Sentences with phrase «in para»

But as I mentioned in my PARA Paints #ParaBlogCrew application video, the one thing our guest room lacked was attractive lighting.
Remember the window I mentioned in my Para Paints #ParaBlogCrew application?
«In April I drove a motor home to Quebec to have my skiers race in the Para Nationals Championships at Mont Sainte - Anne, Que.,» he says.
The Outline indicates (in para 30) that the regulations will include legal protection for the trustee.
The expression «common law of Australia» in para 223 (1)(c) can not mean that every judicial statement concerning the common law of native title is required to be read into the statutory definition of native title.
Participation in a Para curricular activity at [company name] known as the Artist Development Program (ADP)
[21] In the event such confirmation is not given the application to strike para 4 of the statement of defence is dismissed and the plaintiff will be required to produce documents as sought in para 1 (e) of Mr. Murray's notice of motion.
It is submitted that in case of Venture Engineering (supra) and Particularly in para 37 of the said judgment, it is held that the ratio of the case in Bhatia International (supra) was not confined to section 9 but took within its sweep the entire Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996 including section 34.
[23] The plaintiff will be required to produce documents, to the extent it has not been done as sought in para 1 (c) and (d):
Although the Carter declaration in para 127 does not explicitly exclude those with mental illnesses, the Crown referred to para 111 of the decision to suggest that they were excluded by the Court:
The judge agreed with the government's approach, stating in para [28] of the judgment: «I am quite satisfi ed that, in this case, in framing ss 2 (1) and (2)(d) of this Act, Parliament would have taken an axiomatic that the pressures on budgets are intense and that government would have to take the necessary steps in the context of other pressing needs for funds.
Holding against too technical an approach to what has to be given when, especially against the background of an employer's own — more complex — procedure, the judgment contains this important passage in para 9:
Moreover, the EAT went on to say in para 15 that «the statutory procedures are no more than a minimum» and that liability for automatic unfairness is (deliberately and as a matter of policy) intended only to be available where the employer has failed to conduct even the most rudimentary procedure.
An analysis producing the result that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the secretary of state's appeals would take the form: (i) the Social Security Act 1998 (SSA 1998), s 15 provided for an appeal against «any decision of a Commissioner»; (ii) the «decision» in each of the cases was to be found in para 1, dismissing the claimant's appeal; (iii) the secretary of state was not seeking to challenge that decision; (iv) by analogy with Lake v Lake [1955] 2 All ER 538, he had no right to challenge the reasoning on an issue upon which he was unsuccessful — jurisdiction — when the ultimate decision was wholly favourable to him.
The judge decided that the criteria in (a) and (b)(i) were satisfied by Crane's activities, but the criteria laid down in para (2)(b)(ii), which relates to the generation of goodwill and repeat custom, were not present.
The Practice Direction (supra) in para 7, provides that if parties can not achieve consensus they must inform all parties in writing with reasons within 10 business days or not less than five of an Interim Report Hearing.
The key example is in para 42, referring to the obligation in Art 5 of the Directive that employers must take «appropriate measures» to increase access, etc (ie what we would call «reasonable adjustments»): ``... the measures in question are intended to accommodate the needs of disabled people at the workplace and to adapt the workplace to their disability.
The answer was found in para 2 of Pt 2 of Annex XII to EU (A) A 2003.
The discussion starts at para 65 and moves to admissibility of electronic documents in para 73.
Summing up is done in para 70, with justifiable emphasis on parties» and the Regulation's intentions (but as noted with considerable reference to precedent and principles of statutory interpretation): Thus with the asymmetric jurisdiction clauses in the present case, the defendants agreed to sue only in the courts of one EU Member State, England.
(Canadian Western Bank as cited in para 69 of NIL / TU, O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C.G.E.U.)
At the end of the day the spirt of the season won out and in para 77 the Judge ruled, The regulation, as presently worded, is an elephant gun; it is not an appropriate weapon with which to dispatch the Christmas mouse.
There is specific guidance in para 16 (2) of Sch 1 of CA 1989 in relation to step - parents.
Thus, it stressed, the rate of convictions to offences recorded as rape is currently 5.7 % and by nonchalantly setting this bare statistic alongside the notion that juries are commonly influenced by myths and stereotypes about victim typology, the implied conclusion is reached that convictions by juries remain, as it put it in para 4 of the report, «unacceptably low».
At the end of the day, the spirit of the season won out and an appeal was allowed, in para 77 the Judge ruled,
Consequently, taking into account the outcome of the judgment pointed in para 57 clearly stating that «the answer to the question referred is that Article 26 (1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as meaning that measures such as a nine - hour night - time curfew, in conjunction with the monitoring of the person concerned by means of an electronic tag, an obligation to report to a police station at fixed times on a daily basis or several times a week, and a ban on applying for foreign travel documents, does not, in principle, have regard towards the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of all those measures; it is restrictive as to give rise to a deprivation of liberty comparable to that arising from imprisonment and thus to be classified as «detention» within the meaning of that provision, which it is nevertheless for the referring court to ascertain».
Where the effect of the amendment would be to withdraw an admission made in an earlier statement of case, the court must have regard to CPR 14.1 and the matters listed in para 7.2 of the associated Practice Direction, including the relative prejudice which will be suffered by each party if the admission is (or is not) withdrawn.
[95] The Jean / Gordon test is encapsulated in para 113 of Jean: «This inquiry necessarily involves an assessment of whether the payor spouse's actions, as they relate to his or her employment situation, are reasonable in the circumstances.»
See also Chiang 2009 ONCA 3, the Court held that a Judge can amend a warrant of committal well after completion of the proceedings in order to reflect the judge's intention at the time of sentencing, in para 123 mentions Malicia, supra
The Solicitors Act 1974, s 37A gives effect to Sch 1A, under which the council of the Law Society may take any of the steps mentioned in para 2 of Sch 1A with respect to a solicitor, «where it appears to them that the professional services provided... have in any respect not been of the quality which it is reasonable to expect of him as a solicitor».
There is a suggestion (in para 21) the period was set as a result of the PCT funding policy.
4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002, NOT the 12 - month limitation period set out in para 17 of the OPCF 44R change form.5 Nor could the «discoverability» criteria used in para 17 be imported into s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.
The exemption from rates in para 11 of Sch 5 to the Local Government Finance Act 1988 (LGFA 1988) in respect of «place of public religious worship» can not apply to places used for religious worship from which the public is excluded; such exclusion is not discriminatory on religious grounds.
Campbell J refers (in para 22) to the «the breathtakingly arbitrary power to make government regulations which contravene the very statute under which the regulations are made.»
In Para 74 and 75 of the document with which the SDGs were adopted a number of principles were agreed on regarding follow - up and review.
Lord Justice Toulson (giving the judgment of the court): The issue was whether or not a person who fell within and had complied with the conditions set out in para 206.1 of the code was qualified to provide immigration advice or immigration services for the purposes of IAA 1999, s 84.
But in para 99 of its judgment the court had laid down a principle which, if not revolutionary, was novel and unsupported by authority:
Sir Andrew Park: The words of the definition in para 1 (1) of Sch 10A required two elements to be present: (i) there had to be an amount to the value of which the pass conferred on the holder a right to services; and (ii) that amount had to be stated on or recorded in the pass.
In concluding that the word «liability» in cl 4.5 did not mean legal liability the judge had relied on the colloquial use of the words «debtor» and «creditor» by Lord Nicholls in para 31 of that case.
A good working rule was the 300 - page maximum for any one file, set out in para 14 of Appendix 6 to the Chancery Guide.
Previously hyperlink has been legally defined in in the lower court ruling 2008 BCSC 1424 in para 29 where hyperlink was defined as: «A hyperlink is like a footnote or a reference... [more]
While the Court of Appeal in Denton declined to provide a list of good and bad reasons for compliance it approved the examples previously given in para 41 of the judgment in Mitchell.
HMRC said that those cases on the meaning of «occupy» for the purposes of VAT 1994, Sch 9 had no application to the meaning of «occupation» in para 3A (7) of Sch 10.
In para 6 of Crookes the SCC defined a shallow hyperlink: ``... a shallow hyperlink, which takes the reader to a webpage where articles are posted».
Thus, whenever the Commission talks about what a private operator would «declare», we must read this as meaning «what tax declaration a private operator would accept», and then compare that with the arrangements Ireland accepted in its contested rulings (see its correct comments in para 53).
«Once the court has identified an obvious omission, and has found in admissible background materials an obvious precedent for filling it, it should not be fatal that there may be more than one possible version of the replacement...» In this context, the Court of Appeal felt it necessary to reject a literal reading of the well known passage in para 23 of Lord Bingham's speech in Homburg:
The further possible exception to equal sharing alluded to in para 86 was «where both parties had worked throughout the marriage, had pooled some of the assets built up by their efforts but had chosen to keep other such assets under their separate control, the latter, although unequal in amount, were unilateral assets which might not be subject to the sharing principle... we would prefer, so far as it is proper for us to do so, to keep the room for application of the concept closely confined».
It was held that having regard to the factors highlighted in para 22 of the judgment the judge was correct to proceed as he did.
In para 181 Wall LJ says: «Once proceedings have been issued... local authorities must play the case as neutrally as possible.»
His reasoning in para's 35 - 47 suggests that Mr. I's conduct can not lead to threatening the calm and physical security for the population at large.
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