As just one example, the Chief Justice authored
the important majority judgments in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15 and R. v. Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13.
Not exact matches
In Chester, if one takes the
majority and dissent speeches (reasons for
judgment) at face value — the split was 3 - 2 — the plaintiff succeeded on the normative basis that the duty of care in issue was so
important that that justified dispensing completely with any requirement for a causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury.
Neither does the
majority judgment mention the history of violence between J.A. and K.D.. Although the
majority's focus was properly on the law of consent in light of the issue it had to decide, it missed an
important opportunity to situate this issue within the broader context of domestic violence and marital rape (for a recent study on marital rape, see my report for the Equality Effect here).
So witnesses, defendants and even victims may all be bound - over, with the
important caveat that they must have been adjudged to have engaged in conduct that was criminal or immoral or, as the Divisional Court eloquently puts it, engaged in «wrong [conduct] rather than right in the
judgment of the
majority of contemporary citizens» (see Hughes v Holley (1987) 86 Cr App R 130, [1987] Crim LR 253).