I would like to respectfully disagree with the fundamental premise underlying your statement, «If Blakely is about preferring adversarial to
inquisitorial sentencing
procedures and if the Framers wanted juries rather than judges to control sentencing, then are indeterminate sentencing systems unconstitutional?»
While I suspect there will always be a need for authoritarian and perhaps adversarial court processes to address truly intractable individuals and problems of genuine urgency, I worry that a reconceptualization of the system may call for more than triage processes and the co-locatation of social services, both of which are reconfigurations of existing services, but may demand a fundamental reconsideration of our basic assumptions and a critically examination of alternatives such as
inquisitorial processes, abridged trial
procedures, non-adversarial judging techniques, the embedding of mental health professionals in decision - making processes and so forth.