Sentences with phrase «impose different sentencing»

A host of constitutional questions may arise when judges extend sentence lengths or otherwise impose different sentencing terms by relying solely on statistical data indicating that persons of a certain gender or race are more likely to re-offend.

Seems to me that the answer is easy in one sense: if the effects of a given crime are really worse in one area than in another, Gall discretion surely allows a sentencing judge to impose a different sentence as a result.

Not exact matches

The second sentence of Article 51 (1) which imposes the obligations of «respecting» rights, while «observing» and «promoting the application of» principles in accordance with the respective powers also addresses primarily the separation of competences between the Union and its Member States and the different duties imposed by rights and principles and not the relevance of fundamental rights in private relations (para 32).

More recently, the trial of the allegations of contempt against Sergei Pugachev in the Mezhprom litigation resulted in sentences totalling 8 years and 11 months being imposed for 11 different contempts.

Perhaps this is a very different Liberal party from the one in 2009 that (along with Justin Trudeau) voted for bill C - 15, which would have imposed a six - month minimum sentence for growing six pot plants.

However, when the judge considered a hypothetical situation (as he was required to do under the s. 12 Charter analysis as set out in Nur) of an offender in a slightly different situation from Mr. Michael he found that a judge who was required to sentence an offender on multiple counts to both jail and probation would be prevented from imposing a fine and would therefore have to impose the statutory amount of $ 100 in victim surcharges for each offence, for a total of $ 900.

Because it appears that the trial court's reliance upon the impermissible and irrelevant sentence factors largely influenced his decision to impose probation, we find it necessary to vacate the sentence imposed and remand for resentencing before a different judge.

Indeed, just this month, the Supreme Court expressly approved of a sentencing court's giving «specific attention to the issue of disparity when [it] inquired about the sentences already imposed by a different judge on two... co-defendants.»

Despite recognizing that some other courts have reached a different conclusion, the Ohio Supreme Court held that jury's weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors is not a fact - finding process, so it is not governed by Hurst, but even if it were, there was no violation because Ohio law requires the jury to unanimously agree that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt before the trial judge can consider imposing a death sentence.