A well designed and executed exit transaction is the last, and usually largest, strategically driven
increase in business valuation.
This means the skill of the sales person (M&A advisor) working with the CEO to sell the business can have a large effect on realizing that final 50 + %
increase in business valuation.
No. 3:
Increase in Business Valuations Valuations are likely to increase for businesses with solid fundamentals.
Not exact matches
Given the flaws
in Netflix's
business and the market's
increasing awareness of them, holders of NFLX are taking imprudent risk with the stock at anywhere close to its current
valuation.
The
increase in valuation was further supported by improvements
in our
business and financial results as evidenced by our sequential revenue growth between July 2011 and March 2012 of $ 54.3 million
in the three months ended March 31, 2012 compared to $ 26.4 million
in the three months ended September 30, 2011.
However, the fundamentals of the
business, which had been poor, did not warrant such an
increase in valuation and FEYE was even more overvalued after this price
increase.
One of the most important reasons selling a
business well can
increase the
business valuation is the high degree of variability
in the «strategic value.»
The first time I experienced the 50 %
business valuation increase was when we sold the company I co-founded
in grad school — Nexus Engineering.
In that sense all analysis of stock market based on historical metrics do nt make much sense since composition of stocks is entirely different in different era and as more capital efficient business model evolve and their time to market cycle shrinks stocks likely to command higher valuations and suddenly lower valuations during short period of time like already happening for many technology companies and as influence of technology on overall cost structure of companies increases (for example: robotics replace many of employees cost etc) valuation matrix of most companies likely to get affected dynamically in short duration of time than in the pas
In that sense all analysis of stock market based on historical metrics do nt make much sense since composition of stocks is entirely different
in different era and as more capital efficient business model evolve and their time to market cycle shrinks stocks likely to command higher valuations and suddenly lower valuations during short period of time like already happening for many technology companies and as influence of technology on overall cost structure of companies increases (for example: robotics replace many of employees cost etc) valuation matrix of most companies likely to get affected dynamically in short duration of time than in the pas
in different era and as more capital efficient
business model evolve and their time to market cycle shrinks stocks likely to command higher
valuations and suddenly lower
valuations during short period of time like already happening for many technology companies and as influence of technology on overall cost structure of companies
increases (for example: robotics replace many of employees cost etc)
valuation matrix of most companies likely to get affected dynamically
in short duration of time than in the pas
in short duration of time than
in the pas
in the past.
In Argo's case, I address the slippage in AUM in the past couple of years by: i) haircutting my valuation of the asset management business to 3.75 % of AUM (if AUM were increasing steadily & incentive fees being earned, a valuation of 7.5 % or even 10 % of AUM wdn't be unreasonable, considering Argo's fee structure, and ii) calling for more resources to be devoted to fund - raising, and other alternative revenue / fee sources (for example, like white - label & sub-advisory contracts) to be explored — see here: https://wexboy.wordpress.com/2012/11/16/argo-escape-from-an-evil-stat
In Argo's case, I address the slippage
in AUM in the past couple of years by: i) haircutting my valuation of the asset management business to 3.75 % of AUM (if AUM were increasing steadily & incentive fees being earned, a valuation of 7.5 % or even 10 % of AUM wdn't be unreasonable, considering Argo's fee structure, and ii) calling for more resources to be devoted to fund - raising, and other alternative revenue / fee sources (for example, like white - label & sub-advisory contracts) to be explored — see here: https://wexboy.wordpress.com/2012/11/16/argo-escape-from-an-evil-stat
in AUM
in the past couple of years by: i) haircutting my valuation of the asset management business to 3.75 % of AUM (if AUM were increasing steadily & incentive fees being earned, a valuation of 7.5 % or even 10 % of AUM wdn't be unreasonable, considering Argo's fee structure, and ii) calling for more resources to be devoted to fund - raising, and other alternative revenue / fee sources (for example, like white - label & sub-advisory contracts) to be explored — see here: https://wexboy.wordpress.com/2012/11/16/argo-escape-from-an-evil-stat
in the past couple of years by: i) haircutting my
valuation of the asset management
business to 3.75 % of AUM (if AUM were
increasing steadily & incentive fees being earned, a
valuation of 7.5 % or even 10 % of AUM wdn't be unreasonable, considering Argo's fee structure, and ii) calling for more resources to be devoted to fund - raising, and other alternative revenue / fee sources (for example, like white - label & sub-advisory contracts) to be explored — see here: https://wexboy.wordpress.com/2012/11/16/argo-escape-from-an-evil-state/
The company could have chosen to take those profits and reinvest them
in growing the
business, which would lead to lower dividends but (hopefully) an
increase in the
valuation of the stock, but they chose to pay dividends instead.