Combine this with rising interest rates,
high margin debt, age of this bull market and lack of fear a potential bear market might not be that far off.
Essentially,
higher margin debt means the risks to the downside are increasing.
Not exact matches
Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those reflected in such forward - looking statements and that should be considered in evaluating our outlook include, but are not limited to, the following: 1) our ability to continue to grow our business and execute our growth strategy, including the timing, execution, and profitability of new and maturing programs; 2) our ability to perform our obligations under our new and maturing commercial, business aircraft, and military development programs, and the related recurring production; 3) our ability to accurately estimate and manage performance, cost, and revenue under our contracts, including our ability to achieve certain cost reductions with respect to the B787 program; 4)
margin pressures and the potential for additional forward losses on new and maturing programs; 5) our ability to accommodate, and the cost of accommodating, announced increases in the build rates of certain aircraft; 6) the effect on aircraft demand and build rates of changing customer preferences for business aircraft, including the effect of global economic conditions on the business aircraft market and expanding conflicts or political unrest in the Middle East or Asia; 7) customer cancellations or deferrals as a result of global economic uncertainty or otherwise; 8) the effect of economic conditions in the industries and markets in which we operate in the U.S. and globally and any changes therein, including fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates; 9) the success and timely execution of key milestones such as the receipt of necessary regulatory approvals, including our ability to obtain in a timely fashion any required regulatory or other third party approvals for the consummation of our announced acquisition of Asco, and customer adherence to their announced schedules; 10) our ability to successfully negotiate, or re-negotiate, future pricing under our supply agreements with Boeing and our other customers; 11) our ability to enter into profitable supply arrangements with additional customers; 12) the ability of all parties to satisfy their performance requirements under existing supply contracts with our two major customers, Boeing and Airbus, and other customers, and the risk of nonpayment by such customers; 13) any adverse impact on Boeing's and Airbus» production of aircraft resulting from cancellations, deferrals, or reduced orders by their customers or from labor disputes, domestic or international hostilities, or acts of terrorism; 14) any adverse impact on the demand for air travel or our operations from the outbreak of diseases or epidemic or pandemic outbreaks; 15) our ability to avoid or recover from cyber-based or other security attacks, information technology failures, or other disruptions; 16) returns on pension plan assets and the impact of future discount rate changes on pension obligations; 17) our ability to borrow additional funds or refinance
debt, including our ability to obtain the
debt to finance the purchase price for our announced acquisition of Asco on favorable terms or at all; 18) competition from commercial aerospace original equipment manufacturers and other aerostructures suppliers; 19) the effect of governmental laws, such as U.S. export control laws and U.S. and foreign anti-bribery laws such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the United Kingdom Bribery Act, and environmental laws and agency regulations, both in the U.S. and abroad; 20) the effect of changes in tax law, such as the effect of The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (the «TCJA») that was enacted on December 22, 2017, and changes to the interpretations of or guidance related thereto, and the Company's ability to accurately calculate and estimate the effect of such changes; 21) any reduction in our credit ratings; 22) our dependence on our suppliers, as well as the cost and availability of raw materials and purchased components; 23) our ability to recruit and retain a critical mass of highly - skilled employees and our relationships with the unions representing many of our employees; 24) spending by the U.S. and other governments on defense; 25) the possibility that our cash flows and our credit facility may not be adequate for our additional capital needs or for payment of interest on, and principal of, our indebtedness; 26) our exposure under our revolving credit facility to
higher interest payments should interest rates increase substantially; 27) the effectiveness of any interest rate hedging programs; 28) the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting; 29) the outcome or impact of ongoing or future litigation, claims, and regulatory actions; 30) exposure to potential product liability and warranty claims; 31) our ability to effectively assess, manage and integrate acquisitions that we pursue, including our ability to successfully integrate the Asco business and generate synergies and other cost savings; 32) our ability to consummate our announced acquisition of Asco in a timely matter while avoiding any unexpected costs, charges, expenses, adverse changes to business relationships and other business disruptions for ourselves and Asco as a result of the acquisition; 33) our ability to continue selling certain receivables through our supplier financing program; 34) the risks of doing business internationally, including fluctuations in foreign current exchange rates, impositions of tariffs or embargoes, compliance with foreign laws, and domestic and foreign government policies; and 35) our ability to complete the proposed accelerated stock repurchase plan, among other things.
That came after the company had jumped into mortgage - backed securities, a complex package of
debts that often meant
higher margins for banks, yet often included poor quality loans.
Margin debt, the money that investors borrow to buy stocks, had reached new
highs (the last two times that happened were just ahead of the dot - com crash and the 2008 financial crisis).
Compared to the broad XIC, XEG has a) a price to earnings ratio that is only slightly
higher, b) a price to book ratio that is lower, c) a
debt to equity ratio that is about half of XIC, d) a dividend yield that is comparable and e) profit
margins that grew 30 % this year versus 18 % for XIC.
Margin debt and «investor credit» began hitting all - time
highs and all - time lows, respectively, in January.
HPFS gross
margin decreased for the three and nine months ended July 31, 2011 due primarily to lower portfolio
margins from a
higher mix of operating leases and
higher transaction taxes, the effect of which was partially offset by
higher margins on lease extensions and lower bad
debt expense as a percentage of revenue.
The decrease in gross
margin was the result of lower portfolio
margins from a
higher mix of operating leases and
higher transaction taxes, partially offset by
higher margins on lease extensions and lower bad
debt expense as a percentage of revenue.
When times are good, sales ticking
higher,
margins expanding and cash flows strong, only the advantages of leverage are visible -
higher returns on equity, faster growth rates and an enhanced benefit to stock holders as
debt is repaid.
However, the most compelling STOCKS» SELL SIGNAL is the all - time
high level of NYSE
Margin Debt.
But because the equities market is at such
high levels with a record
margin debt, this combination along with the shift in investor sentiment could lead to a significant and dramatic sell - off.
Year 2000
margin debt levels saw their
highest readings up to that point.
Taking into consideration the fact that there is just two other circumstances when the
debt / GDP NYSE
margin had increased by about 30 basis points or more in a period of only three months — that happened when the ration had reached its two major secular bull market
highs — the likelihood is highly probable that the NYSE
margin debt / US GDP, is once more at its peak of all time
high of 2.87 %!
Before the 2008/2009 financial crisis during the 2007 economic bubble, the
margin debt of the NYSE was only about 2.62 % of US GDP, just short of the dot - com bubble
high of 2000.
Before 2007, the increase of 35.9 or
higher basis points had occurred when the NYSE
margin debt / USGDP peaked at its all time
highs of 2.78 % in March of 2000 after having risen by 47.4 basis points in just three months!
According to NIA, after the dot - com bubble had burst, the NYSE
margin debt in nominal terms rose from its low of $ 130.21 billion in 2002 to a
high of $ 381.37 billion in 2007 — that is a rise of 193 %.
For the second month consecutively in April of 2015, the
margins debt of the NYSE, nominally, reached new all - time
highs increasing by $ 30.772 billion to $ 507.153 billion, an increase of 6.46 %!
Taking the context in real terms, it implies that the
margin debt of the NYSE amount currently to about 2.87 % of US GDP, surpassing the previous all - time
high of 2.78 % which has been set at the peak of the biggest stock market bubble in global history, in March 2000.
Currently the
margin debt of the NYSE expressed as a percentage of US GDP is 1.85 times
higher than the median for the past 292 months of 1.55 %.
It should be given very a
high attention that in July 2007, after the
debt / US GDP NYSE
margin reached its pre-financial crisis
high, the S&P 500 just three months later had reached its bull market record monthly close, and after the
debt / US GDP NYSE
margin in March of 2000 had reach the dot - com bubble peak, the S&P 500 after just 5 months in August of 2000 had reached its secular bull market record monthly close.
Margin debt is at a record
high.
Ignore the
Margin Debt Alarm The margin debt alarm has seemingly been sounded every few months when investors realize absolute levels of margin debt has reached new all - time highs (inferring that risk taking has too reached all - time high levels and stocks are at
Margin Debt Alarm The margin debt alarm has seemingly been sounded every few months when investors realize absolute levels of margin debt has reached new all - time highs (inferring that risk taking has too reached all - time high levels and stocks are at ri
Debt Alarm The
margin debt alarm has seemingly been sounded every few months when investors realize absolute levels of margin debt has reached new all - time highs (inferring that risk taking has too reached all - time high levels and stocks are at
margin debt alarm has seemingly been sounded every few months when investors realize absolute levels of margin debt has reached new all - time highs (inferring that risk taking has too reached all - time high levels and stocks are at ri
debt alarm has seemingly been sounded every few months when investors realize absolute levels of
margin debt has reached new all - time highs (inferring that risk taking has too reached all - time high levels and stocks are at
margin debt has reached new all - time highs (inferring that risk taking has too reached all - time high levels and stocks are at ri
debt has reached new all - time
highs (inferring that risk taking has too reached all - time
high levels and stocks are at risk).
While Walmart's
margins are lower than what is typical for a company with such
high financial strength, its
debt is not exceptionally low and it continues to face intense competition from Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ: AMZN), the analyst said.
The club is largely operating with low levels or
debt and has one of the
highest turnover and profit
margins in world football.
Prior peak earnings were, indeed, an artifact of unrealistically
high profit
margins and return on equity, driven by large amounts of
debt - financed leverage.
For most firms, I like to see growing sales and growing earnings, preferably
high operating
margins, and also a conservatively financed capital structure (low
debt to equity).
Last month, Feb we had a record
high of
margin debt....
Hengfu seeks to find stocks with strong earnings and sales growth, favorable p / e / g ratios,
high operating
margins, low
debt - to - equity, consistent free cash and relative price strength.
Reason why I like it: the markets they operate in (security, automotive) hereby already having a strong patent portofio,
high operating
margins (66 %), no
debt, a current yield of 2.20 %, regular special dividends, a low P / E of 9.5 and the DCF calculations suggest a fair value of approx.
I know we are at all time
highs of
margin debt which in the past has signaled market tops.
But despite this,
margin account money can be use to do anything and everything you want, including paying
debt at a
higher interest rate and including a Louis Vuitton bag or a Denis Gagnon sexy dress!
All I can tell you is keep your
margin of safety
higher by keeping your
debt lower, these are very interesting times.
A low
debt company can enjoy
higher profit
margin and
higher solvency.
Consider the fact that NYSE
margin debt cracked at an all - time
high near the $ 500 billion mark in April.
Margin debt is at its
highest level since the 1920s, though as a percentage of market capitalization, it is lower than it was in 2000.
Margin debt in the United States — money borrowed against securities in brokerage accounts — has risen to its
highest level ever, at $ 384 billion, surpassing the previous peak of $ 381 billion set in July 2007 according to New York Times Business Day's Off The Charts: Sign of Excess?.
Perhaps ominously, all three circumstances currently exist, with
margin debt at an all - time peak and IPOs at their
highest level since 2007.
Tweets about
margin debt new
high Déjà Vu All Over Again We went through this exact same exercise a year ago.
A new
high in
margin debt doesn't mean the stock market has peaked or a -LSB-...]
Margin debt hit a new
high back February.
As of last week, the market remained characterized by an overvalued, overbought conditions, complicated by extremely
high leverage through
margin debt, and record bullishness among institutional investors, according to the Barron's Big Money Poll.
This is certainly no assurance of the market outcome in the present instance, but in the context of an overvalued, overbought, overbullish market with
margin debt near record
highs, it's also not a feature of the present environment that we're inclined to overlook.
A surfeit of
margin debt can turn a low severity crisis into a
high severity crisis, both individually and corporately, the same way too much
debt applied to housing created the crisis in the housing markets.
Of course, the usual temptation here is to rely primarily on quantitative analysis — let the numbers do the talking — focusing on the consistency & sustainability of strong free cash flow (as a % of net income),
high net
margins,
high return on equity (though not dependent on excessive
debt), and good return on assets (in excess of WACC).
As of end - September 2017,
margin debt on the NYSE was a record $ 559.6 billion, which is to be expected as U.S. equity indices were also near all - time
highs, and stock market peaks and record levels of
margin debt often coincide.
While rising
margin debt levels provide the additional liquidity to drive stock prices
higher on the way up, it also cuts deeply as prices fall.»
We own the stock we want sooner, and can get a tax deduction for the interest paid on the
margin debt (and avoid paying a
higher tax rate on the interest we would have earned if we saved up to make purchases in a
high - interest savings account).
I decide to use
margin money to invest at a low interest rate despite the fact that I said previously that I was going to only use the
margin money to pay off
debt at a
higher interest rate.
In my personal financial situation,
margin is a great tool to use to pay off
debt hold on line of credit at a
higher interest rate (8.75 % in this case).