An increase in marginal yield corresponds to an increase in marginal risk, but that risk is not born evenly by investors: the ones with bad setup end up with a vacant property, while the ones with good setup can access that
higher nominal yield.
Not exact matches
Brian Sack and Robert Elsasser explain that over most of the post-1997 period,
yields on TIIS have been surprisingly
high relative to
yields on comparable
nominal Treasury securities.
Real bond returns have been
high over the past 30 years or so because
nominal starting
yields were
high and inflation has fallen.
We see
higher inflation expectations, rather than rising real
yields, driving rises in
nominal bond
yields.
Higher rates effected performance, but
nominal returns were still positive because eventually investors were able to make up for the price losses through the increases in
yield.
High -
yield stocks generated an annualized
nominal return of 12.2 %; low -
yield, 10.4 %.
For roughly three decades, U.S. non-financial corporate debt as a percentage of U.S.
nominal GDP and the
high yield default rate moved in tandem.
Yet low
nominal gross domestic product growth and aging populations argue for lower bond
yields than in the past — and sustained demand for
high quality bonds.
When savings are
high, the term premium is more likely to be low, in the process keeping
nominal yields down.
The findings: Traditional defensive sectors such as utilities, telecommunications, real estate and consumer staples provided minimal protection when
nominal yields moved
higher.
Even with the prospect of a near - term easing of inflation and perhaps even some negative CPI inflation figures, the combination of strong real
yields and principal safety makes these a good harbor for investors who want to sleep nights without accepting untenably low
nominal yields (and the
high associated durations - which I suspect many investors currently overlook).
While the initial
yield was
high, your overall return has been eroded by a 25 % decline in the
nominal value of your investment.
They are attempting to achieve
high smooth
yields well in excess of the
nominal risk - free rate on a constant basis.
Think of 1979 - 82: by the time bond
yields were nearing their peak levels, bond managers were making money in
nominal terms with rates rising because the income from the coupons was so
high, and it set up the tremendous rally in bonds that would last for ~ 30 years or so.
Usually done based on models, the hedging ratio is not 100 % but leaves some exposure open but then captures some of the extra
nominal yield offered by the
higher yielding currency.
High yield bonds are risky enough that when
nominal yields get low enough, it is probably time to start reducing exposure.
For roughly three decades, U.S. non-financial corporate debt as a percentage of U.S.
nominal GDP and the
high yield default rate moved in tandem.
Here's my bias: at the first investment shop I worked in, the
high yield manager told me that there is a
nominal yield for
high yield bonds which reflects the risk.
The
higher TIPS
yields are relative to the historical real return on
nominal bonds, the greater the allocation to TIPS and the longer the maturity can be.
Real
Yields Another consideration is if TIPS yields are high or low relative to the real return on nominal bonds of the same mat
Yields Another consideration is if TIPS
yields are high or low relative to the real return on nominal bonds of the same mat
yields are
high or low relative to the real return on
nominal bonds of the same maturity.
Current TIPS
yields are below the long - term average real
yield of both
nominal bonds and TIPS, but the steepness of the TIPS
yield curve means longer - maturity TIPS are
yielding higher percentages of both the historic real return on
nominal bonds of the same maturity and the historical
yield on TIPS.