It tries to minimize the effect that a presumption of reasonableness will have on the gravitational pull towards within -
guidelines sentences so much so that, I can't quite figure out what the point of a presumption of reasonableness («POR») is?
Not exact matches
So King used 33 years of data that was held by the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
On the one hand, those circuits that have been applying a presumption of reasonableness to within -
guideline sentences now have conclusive authority that they can continue to do
so.
The Government argues that in doing
so the District Court «discarded the
Guidelines in favor of the District Court's personal view of the seriousness of the offense,» resulting in «fail [ure] to give proper weight to the
sentencing factors.»
«I don't know of any other cases out there where the difference between
guidelines and actual
sentence were
so big,» Arisohn said....
If it does, we may see a new, different age of judicial discretion: judges who want to slavishly follow the
Guidelines will be free to do
so, and judges who want to take 3553 (a) seriously and give non-
Guidelines sentences will be free to do
so.
So often state and federal elected officials put forth «
sentencing guidelines» to show off their stance on crime.
So instead of carrying around the bound volumes of the Crimes Code, Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
Sentencing Guidelines, I have them all available as searchable.
It is a tragic irony that
sentencing judges in the Sixth Circuit are required to give enhanced deference to
guidelines which the independent Commission, relied upon so heavily by the Supreme Court in upholding the Guidelines, has now declared flawed and in need
guidelines which the independent Commission, relied upon
so heavily by the Supreme Court in upholding the
Guidelines, has now declared flawed and in need
Guidelines, has now declared flawed and in need of reform.
reasons why the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has been
so quirky and unpredictable has the the fact that the Court has been, from the very beginning and even in all state cases, shadow - boxing about the validity, viability, virtues and vices of the federal
sentencing guidelines.
It is responsible for preparing
guidelines which set out a decision - making process which must be followed, where they exist, by the
sentencing court unless it is contrary to the interests of justice to do
so.
In
so doing, the Spears majority encourages judges to articulate personal
sentencing guidelines in a sense, by concretely defining the alternatives they are choosing.
This suggests that a District Judge of a mind to give a
sentence above or below the
Guidelines will get the leeway to do
so.
Sentencing scholars have criticized the federal
guidelines» (over) reliance on
so - called relevant conduct for years.
The court system got things exactly right in Mr. Lawrence's case; there was nothing
so unusual about it as to disengage the
sentencing guidelines and counsel no jail time at all for him.
That defendant would seem to have an incentive to obstruct justice, in order to create a Blakely factor,
so that then a judge could be free to
sentence lower than the
guidelines.
I think Thomas is saying that not every
guideline sentence gave rise to a 6th Amendment violation,
so Booker should have been limited, and if it had been, the instant
sentence would not have created any 6th Amendment issue.
There is absolutely nothing in Rita that compels a
sentencing judge who wants to treat the
Guidelines as mandatory to really consider the 3553 (a) factors,
so long as he gives some kind of lip service to «having listened to the arguments» (which is what I read Rita as basically requiring, if that much, in terms of a judicial statement).
Second, even if the
guidelines are deemed non-severable only in cases with Blakely factors, Martha's lawyers might claim now that her case involves a Blakely factor
so she can argue for a lower
sentence under the government's non-severability theory.
In addition, Grassley's bill ignores the reality that strong federal
sentencing guidelines have another valuable byproduct — squeezing cooperation from reticent criminals
so they will testify against other criminals, while incentivizing them to plead guilty to lesser offenses to get shorter prison terms...
In
so doing, the district court relied heavily on Pugh's history, characteristics and motive in imposing a non-custodial
sentence for a crime that fell on the high end of the
Guidelines sentencing table.
(ii) The matters to be dealt with are: - the aggravating and mitigating factors of the offence (not personal mitigation); - any statutory provisions relevant to the offender and the offence under consideration
so that the judge is made aware of any statutory limitations on
sentencing; - any relevant
sentencing guidelines and
guideline cases; - identifying any victim personal statement or other information available to the prosecution advocate about the impact of the offence on the victim; - where appropriate, any evidence of the impact of the offending on a community; - an indication, where applicable, of an intention to apply for any ancillary orders, such as anti-social behaviour orders and confiscation orders, and
so far as possible, indicating the nature of the order to be sought.