Sentences with phrase «in object form»

Relevant clauses include (in version 3 of the GPL) clause 6, which says: You may [distribute your program in object form] provided that you also convey...

In no event are You allowed to distribute the Software or sublicense its use in any format other than in object form, as a standalone product, or as a part of any product other than Your Integrated Product.

This is a memorably quirky, poignant curiosity of an exhibition: a tragicomedy in object form.

Capturing a moment in object form, future relics of past events, commenting on the collector and the collected.

They are separated while in their object forms, which gives the cursed staff an undertone of tragedy that the animation ignored altogether.

Not exact matches

«The ability to track, navigate, map and recognize both scenes and objects using Movidius» low - power and high - performance SoCs opens opportunities in areas where heat, battery life and form factors are key.»

He spoke of the promise of smart materials — life - like objects that change form in reaction to external triggers.

Deep observation must be done in steps: «If you wish to have a sound knowledge of the forms of objects, begin with the details of them, and do not go on to the second step until you have the first well fixed in memory.»

Hitler, for a time, advocated for Germans a form of the Christian faith he called «Positive Christianity», [244][245] a belief system purged of what he objected to in orthodox Christianity, and featuring added racist elements.

If God is our exemplar of a superior violence, violence itself becomes the object of faith, and religious people then engage in a perpetual holy war that is deemed a valid form of religious expression.

In microgenesis, objects are generated from phases of potential to forms that become actual in order to become reaIn microgenesis, objects are generated from phases of potential to forms that become actual in order to become reain order to become real.

When an event becomes an objective datum in the emerging constitution of some subsequent occasion, its symbolic form is interpreted anew, in relation to other symbolic objects, but always in conformity with the conditions established by its own actualization.

We know this because damage to a preliminary stage can result, say, in a well - formed object (word, etc.) deprived of its meaning or recognition.

If it is true that the creator constantly supports, preserves, and renews His world, if everything new that appears in the world has come and continuously comes from His plan for creation and from His creative power, then in some way it has to come into contact with the reality that forms the object of the sciences.»

Only the dualistic form of the modern Western consciousness, which is grounded in an absolute distinction between the subject and the object of consciousness, instills us with the seemingly irrevocable sense that the world or reality stands wholly outside of consciousness itself.

Because such enduring objects are more tied to the body, they are more dominated by particular forms of definiteness in their successive satisfactions than the final percipient route, whose sole value to the body, as we pointed out above, is its vivid originality.

The human mind, in Whitehead's view, is an example of the latter: «There is also an enduring object formed by the inheritance from presiding occasion to presiding occasion» (PR 167).

Like the Leibnizian monad, the occasion is individuated by its individual essence, its particular perspective; but unlike the Leibnizian monad this essence is not predicated of the occasion as a substantial substratum, but enters into the inner constitution of the occasion as «a vector transmission of emotional feeling» or, in the language of physics, «the transmission of a form of energy» from past occasions via the eternal objects that communicate the emotional form and make possible the subsequent reenactment by the prehending occasion (PR 315 / 479f.).

But on the other hand, the concatenation of functional forms, or eternal objects, affords him the means to establish relations, indirect, but nevertheless internal, between contemporary occasions, where causal relations proper are not in question at all.

In point of fact, the comprehension of an object consists in nothing else than that the ego makes it its own, pervades it and brings it into its own form, that is, into the universality that is immediately a determinateness, or a determinateness that is immediately universalitIn point of fact, the comprehension of an object consists in nothing else than that the ego makes it its own, pervades it and brings it into its own form, that is, into the universality that is immediately a determinateness, or a determinateness that is immediately universalitin nothing else than that the ego makes it its own, pervades it and brings it into its own form, that is, into the universality that is immediately a determinateness, or a determinateness that is immediately universality.

Aristotle means that in perception the individual form is actualized in the mind of the perceiver and in the object as perceived, and that the universal is then potentially reachable by application of the actualized form to other similar particulars.

29 More perhaps than do «eternal objects,» these «propositions» show how far Whitehead has come with his new solution to the problem of form: he has provided a free space for the unfolding of creativity in world - process.

Just as the seed must learn to see beyond the world of the seed, beyond the forms and objects found there, so reason must learn to see beyond its world, beyond its logic, beyond the forms and objects found in it, for its «Other» and Ground.

Man's cognition thereby corresponds to the hylomorphic structure of reality [i.e. to the way in which physical objects aredefined by a combination of matter and form].

Now insofar as Whitehead thinks of these «eternal objects» as forms, we have in fact a case of a radical identification of form and potentiality.

There exists a difference between both, but not in the difference of the object (the religion, the cosmology), rather in the «subjective form» of the experience, i.e., the way in which the «object» is assumed.

It has spread monotheism and driven out heathenism which was based on the worship of spirits which were symbolized in the mean forms of animals and inanimate objects.

If one still wanted to know about the knower and the knower's experience, this could be treated in a secondary way as a particular form of the body or a relation of the body to external objects.

He wants an eternal object to be «the same for all actual entities» (Process 23), and yet needs each creating subject to have its own subjective form of that object (Process 227, 232, 246), in other words, to create its own, novel «eternal» object.

I can therefore see an object in so far as objects form a system or a world, and in so far as each one treats the others round it as spectators of its hidden aspects which guarantee the permanence of those aspects by their presence.

Since there are no eternal objects or pre-existing forms in Hartshorne's view, the function of the abstract pole of God can not be solely one of the valuation of such entities as it is for Whitehead.

Platonic Form, Idea, Essence, Eternal Object; Potentiality and Givenness; Exclusiveness of the Given; Subject - Superject, Becoming and Being; Evaporation of Indetermination in Concrescence, Satisfaction Determinate and Exclusive; Concrescence Dipolar... (PR 57; emphasis mine)

6 In a conformal feeling, an eternal object already ingressed as characterizing the subjective form of an individual objectification given for a nascent occasion is reingressed as a character of the subjective form of the nascent subject's prehension of that objectification (PR 476, 364, 78).

Then a theological passage, «Eternal objects, as in God's primordial nature, constitute the Platonic world of ideas» (PR 73), is translated: God's primordial nature is an abstract structure of mathematical Platonic forms (PW 59/56).

Mays takes the statement that «The order of nature, prevalent in the cosmic epoch in question, exhibits itself as a morphological scheme involving eternal objects of the objective species» (PR 447f) and renders it: The order of nature is a morphological scheme of mathematical Platonic forms (PW 58/56).

with complete consistency, accords priority to actual entities is that it is only actual entities which are agents, in the primary sense I have endeavored to elucidate, all other entities being «agents» or «efficacious» only either as factors in actual entities, i.e., as contributory to the «act» of actual entities (e.g., eternal objects, prehensions, subjective forms, propositions) or as derivative from actual entities (e.g., nexus, societies).

That is, the form is received in matter as it is in any physical change, but also the form is received without matter, that is, it is possessed in disassociation from the sentient's material constitution.3 In virtue of this second mode of reception, the sensible thing is something more than an agent; it becomes an object for an experiencing subject — though this is not, of course, how Aristotle expressed iin matter as it is in any physical change, but also the form is received without matter, that is, it is possessed in disassociation from the sentient's material constitution.3 In virtue of this second mode of reception, the sensible thing is something more than an agent; it becomes an object for an experiencing subject — though this is not, of course, how Aristotle expressed iin any physical change, but also the form is received without matter, that is, it is possessed in disassociation from the sentient's material constitution.3 In virtue of this second mode of reception, the sensible thing is something more than an agent; it becomes an object for an experiencing subject — though this is not, of course, how Aristotle expressed iin disassociation from the sentient's material constitution.3 In virtue of this second mode of reception, the sensible thing is something more than an agent; it becomes an object for an experiencing subject — though this is not, of course, how Aristotle expressed iIn virtue of this second mode of reception, the sensible thing is something more than an agent; it becomes an object for an experiencing subject — though this is not, of course, how Aristotle expressed it.

However, the object is not within in its own physical reality; it is not the stone that is in the soul but the form of the stone (DA 432a1).

His solution was the disengaged form, but with that the form of the object becomes abstract — not in the sense that it is grasped as an abstract essence but insofar as it no longer remains the form of that individual — and this is the problem that Whitehead saw and tried to solve.

Reproduction and inheritance are therefore effected through the intermediary of form, or in Whitehead's term, «eternal objects.»

By this distinction of two modes of passivity — of receiving forms - Aristotle sets off the world of conscious experience from the world of nature, but in such a way that not only the objects but the very workings of nature are included as part of what is felt.

What this means is that the initial feeling derives its character, or subjective form, from the object felt, and insofar as it assumes the same form it reproduces the object: «In the conformal feelings the how of feeling reproduces what is felt» (PR 249).

Each sense has its peculiar object, but the sense of being affected by the object is an integral and basic part of sensing in general — at least in its more basic forms.

The natural structure of Prolog programs allows us to see in an appealing manner how eternal objects and propositions are nested and related to each other and how they can reveal the form of prehensive structure in the real world.

And finally, for both, perception, especially in its basic forms, involves an element of affective response to the object — a response that is an integral part of the basic experience rather than «a reflective reaction derived from the original perception» (AI 228).

In other words, it is through the causal influence of the external world that form is received, the object is possessed and sensation takes place.

In both, the object is immanent in the perceiving subject and this, moreover, is effected through the intermediary of forms (eternal objectsIn both, the object is immanent in the perceiving subject and this, moreover, is effected through the intermediary of forms (eternal objectsin the perceiving subject and this, moreover, is effected through the intermediary of forms (eternal objects).

In both, furthermore, what is perceived is a concrete individual entity, not a universal and not a sensum representing the entity, and the form by which this is effected is an individualized form of the concrete individual object.

The subjective form in a particular actual entity, he tells us, unlike the abstract eternal object, is an «element in the private definiteness of that actuality» (PR 444), and the subjective form can not be torn apart from its particular subject without becoming a mere universal (PR 354, 356).

In the De Anima we learn that in perception the object is present in the percipient insofar as its form is in the percipienIn the De Anima we learn that in perception the object is present in the percipient insofar as its form is in the percipienin perception the object is present in the percipient insofar as its form is in the percipienin the percipient insofar as its form is in the percipienin the percipient.