an advisory
guideline system survives constitutional review,
because the legislature and the commission haven't determined the maximum
sentence that can be imposed based solely on the verdict.
The [Enron] Task Force says the district court was prohibited from considering the
sentence imposed on former Enron CAO Richard Causey
because the
Guidelines and
sentencing statutes concern «nationwide» disparities rather than those among co-defendants.
One (unnamed) commentor assails me for a a lack of «objectivity»
because I critique this affirmance of an above -
guideline sentence but often praise affirmances of below -
guidelines sentences.
This reformulation would explain why (as the Court held) a binding
guidelines system violates the Constitution, but an advisory
guidelines system does not: A binding
guideline system (such as the prior federal
sentencing system) would violate Apprendi
because — and to the extent that — it allows the judiciary to increase the
sentence beyond the maximum
sentence established by the legislature or Commission, pursuant to facts the legislature or Commission has prescribed as important.
We don't know what his true
guideline range was
because, as the USSC
sentencing table shows, there is no
guideline range of 8 - 12 months.
Thus, district courts say they are
sentencing based on 3553 (a), but
because of the presumption, they
sentence within the
Guidelines.