«10 But the question of consciousness can of course not be dismissed when the philosophical stance is that of oneself as
a human knower; and if cognitive consciousness is always the result of processing an input, as it appears to be with Kant's doctrine of synthesis, consciousness of the input can not be a cognition of reality.
Like Whitehead prior to Science and the Modern World, he brackets out
the human knower from the world he studies.
Expulsion of the human subject from nature is implied in the scientific method of knowing which puritanically (one is tempted to say Gnostically) segregates
the human knower from nature, and in the materialism, mechanism, or «hard naturalism,» which follows from a severe logical divorce of physical reality from mental reality.
Of course no
human knower completely grasps or includes the entities he knows, but God fully incorporates and thus preserves all events as they occur.
And there can be no efficacy in a systematic philosophy that loses sight of the vocation of
the human knower to the whole of reality.
Hartshorne is counter-intuitive, saving that, not only is God relative to the known, but more related to the known than are
human knowers.
These questions present no special difficulty if one's philosophical stance is external to
the human knowers one is considering as subjects; if, in other words, one speaks of knowers only in the third person.
Not exact matches
As I have argued in my book Moral, Believing Animals, all
human beings are believers, not
knowers who know with certitude.
Later the idea gained ground that we can not «speak of nature apart from
human perception in the historical development of knowledge», that all knowledge is «a creative interaction between the known and the
knower» and that therefore there is no System of scientific knowledge or of technology which does not have the subjective purposes and faith - presuppositions of
humans built into it.
-- power -
knowers read these as humiliations rather than as features of the daily
human landscape that should require only sobriety, not courage, to acknowledge.
In the former the
knower can not be merely a detached scientific observer but must also himself participate, for it is through his participation that he discovers both the typical and the unique in the aspects of
human life that he is studying.
He provides the balanced picture again between
knower and known, without an a priori, in going on to say: «The key to development is a mind capable of thinking in technological terms and grasping the fully
human meaning of
human activities, within the context of the holistic meaning of the individual's being.»
All these thinkers emphasize the relation of the
human mind to a «real» world that exists apart from the
knower.
«The vaunted transcendence, taken as externality of known to
knower, is... really a defect of our
human knowledge.»
Like Kant in his critical period, Peirce's initial philosophical stance is that of a
knower with
human cognitive faculties for processing given input into cognitions of reality.