Sentences with phrase «instead of court orders»

Thus began a nationwide experiment to integrate public schools using market - like incentives instead of court orders.

Not exact matches

Singer refused to take the deal and instead litigated — at one point obtaining a court order mandating the seizure of an Argentine naval vessel.

After its scandal in which it created up to 2 million fraudulent accounts, Wells Fargo (WFC) asked a Federal District Court to order customers to private arbitration instead of the class - action suit they were pursuing.

-RRB- asked a Federal District Court to order customers to private arbitration instead of the class - action suit they were pursuing.

Instead, the one - paragraph order, signed by a Fisa court judge in 2010, declares that the procedures submitted by the attorney general on behalf of the NSA are consistent with US law and the fourth amendment.

One might have thought that that would be the end of the matter, but instead Burnaby commenced this action in the Supreme Court of British Columbia seeking a declaration (at para 13) «that the National Energy Board does not have the constitutional jurisdiction to issue an order to the City of Burnaby that directs or limits the City of Burnaby in the enforcement of its bylaws.»

His offer to me personaly for getting him forced to work over the holiday with a court order again overriding his contract and making him stay and work instead of forcing younger seniority to work.

The court ordered that ex-NSA must be allowed to access and brief his lawyers at a neutral place instead of the premises of the DSS headquarters in Abuja so as to enable him prepare adequately for his defence in the trial.

A bevy of unfavorable federal court rulings blocked the implementation of Trump's initial attempt at temporarily barring arrivals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, Syria and Somalia via executive order in January, prompting the administration to announce it would issue a new fiat instead of defending the original.

Rocky reform allowed judges to intervene and order mere users go to court - mandated drug treatment instead of going to prison thereby saving taxpayers tens of thousands of dollars

Instead of some of my policies already being enshrined as precedent from being «blessed» by the courts, all of them would be up to be struck down (which is much tougher if they've already been set as standing precedent), which is why I referred to even laws as potentially being no more enduring than an Executive Order, under this scenario.

Justice Adeniyi Ademola of the Federal High Court also in Abuja had granted the ex-NSA bail on November 3 in the charges of unlawful possession of firearms but the bail was on November 4 scuttled by the SSS who instead of obeying court order laid siege on his Asokoro Residence and placed him under house arCourt also in Abuja had granted the ex-NSA bail on November 3 in the charges of unlawful possession of firearms but the bail was on November 4 scuttled by the SSS who instead of obeying court order laid siege on his Asokoro Residence and placed him under house arcourt order laid siege on his Asokoro Residence and placed him under house arrest.

«In announcing its list, INEC completely disregarded the order of Justice Olamide of the Ondo State High Court restraining INEC from substituting the name of our candidate, Jegede choosing instead to pay heed to the order given by Justice Okon Abang of the Federal High Court.

But the Supreme Court in its ruling today [Thursday] May 5, instead ordered the deletion of the names of all those who registered with the NHIS cards.

Many couples Iâ $ ™ ve counseled fall into a rut of using food as their primary way of spending time together — going out to dinner, or for ice cream, ordering pizza, making brunchâ $ ¦ Try mixing things up and plan activities that don't revolve around food (go to a play, art gallery or museum, or do something active, like hiking, biking, or indoor rock climbing), or involve healthy eating (visit a farmerâ $ ™ s market instead of a food court).

Importantly, although accomplished after the entry of a court order, these deeper policy changes were not specifically ordered by the court, but instead represented creative reform efforts by the political branches.

Yesterday the Court further denied a government request for an additional 3 to 4 years of delay, instead ordering the DOE to revise the long - overdue petroleum reduction goal to an achievable number within one year, and in the following year to determine whether the AFV purchase rules must apply to private and municipal vehicle fleets, potentially requiring the purchase of tens of thousands of additional AFVs.

Instead of seeking court permission for traditional wiretaps, law enforcement will obtain orders to access an enormous volume of text messages or other mobile device data.

For instance, in a 1968 case, a Swiss court refused to issue an enforcement order on the grounds that the arbitral tribunal had not complied with the agreement of the parties that «all disputes should be settled in one and the same arbitral proceedings» and instead conducted the arbitration in two stages.904 In a 2001 case, the Italian Supreme Court enforced a first award but not a second award made with respect to the same discourt refused to issue an enforcement order on the grounds that the arbitral tribunal had not complied with the agreement of the parties that «all disputes should be settled in one and the same arbitral proceedings» and instead conducted the arbitration in two stages.904 In a 2001 case, the Italian Supreme Court enforced a first award but not a second award made with respect to the same disCourt enforced a first award but not a second award made with respect to the same dispute.

Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court would sanction this circumvention of the tribunals set up to resolve internal church disputes and has ordered the Mother Church to reinstate as Bishop one who espoused views regarded by the church hierarchy to be schismatic and which the proper church tribunals have already determined merit severe sanctions.

2017), the Virginia Court of Appeals remanded a divorce case back to the trial court for a nunc pro tunc («now for then») order granting a divorce from the bond of matrimony for adultery, to correct what the appellate court believed was a clerical error in granting a divorce a mensa et thoro instead, a divorce from bed and board or what the court called a legal separaCourt of Appeals remanded a divorce case back to the trial court for a nunc pro tunc («now for then») order granting a divorce from the bond of matrimony for adultery, to correct what the appellate court believed was a clerical error in granting a divorce a mensa et thoro instead, a divorce from bed and board or what the court called a legal separacourt for a nunc pro tunc («now for then») order granting a divorce from the bond of matrimony for adultery, to correct what the appellate court believed was a clerical error in granting a divorce a mensa et thoro instead, a divorce from bed and board or what the court called a legal separacourt believed was a clerical error in granting a divorce a mensa et thoro instead, a divorce from bed and board or what the court called a legal separacourt called a legal separation.

In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 6 the United States Supreme Court held that a company's attorney — client privilege extends to company counsel's communications with employees in certain prescribed circumstances.7 Rather than providing a simple objective test, the Upjohn court instead established five factors to guide courts in determining whether the company's privilege should extend to counsel's communications with its employees: (1) whether the communications were made by employees at the direction of superior officers of the company for the purpose of obtaining legal advice; (2) whether the communications contained information necessary for counsel to render legal advice, which was not otherwise available from «control group» management; (3) whether the matters communicated were within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; (4) whether the employee knew that the communications were for the purpose of the company obtaining legal advice; and (5) whether the communications were ordered to be kept confidential by the employee's superiors, including that the communications were considered confidential at the time and kept confidential subsequent to the interview.8 When these elements are established, courts generally consider communications between company counsel and an employee to be within the scope of the company's attorney — client privilCourt held that a company's attorney — client privilege extends to company counsel's communications with employees in certain prescribed circumstances.7 Rather than providing a simple objective test, the Upjohn court instead established five factors to guide courts in determining whether the company's privilege should extend to counsel's communications with its employees: (1) whether the communications were made by employees at the direction of superior officers of the company for the purpose of obtaining legal advice; (2) whether the communications contained information necessary for counsel to render legal advice, which was not otherwise available from «control group» management; (3) whether the matters communicated were within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; (4) whether the employee knew that the communications were for the purpose of the company obtaining legal advice; and (5) whether the communications were ordered to be kept confidential by the employee's superiors, including that the communications were considered confidential at the time and kept confidential subsequent to the interview.8 When these elements are established, courts generally consider communications between company counsel and an employee to be within the scope of the company's attorney — client privilcourt instead established five factors to guide courts in determining whether the company's privilege should extend to counsel's communications with its employees: (1) whether the communications were made by employees at the direction of superior officers of the company for the purpose of obtaining legal advice; (2) whether the communications contained information necessary for counsel to render legal advice, which was not otherwise available from «control group» management; (3) whether the matters communicated were within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; (4) whether the employee knew that the communications were for the purpose of the company obtaining legal advice; and (5) whether the communications were ordered to be kept confidential by the employee's superiors, including that the communications were considered confidential at the time and kept confidential subsequent to the interview.8 When these elements are established, courts generally consider communications between company counsel and an employee to be within the scope of the company's attorney — client privilege.9

Instead of abiding by the OQLF orders, these companies took the province of Quebec to court seeking a definitive legal opinion on whether the trademark exception allows them to display their trademarks on their premises unaccompanied by a French descriptor.

Instead, the court is economically enjoined to «consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application, including the need (a) for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and (b) to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.»

Joel Sanders, the former chief financial officer at now - defunct Dewey & LeBoeuf, has avoided a prison term after a New York state Supreme Court justice instead ordered him to pay a $ 1m fine and perform 750 hours of community service.

How does this rule apply to an award of spousal maintenance that was not agreed up by the parties in a settlement agreement but, instead, was ordered by the court after a contested trial?

The corporation would have been in a much better position had the Court ordered the unit owner to pay costs instead of the tenants.

Despite the evolving nature of Norwich orders in Canada, the court upheld the bona fide threshold instead of a prima facie one.

Instead of taking the time to save his car, he abandoned it in order to get to court on time.

The common understanding was that in order to protect employees, courts would consider termination provisions that failed to reference the full scope of the employee's entitlements (including the continuation of benefits) to be unenforceable and instead grant common law notice of dismissal.

On the face of it the Court was bound to grant an injunction but it instead ordered an expedited trial and ordered for the delivery up of documentation and information by the franchisee.

Like a confiscation order, a compensation order is an ancillary court order and is designed to compensate a victim for personal injury or any loss or damage that may have resulted from the offence committed by the defendant and is made in addition, or instead of, other sentencing options under section 130 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (PCCSA).

However, the tribunal had failed to take into account its own criticisms of the council in being over-zealous in its defence and on that basis the court made an order for costs on a 50 % basis instead, in relation to the PHR «since the untruthfulness of the claimant and the overdone defence of the council were mainly material only to that phase of the proceedings».

Lord Justice Briggs, in a dissenting judgement, stated that the marginal costs of implementing a blocking order should instead be borne by the rights holder, in line with the approach taken by the courts in other situations where compliance by an innocent party (here the ISPs) with an equitable duty to assist the victim of a wrongdoing (here the rights holder) should generally be at the victim's expense.

Instead the Court relies on the wording of a Practice Direction, namely FPR 2010 PD12D which states that, «the court may in exercising its inherent jurisdiction make any order or determine any issue in respect of a child unless limited by case law or statute.&rCourt relies on the wording of a Practice Direction, namely FPR 2010 PD12D which states that, «the court may in exercising its inherent jurisdiction make any order or determine any issue in respect of a child unless limited by case law or statute.&rcourt may in exercising its inherent jurisdiction make any order or determine any issue in respect of a child unless limited by case law or statute.»

Instead, the court pointed out that if the father was refusing to sign the Parenting Coordination Agreement then this amounted to a straightforward breach of a prior court order, for which the mother had other established procedural remedies at her disposal, including bring a motion to strike the father's pleadings entirely.

Our law firm is on the forefront of these changes, and constantly battling large insurers in the Courts in order for these definitions to be more favourable to accident victims and their loved ones, instead of being skewed in favour or the insurance companies.

Procedural Background In the case of 244674 Ontario Inc. v. Home Instead, Inc., 2015 ONSC 8004, a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found two sets of franchisees in contempt of an earlier injunction order.

Instead of ordering a new trial, the court proceeded to set the husband's income at $ 214,872 and the wife's income at $ 109,535.

2011), the Court of Appeals reversed a family court permanency planning order requiring the Department of Social Services (DSS) to bring a termination of parental rights (TPR) action against Mother and instead ordered the matter remanded for -LSBCourt of Appeals reversed a family court permanency planning order requiring the Department of Social Services (DSS) to bring a termination of parental rights (TPR) action against Mother and instead ordered the matter remanded for -LSBcourt permanency planning order requiring the Department of Social Services (DSS) to bring a termination of parental rights (TPR) action against Mother and instead ordered the matter remanded for -LSB-...]

Asked by the state Commission on Judicial Conduct to impose a 90 - day suspension without pay, four of the court's nine judges agreed that Eiler had violated the canons of judicial ethics but instead ordered a five - day suspension.

The Labour court sought clarification from the ECJ as to whether the protection afforded by the Directives extended to an applicant who had no intention of seeking employment, but instead sought the status of job applicant in order to bring a claim for compensation.

Section 37 (3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 provides the magistrates» court with the power, in an appropriate case, to abstain from either convicting or acquitting, but instead to make a hospital order.

In the case N.R.G v. G.R.G., The B.C Court of Appeal determined that the trial judge did not use the proper approach in when determining the best interest of the children (s. 37 of the Family Law Act) and found that some orders made were instead focused on correcting the behaviour of the parents.

Surprisingly, instead of disbarring the attorney, the Ohio Supreme Court indefinitely suspended him, but ordered that he could not seek reinstatement until he successfully completed or was released from the five year «community control» sanction imposed as part of his criminal sentence.

In his written submissions, the plaintiff states that «[i] f the court orders that the Plaintiff is to pay costs to ICBC, it means that Mr. Anderson must pay the entire judgment award to ICBC, instead of spending this money on his health condition and prognosis.»

Instead of dividing the military pension with an order complying with the Qualified Domestic Relations Order provisions, the husband agreed in an atypical Property Settlement Agreement to pay to wife one - half of of his monthly military pension as spousal support or alimony, without a separate court order or any election of survivor beneorder complying with the Qualified Domestic Relations Order provisions, the husband agreed in an atypical Property Settlement Agreement to pay to wife one - half of of his monthly military pension as spousal support or alimony, without a separate court order or any election of survivor beneOrder provisions, the husband agreed in an atypical Property Settlement Agreement to pay to wife one - half of of his monthly military pension as spousal support or alimony, without a separate court order or any election of survivor beneorder or any election of survivor benefits.

In the case of 244674 Ontario Inc. v. Home Instead, Inc., 2015 ONSC 8004, a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found two sets of franchisees in contempt of an earlier injunction order.

In Antrobus v Antrobus 2012 BCSC 613, the Court declined an award of special costs but instead ordered costs to be increased under Tariff C of... Read more

However, the spouses deliberately did not comply with the court's order: instead they mutually agreed to dispense with the services (and cost) of a «certified real estate valuator,» since they felt that they could obtain a valuation from the experienced real estate agent (s) they were planning to hire.