Sentences with phrase «interpreted as a means»

When he received the letter from the king of Syria he interpreted it as a means of provoking war.

Hell supporters interpret this as meaning that the person's soul is the worm and it's burning in an unquenchable fire.

The difference stems from Augustine's interpretation of a Latin translation of Romans 5:12 to mean that through Adam all men sinned, whereas the Orthodox reading in Greek interpret it as meaning that all of humanity sins as part of the inheritance of flawed nature from Adam.

This is lost sight of when the idiom is interpreted as meaning that which is more appropriately referred to as «resuscitation» or «revivification».3

Perry Miller once said that Protestantism has always had difficulty in preventing the doctrine of justification by faith from being interpreted as meaning justification by ignorance.

I suggest you read everything he says and interpret it as meaning the opposite.

The results of this study should be interpreted as a means of comparing nipples to one another.

The term «donor human milk» is widely interpreted as meaning milk provided to milk banks irrespective of whether payment has been provided even though by definition the use of the word «donor» assumes that the milk is a gift from the mother.

But should «necessary» when used in the context of «all necessary means» be interpreted as meaning «essential» or «the only means possible»?

Tom Chatfield's article on the linguistic revolution fuelled by digital technology (6 April, p 30) explores the possible origins of the expression LOL, which is usually interpreted as meaning laughing out loud.

I interpret this as meaning this product is not for women who have a large amount of gray hair, so it's definitely not for me!

The sensation of thirst appears after a certain degree of dehydration, and this was always interpreted as meaning thirst is not the best indicator of fluid needs.

I interpret this as meaning that there really is something to the idea that the ratio of various amino acids coming in makes a difference on how our bodies react to the proteins.

The board tries to clarify these standards by explaining, for instance, that «commitment» is interpreted as meaning that «accomplished mathematics teachers value and acknowledge the individuality and worth of each student, believe that all students can learn,» and so on.

Look for controversy to return if the Common Core is interpreted as meaning all students will take the exact same courses.

Your post about there being available places could have been interpreted as meaning alternative school places were not wanted by the community but that needed to be put in context of what those available places were.

If management can't explain themselves in a few concise paragraphs, I have to interpret this as meaning either they don't really know what they are planning to do, or they don't want to tell us shareholders.

A red swelling is interpreted as meaning the pet is possibly allergic to that allergen.

Thus, a product described by these terms is not held up to any standard higher than would be required for any other pet food on the market, and should not be interpreted as meaning the product is necessarily of higher quality or greater nutritional value.

Yu, Cal Peten was a Mayan name which the Spanish interpreted as meaning the neck of the continent (the gargantilla del continente).

This work is often interpreted as a means of exposing people to a foreign landscape, but the artist holds that this is not her intent.

To be called popular can be interpreted as meaning you are one of those artists who are popular with ignorant people yet reviled by the cognoscenti — for example Jack Vettriano or Thomas Kinkade.

It could be interpreted as meaning that there is not enough information in the prior distributions to justify a policy recommendation of the «experts» so modeled.

Please don't interpret this as meaning that I'm an algebraphobe.

and were just too happy to interpret this as meaning that there has been no significant global warming.

59 The answer to the first question and the first part of the third question is therefore that European Union law must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude the issue of judgment by default against a defendant on whom, given that it is impossible to locate him, the document instituting proceedings has been served by public notice under national law, provided that the court seised of the matter has first satisfied itself that all investigations required by the principles of diligence and good faith have been undertaken to trace the defendant.

The AHRC did not accept that being a non - denominational school could reasonably be interpreted as meaning that no prayer or religious practice would be allowed.

By its question, the referring Court asks, in essence, whether Article 101 (1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that agreements whereby car insurance companies come to bilateral arrangements, either with car dealers acting as car repair shops, or with an association representing the latter, concerning the hourly charge to be paid by the insurance company for repairs to vehicles insured by it, stipulating that that charge depends, inter alia, on the number and percentage of insurance contracts that the dealer has sold as intermediary for that company, can be considered a restriction of competition «by object» within the meaning of that provision.

This is not generally interpreted as meaning that any particular business activity or active management needs to be carried out in Scotland, merely that the SLP must have its administrative headquarters there.

Article 10 (1)(d) of Council Directive 2004 / 83 / EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third - country nationals or Stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted must be interpreted as meaning that the existence of criminal laws, such as those at issue in each of the cases in the main proceedings, which specifically target homosexuals, supports the finding that those persons must be regarded as forming a particular social group.

Article 9 (1) of Directive 2004/83, read together with Article 9 (2)(c) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that the criminalisation of homosexual acts per se does not constitute an act of persecution.

According to the AG, paragraphs 56 to 59 of Digital Rights Ireland should indeed be interpreted as meaning that a general data retention obligation does not pass the strict necessity test but only if «it is not accompanied by stringent safeguards concerning access to the data, the period of retention and the protection and security of the data» (§ 195, original emphasis).

the provisions of Article 81 EC and Article 3 (1) of Regulation No 1/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a proceeding initiated after 1 May 2004, they do not apply to a cartel which produced effects, in the territory of a Member State with acceded to the Union on 1 May 2004, during periods prior to that date.

Articles 5 to 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, must be interpreted as meaning that passengers whose flights are delayed are entitled to compensation under that regulation where they suffer, on account of such flights, a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours, that is, where they reach their final destination three hours or more after the arrival time originally scheduled by the air carrier.

Paragraph 31 of Annex I to the directive does not contain similar wording, confirming that that paragraph should be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition on making the consumer bear any cost whatsoever is absolute, whether it be the cost of a stamp or of a simple telephone conversation (sic).

As to the first question, the Court of Justice held that European Union law must be interpreted as meaning that it is for the Member States to define the concept of «workers who have an employment contract or an employment relationship» in Clause 2.1 of the PTWD, and, in particular, to determine whether judges fall within that concept.

As to the second question, the Court held that the PTWD must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes, for the purpose of access to the pension scheme, national law from establishing a distinction between full - time judges and part - time judges remunerated on a daily fee - paid basis, unless such a difference in treatment is justified by objective reasons, which is a matter for the referring court to determine.

Section interpreted as meaning may serve until end of term turns 70.

Consequently, taking into account the outcome of the judgment pointed in para 57 clearly stating that «the answer to the question referred is that Article 26 (1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as meaning that measures such as a nine - hour night - time curfew, in conjunction with the monitoring of the person concerned by means of an electronic tag, an obligation to report to a police station at fixed times on a daily basis or several times a week, and a ban on applying for foreign travel documents, does not, in principle, have regard towards the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of all those measures; it is restrictive as to give rise to a deprivation of liberty comparable to that arising from imprisonment and thus to be classified as «detention» within the meaning of that provision, which it is nevertheless for the referring court to ascertain».

Article 7 (1)(c) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that, while Member States have the faculty of requiring proof that the sponsor has stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain himself and the members of his family, that faculty must be exercised in the light of Articles 7 and 24 (2) and (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which require the Member States to examine applications for family reunification in the interests of the children concerned and also with a view to promoting family life, and avoiding any undermining of the objective and the effectiveness of that directive.

Article 7 (1)(c) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that, while Member States have the faculty of requiring proof that the sponsor has stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain himself and the members of his family, that faculty must be exercised in the light of Articles 7 and 24 (2) and (3) of the Charter, which require the Member States to examine applications for family reunification in the interests of the children concerned and also with a view to promoting family life, and avoiding any undermining of the objective and the effectiveness of that directive.

I shall then state why, in my view, Article 28 (2) and (3) is to be interpreted as meaning that a Union citizen can not rely on the right to enhanced protection against expulsion under that provision where it is shown that that citizen derives that right from offending conduct constituting a serious disturbance of the public policy of the host Member State.

In its judgment in Tsakouridis, the Court held that Article 28 (3) of Directive 2004/38 is to be interpreted as meaning that the fight against crime in connection with dealing in narcotics as part of an organised group is capable of being covered by the concept of «imperative grounds of public security» which may justify a measure expelling a Union citizen who has resided in the host Member State for the preceding 10 years.

26 By its question, the referring court asks whether Article 7 (1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 should be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of that provision, the concept of «social assistance» covers a benefit such as the compensatory supplement provided for in Paragraph 292 (1) of the ASVG.

In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I think that Article 28 (2) and (3) of Directive 2004/38 is to be interpreted as meaning that a Union citizen can not rely on the right to enhanced protection under that provision where it is shown that that citizen is deriving that right from criminal conduct constituting a serious disturbance of the public policy of the host Member State.

Article 28 (3) of Directive 2004 / 38 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64 / 221 / EEC, 68 / 360 / EEC, 72 / 194 / EEC, 73 / 148 / EEC, 75 / 34 / EEC, 75 / 35 / EEC, 90 / 364 / EEC, 90 / 365 / EEC and 93 / 96 / EEC, is to be interpreted as meaning that sexual abuse of a 14 year old minor, sexual coercion and rape are not covered by the concept of «imperative grounds of public security» where those acts do not directly threaten the calm and physical security of the population as a whole or a large part of it.

In Gariepy v. Shell Oil, [2002] O.J. No. 2766, Justice Ian Nordheimer indicated that while s. 5 (1)(a) refers to the pleadings disclosing «a» cause of action, that section is not interpreted as meaning that only one cause of action need be established.

The Court is asked to rule whether that provision is to be interpreted as meaning that sexual abuse of a 14 year old minor, sexual coercion and rape are covered by the concept of imperative grounds of public security.

The fourth question relies on relating «an individual», which in context we have to interpret as meaning relating «a specific individual» to the datum, as opposed to relating some set of individuals.

62 The answer to the second question should therefore be that Article 9 of the directive is to be interpreted as meaning that the activities referred to at points (a) to (d) of the first question, relating to data from documents which are in the public domain under national legislation, must be considered as activities involving the processing of personal data carried out «solely for journalistic purposes», within the meaning of that provision, if the sole object of those activities is the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas.