Sentences with phrase «in peirce»

If we don't want to deal with problems in Peirce's philosophy of science, simply talking about naturalism and pragmatism might be of help.

If not, then they are clearly stuck in Peirce's «tenacity» mindset.

With them I take seriously the apparent asymmetry of becoming, time's arrow, according to which the past is (in Peirce's words) «the sum of accomplished facts,» of definite particulars, whereas the future is exclusively constituted by real Thirds, that is, not fully particularized generals, which will be somehow particularized as the future becomes past but are not particularized in advance or eternally.

What one needs is an all - inclusive logic — a «grand logic,» in Peirce's phrase — in which the positive achievements of these various alternative logics can be accommodated without having to pay the high, inflationary prices they usually demand: excessive ontic commitment and involvement, «fuzzy» semantics, excessive and perhaps unsound or at least dubious axioms and rules, and failure to achieve the kind of «maximum logical candor» that should be aimed at.

The inconsistencies Murphey finds in Peirce's attempt to define individual identity are unavoidable if one begins with the assumption that the identity of an individual consists in a collection of independent reactions.

Tendencies like these appear in Peirce as quality and actuality in contrast to possibility and regularity.

However, most important for our immediate purposes, the view that there are limitations on both mechanistic and teleological causal explanations of creative events is expressed in Peirce's own writings.

The pattern of development from the limited to a goal that is unbounded and envisaged in an infinite future also can be seen in Peirce's rejection, in «Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,» of Cartesian philosophy, particularly in his opposition to what he took to be the standard of subjectivity (5.263 - 317).

«The Reconception of Experience in Peirce, James, and Dewey.»

Smith, John E., «Religion and Theology in Peirce,» Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed.

All of these motifs are united in Whitehead, and all but the clear rejection of substance as relevant to ethics and as implying the primacy of unit - events rather than unit - things or persons, were in Peirce.

Not exact matches

In January, Commissioners Hester M. Peirce and Robert J. Jackson Jr., both nominees of President Donald J. Trump, joined SEC commissioners Kara Stein and Michael Piwowar, along with SEC Chairman Jay Clayton.

In the preface to Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, Hartshorne celebrates «our English inheritance of critical caution and concern for clarity»; he seeks to learn more from Leibniz, «the most lucid metaphysician in the early modern period,» as well as from Bergson, Peirce, James, Dewey, and Whitehead, «five philosophers of process of great genius and immense knowledge of the intellectual and spiritual resources of this centurIn the preface to Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, Hartshorne celebrates «our English inheritance of critical caution and concern for clarity»; he seeks to learn more from Leibniz, «the most lucid metaphysician in the early modern period,» as well as from Bergson, Peirce, James, Dewey, and Whitehead, «five philosophers of process of great genius and immense knowledge of the intellectual and spiritual resources of this centurin the early modern period,» as well as from Bergson, Peirce, James, Dewey, and Whitehead, «five philosophers of process of great genius and immense knowledge of the intellectual and spiritual resources of this century.

But... the infinite regress in question is an example of the «non-vicious» type of regress, since it concerns possibilities, and these not (on one view of potentiality) as a definite multitude, whose number is infinite, but as a continuum, which in the words of Peirce is «beyond all multitude,» as God was formerly described as being; and indeed, as we shall see, the continuum of possibilities is one aspect of God which may be truly so described.

After these influences I was simultaneously exposed, during my second and last stay in an official capacity at Harvard, from 1925 to 1928, to the writings of Peirce and the writings and presence of Whitehead.

[11] For the pragmatic complementarity of law and freedom (spontaneity) cf. C. Peirce,; «The Doctrine of Necessity Examined,» in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed.

A brief exploration of Peirce's use of continuity in his account of individual existence as well as a review of this account in the light of Professor Hartshorne's criticisms.

After joining the faculty in philosophy at Harvard University in 1925, where he began editing the collected papers of C. S. Peirce, Charles Hartshorne also served as an assistant to Alfred North Whitehead.

William James, Charles Peirce, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead have much in common with the process metaphysicians.

According to Neville, Peirce is correct in holding that «the only thing that does not need an explanation is pure chaos»; consequently order and first principles are not self - explanatory but need explanation (p. 59f).

The latter is a tangled problem at best, but it is clear that among the important founders of the process perspective — specifically I mean James, Peirce, Bergson, Whitehead, Dewey, and Hartshorne — it is Hartshorne's work which comes closest to being a kind of personalism.1 Whitehead explicitly sets aside the personalist perspective in Religion in the Making, considering its claims beyond the possibility of being established.2 On the other side, a number of personalists have been sympathetic to process thought, and Brightman is surely principal among them.3 Here I will not investigate the question of whether personalism in general, or even the idealistic type, is reconcilable with process thought.

And those more recent thinkers who are most like Leibniz in comprehensive knowledge (Peirce and Whitehead being almost unique in this respect) reject any such jumble of notions as automatic yet spiritual realities.

Fortunately quantum physics has put this doctrine in doubt and some scientists and philosophers of science had already rejected it long before quantum physics, including the great Clerk Maxwell, and the great American philosopher who was also physicist, Charles Peirce.

The overall situation in matters of abstraction is triadic (to use the term favored by C. S. Peirce).

Does not Peirce's argument for the improbability of an exact zero of a property found in highly variable degrees, and in highly variable extents of space, hold against the exact truth of Euclidian geometry?

Lowe, Victor, «Peirce and Whitehead as Metaphysicians,» Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Second Series, ed.

Peirce had a mixture of good and not at all good in both his marriages.

In this Bibliography references to Charles Hartshorne simply as Editor of the Peirce papers have been omitted.

From Peirce's claim that we can make our ideas clear by considering their conceivable practical effects, to James's notion of truth's cash value in experiential terms, to Dewey's own view of the practical character of reality, the message seems to be that philosophy has more to offer than a therapeutic stance toward social issues and a rhetorical presentation of new suggestions.

Peirce argued that, since zero magnitude is one of an infinity of possible magnitudes, all except one greater than zero but too small for us to definitely detect in nature, the improbability of the zero size being the exact truth is infinite.

In any case, whatever the causes, Whitehead and Santayana form with James, Josiah Royce, C.A. Strong, C.S. Peirce, Charles Hartshorne and others a distinctive philosophical grouping with common concerns distinct from those of British and European philosophers.

A contrasting difference is that Peirce had a powerful mathematician as father who tutored him in that subject, helped him in other ways, but was almost brutally unkind at times and a possible cause of a psychosomatic illness in his son.

One striking affinity between all these philosophers, except Peirce, is the central role in their metaphysics played by the notion of «the specious present.»

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Book Notice: The New American Philosophers, Andrew J. Reck: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Journal in American Philosophy 5, 3 (Summer, 1969), 193.

Right away on receiving the information about natural selection as factor in the becoming of animal species Peirce said to Chauncey Wright that he'd have to give up his determinism; animal habits are not absolute regularities.

But starting with Peirce and Frege in the nineteenth century and continuing with Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, and a host of others in the twentieth, the fundamental assumptions of this framework came under consistent and, I think, effective attack.

I agree but add: God had no alternative to willing that there be some free creatures, first because (pace Alston) the idea of not creating at all could occur (if I may say so) only to a confused creature, second because, as Peirce, Bergson, and Whitehead have seen, by a «creature» we can consistently mean only a lesser form of the freedom or creativity which in eminent form is deity.

He was aided in this by Charles Peirce's theory of interpretation as the structure of historical existence.

«44 This statement exhibits an mischaracterization of Bergson so extreme it defies words; if ever there was a more persistent opponent of Descartes» conception of natural science than Bergson, I do not know who it might be — with the possible exception of Bergson's process blood brothers — Peirce, Dewey, James, Whitehead and Hartshorne.45 In Lowe's defense it might be said that the eight or ten books that do the most to establish just how non-Cartesian, and indeed revolutionary Bergson's view of science was were all published after Understanding Whitehead.

Regarding his intellectual affinities, Hartshorne feels himself to be «closest» to Charles Sanders Peirce, Henri Bergson, and A. N. Whitehead.4 He expresses gratitude to his Harvard professors C. I. Lewis and H. M. Sheffer for introducing him to «logical exactitude,» and especially to Professor William Ernest Hocking, his first teacher in philosophical theology, for fresh insights into a philosophically trustworthy vision of God.5 Furthermore, he acknowledges some indebtedness to Josiah Royce, William James, and Ralph Barton Perry, as well as a close kinship to the Russian existentialist Nicolai Berdyaev.6 Nevertheless, Hartshome's philosophy is strikingly similar and most profoundly indebted to that of A. N. Whitehead.

For Bergson, like many process thinkers (Peirce, James and Dewey come particularly to mind), the entire concept of «necessity» only makes sense when applied internally to abstractions the intellect has already devised.11 Of course, one can tell an evolutionary story about how the human intellect came to be a separable function of consciousness that emphasizes abstraction (indeed, that is what Bergson does in Creative Evolution), but if one were to say that the course of development described in that story had to occur (i.e., necessarily) as it did, then one would be very far from Bergson's view (CE 218, 236, 270).

In this respect Peirce's agape is inseparable from eros with respect to the goal or final end to be reached by love.

Hausman believes that Peirce's insight is restricted in the role of eros and agape in creative evolution, but he also suggests the fruitfulness of his insight.

This is why Peirce says that agapastic evolution consists in a bestowal by parents on offspring of spontaneous energy.

It is to Peirce's credit to have revealed a fundamental insight in introducing agape as a dynamic principle.

My plan is to approach the topic in terms of a very brief account of Peirce's three categories as they bear on his view of evolution.

He and I are in some ways the two among the living who have had the best opportunities to know about Peirce and his world.

Again, in «The Law of Mind,» Peirce argues that personality, which is one of the manifestations of the law of mind, is a structure that evolves (6.102 - 63).

More than this, he was sensitive to the fact that the writing of philosophy's history can be at once technically competent and narrow He praised the «philosophical greatness achieved in American philosophy, from Peirce to Santayana, but he complained of the cultural chauvinism in failing to recognize it.5 According to Hartshorne, «One might about as easily reach great heights in philosophy without benefit of the work done in modern America as to reach them in physics without using the work of modern Germans» (Creativity 11).

Charles Peirce said this in his twenties with superb clarity, except that finitude is in this usage an inadequate word; we are but fragments of the finite cosmos, which so far as we know is itself finite.