Serious violence will involve, or will appear to involve, serious bodily
harm in a sexual context; and serious sexual violence will involve, or will appear to involve, serious bodily harm where the violence is sexual; and serious bodily harm covers violence in respect of which a prosecution of grievous bodily harm could be brought.
Not exact matches
As I will discuss
in this post, White suggests that choking should be seen as equivalent to bodily
harm in this
context, which may have implications for
sexual assault matters more broadly.
There have been other cases where lower courts have found that bodily
harm in the
sexual assault
context vitiates consent (see e.g. R v Welch, 1995 CanLII 282 (ONCA)-RRB-, and the Supreme Court itself has held that consent to
sexual activity may be vitiated
in cases involving significant risk of serious bodily
harm (R v Cuerrier, [1998] 2 SCR 371, 1998 CanLII 796; R v Mabior, [2012] 2 SCR 584, 2012 SCC 47, both dealing with non-disclosure of HIV).
In Welch, the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the defence argument of consensual sado - masochistic (SM) sex, holding that in the sexual assault context, «a victim can not consent to the infliction of bodily harm upon himself or herself... unless the accused is acting in the course of a generally approved social purpose when inflicting the harm.&raqu
In Welch, the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the defence argument of consensual sado - masochistic (SM) sex, holding that
in the sexual assault context, «a victim can not consent to the infliction of bodily harm upon himself or herself... unless the accused is acting in the course of a generally approved social purpose when inflicting the harm.&raqu
in the
sexual assault
context, «a victim can not consent to the infliction of bodily
harm upon himself or herself... unless the accused is acting
in the course of a generally approved social purpose when inflicting the harm.&raqu
in the course of a generally approved social purpose when inflicting the
harm.»