Sentences with phrase «human experience as»

As Bernice Rose explains: «Beuys wounded in the World War II and living in a divided Germany, had come to see human experience as it is reflected through the body's drives and sensations, its pleasure and pain.

An exhibition of paintings and drawings celebrating the human experience as imagined by master draughtsman, Harry Carmean.

Conceptually, however, the sculptures speak to the artist's pursuit to reveal the common human experience as communicated through the origins of language.

Both challenge the very notions of live art and the human experience as set out for»14 Rooms».

Two additional works served as an epilogue (Wolfson) and an archival documentation (Baldessari), challenging the very notions of live art and the human experience as set out in 14 Rooms.

From our intimate meeting area to the thorough discharge information, our intent is to make the pet / human experience as pleasurable as possible.

As much about the fragility of the human experience as it is about mental illness, this offers a refreshing perspective on a spectrum of mental health disorders.

A powerful historically accurate book that brings alive the life of one woman enduring the emotional and physical hardships of slavery - written so well and so lyrically that we feel and see all she does - we are there - it is a visceral experience to read this book and I could not put it down - a true look at and experience of the human experience as it endures the unthinkable and yet retains it's humanity.

If they have nothing to say to any of us about understanding what it means to be fully human and more fully ourselves, if they have nothing to tell us about the human experience as it has unspooled throughout human history, if they have nothing to say about the power of language to communicate across the gaps that separate us, if they have nothing to say about culture, if they have nothing to say about the rich heritage of the English language, if they have nothing to say about understanding the universal and the specific in human life, about how to grow beyond our own immediate experience — if they are, in fact, nothing more than fodder for test prep, then what the hell are we doing?

Creativity is as core to the human experience as breathing.

I practice yoga because while it teaches me that suffering is as much a part of this human experience as is sweetness, it also reaffirms the impermanent nature of all of it, breath after breath.

Whitehead is a radical empiricist who understands human experience as a unity of largely unconscious feelings of the body and its environment.

Instead, he portrays human experience as a process of selective abstraction from an environment within which it is included, and to which it makes natural bodily reference.

From this standpoint, then, theology is perhaps best understood as the effort to nurture awareness of the depth dimension of human experience as it comes to expression in the myths and symbols of particular religious traditions and their broader cultures.

These are as real in human experience as space and time, and the way contingent future events are sometimes altered by volitional decision makes us unwilling to see that human effort is of no avail.

It is «existential» in the sense that it is inherent in our human experience as self - aware creatures.

The only hopeful model, then, is the human experience as such.

We can just as well read it as speaking of the double nature of human experience as men exist in «true faith» and as they seek after «right living».

At any rate, Whitehead launched boldly forth on the speculative possibility that human experience as such is a clue to the ultimate nature of things.

This is not simply a given in human experience as such, as witness the Buddhist world.

But Whitehead is convinced that we can not understand human experience as simply physical.

To think of ourselves as totally corrupt would be far too pessimistic: it would not take account of the patent fact that there is much goodness in the world and in human experience as we know it.

The «aesthetic,» in this profound sense, with its expression in appreciation, evaluation, enjoyment or displeasure, and the like, is as much a part of our human experience as the rational and volitional aspects.

The Christian analysis of human experience as exemplifying a «mystery of iniquity,» or a ubiquitous «missing» of the experience we most deeply seek and need, means that the explication of Christ's transforming effect upon humanity will not involve merely a perfecting of our intrinsic capabilities, but an overcoming of human hostility to God's aims, a healing of human deformation consequent to that hostility, and a reuniting of humanity with the God from whom we are estranged.

This type of argument is again broadly evidentiary in nature, although it reflects not the «turn to the subject» characteristic of the appeal to individual experience, but rather a «pragmatic» or «linguistic» turn, as illustrated by Whitehead's observation that the evidence of human experience as shared by civilized intercommunication «is also diffused throughout the meanings of words and linguistic expressions» (cited in TPT 74).12 Such an appeal is an essentially historical form of argumentation.

In any event, I find that I have begun the decade of the «80s still firmly committed to the same essential project with which I entered the «60s: to work toward a genuinely postliberal theology that, being sensitive at once to the human concern for freedom and to the claims of Christian faith, will be as concerned for the credibility of the church's witness when judged in terms of changing human experience as for the appropriateness of its witness when judged by reference to its abiding apostolic norm.

He is well aware that this procedure of taking human experience as the model of all reality may provoke from some quarters the charge against his metaphysics of unmitigated anthropomorphism.

Far from thinking of billiard balls as symbols of reality, Whitehead takes human experience as the event or process that points to the nature of all individual entities, from protons to people.

Using common human experience as a base, Niebuhr sought to show that the secular view of life is inadequate: the secular analysis of man made less sense than the biblical one.

Or, as Cobb and Griffin (1976) say: «Process philosophy sees human experience as a high - level exemplification of reality in general» (p. 13).

Whether such freedom can exist in a state where any church is «established» is debatable, taking human experience as a whole.

But «a moral discussion is inconclusive and even trivial, if it leaves out the question of its application,» as Gregory Vlastos has said.13 In order to be as specific as possible about this approach to Christian social philosophy I shall outline in arbitrary fashion five general principles which I suggest can be supported by the evidence of human experience as being necessary guides to the conditions under which the Good Society can grow.

This is the sort of experience Whitehead is referring to when he writes: «In describing the capacities, realized or unrealized, of an actual occasion, we have, with Locke, tacitly taken human experience as an example upon which to found the generalized description required for metaphysics» (PR 112).

It added an immense richness to the unconscious, which, by the continuity of its life, constituted the successive occasions of human experience as a unified soul.

The «liberal» is more often impelled to employ appeals to our common human experience as evidence for or against particular beliefs.

1), it is also part of human experience as, e.g., in the pregnant formulation by Chuang Tzu:

For example, talk of coming down from heaven may have been appropriate in a world that conceived the divine habitations as almost literally «above»; it will also be appropriate as a useful metaphorical way of describing the presence among us of that which (again in a symbolic sense) is higher than human experience as such.

We have come to the question of suffering in human experience as we try to understand atonement.

As is well known, there are many significant points of divergence between the two philosophers, but we shall keep to our topic of human experience as manifested in its basic mode, primitive perception.

Whitehead's method, in part, is to analyze these occasions of subjective experience in order to find factors capable of being generalized into principles applicable to all actual entities: «In describing the capacities, realized or unrealized, of an actual occasion, we have... tacitly taken human experience as an example upon which to found the generalized description required for metaphysics» (PR 172).

But to try to develop some general theory of the narrative shape of human experience as a foundation for Christian theology seemed to him «first to put the cart before the horse and then cut the lines and pretend the vehicle is self - propelled.»

For them, such healing is the necessary and decisive proof of the revolutionary power of Christianity to transform human experience as a whole.

Once God has ceased to exist in human experience as the omnipotent and numinous Lord, there perishes with him every moral imperative addressed to man from a beyond, and humanity ceases to be imprisoned by an obedience to an external will or authority.

The God who is progressively manifest in human experience as an empty and alien other is the inevitable consequence of the Spirit who descends ever more deeply into flesh.

«23 It is basic to human experience as such, to one's sense of identity.

Using human experience as a model to depict the nature of reality, Whitehead argues that every actuality (i.e., every actual event) has both a present subjective immediacy and a past objectivity.

God is real actual, and existent where and when he is present in human experience as real, actual, and existent.

• The movement to reject any objective ultimate authority and elevate human experience as the only source of meaning.

It would still be true, I think, that the content of such an experience, and even a fully adequate and somehow (impossibly) guaranteed inventory of that content, would not alone provide any nonarbitrary basis, intuitive or articulate, for distinguishing what is essential to the experience simply as an experience, and what is essential to it as a specifically human experience — nor even for determining whether there is anything peculiarly one's own in the experience, as distinguished from what is essential to human experience as human or as experience.

If, as Hartshorne does, one uses one's prior understanding of various types of human experience as the source of generalized descriptions which together constitute the final concept of experience, how does one decide whether the generalizations have been radical enough to support application to all — including nonhuman — experiences or were sufficient only to cover human experiences?