And the GSE's major role in mortgage finance had the perverse effect of reducing the attractiveness of opportunities for banks in
higher credit quality mortgages (the GSEs take their cut with the advantage of near - Treasury borrowing rates and far higher gearing, leaving a smaller part of the economic pie left for banks).
«The GSE's major role in mortgage finance had the perverse effect of reducing the attractiveness of opportunities for banks in
higher credit quality mortgages (the GSEs take their cut with the advantage of near - Treasury borrowing rates and far higher gearing, leaving a smaller part of the economic pie left for banks).»
Not exact matches
Unlike wild risk takers investing in subprime
mortgages — low -
quality loans to borrowers with iffy
credit — Thornburg stuck to
high -
quality assets.
Moreover, something that gets lost in the arguments about
credit quality is that the second - best predictor of
mortgage default was how much skin in the game these buyers had, and even if Canada is not as risky as the US on lending to people with poor
credit scores, we are awash in
high loan - to - value lending (with its explicit government backing).
Also helping to lower shadow inventories is the rise in home prices, lower unemployment rates, the
higher number of loan modifications, and tightening of underwriting standards that has led to an improvement in
mortgage credit quality, economists note.
Credit policy restrictions and
high lending fees for borrowers are not conducive to a healthy housing market — continuing access to affordable and sustainable residential
mortgages through
quality underwriting is what Congress should really focus on.
Couple that with the FACT that
mortgages of the last 5 years have been of MUCH
higher credit quality (no more people that couldn't buy homes could anymore, and are therefore less likely to default), we see an ever - improving real estate market that should stand on its own after years of being propped up by Washington.