Sullivan observes that the use of «disgruntled» to describe employees is creeping beyond defense counsel's briefs and
into judicial opinions.
With all of the hype surrounding Star Wars: The Force Awakens, it should come as no surprise that Star Wars references are seeping
into judicial opinions.
Not exact matches
(c) As to transactions entered
into after May 20, 1996, a creditor shall have no liability under this chapter for any act or practice done or omitted in conformity with any (i) regulation of the administrator, or (ii) any rule, regulation, interpretation, or approval of any applicable Alabama or federal agency or any
opinion of the Attorney General, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, the regulation, rule, interpretation,
opinion, or approval is amended, rescinded, or determined by
judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason; provided, however, that any interpretation or
opinion issued after May 20, 1996, shall not have any effect on any litigation pending on May 20, 1996, nor shall any interpretation or
opinion issued after May 20, 1996, have any effect on litigation if issued subsequent to filing of the litigation.
I urge you to buy the book, not so much because I need the money for my end of the case (which I do) but because when a sclerotic and dysfunctional
judicial system co-operates with a cynical and fraudulent plaintiff in turning the DC courts
into a 21st century version of trial by ordeal, it is more important than ever to push back by disseminating as widely as possible the
opinions of him that Mann is trying to suppress.
[127] Professor Piché in her text Fairness in Class Action Settlements, supra at pp. 179 - 80 summarizes the various factors for the settlement approval test
into seven factors; i.e.: (1)
judicial risk analysis: likelihood of recovery, or likelihood of success on the merits weighed against amount and form of settlement relief; (2) future expense, complexity and likely duration of litigation; (3) class reaction: number and nature of objections; (4) recommendations and experience of counsel and
opinion of interested persons; (5) adequacy of representation: good faith and absence of collusion; (6) discovery evidence sufficient for «effective representation» and (7) adequacy of notice of proposed settlement to absent class members.
Rather, everyone understands that such practices are de rigueur because the senior folks are simply way too busy handling other senior - level tasks to undertake the very time - consuming process of researching all of the relevant facts and legal issues pertinent to a
judicial opinion, legal brief, or law journal article, and crafting all that raw material
into persuasive prose.
This article, while not about
opinion writing, does venture
into the minds of lay and
judicial decision - makers.
A first - year law student who has never had the opportunity to disagree with a professor or to independently form
opinions about cultures based on their art, literature, or music will almost certainly struggle to synthesize seemingly inconsistent
judicial opinions into a cogent legal principle.
While this is an excellent reference for all legal writers, the short section on writing
judicial opinions does not go
into sufficient depth for courses on
judicial opinion writing.
19th - and early - 20th - Century
judicial opinions are also littered with man - ending nouns, which cemented the acceptability of some of these words as legal terms of art
into the minds of impressionable law students.
Just as sports analogies, movie lines, and song lyrics have found their way
into lawyers» briefs and
judicial opinions, Star Trek and its intergalactic wisdom have permeated our jurisprudence as well.
To be practice - ready, law students need to be able to find and evaluate a broad range of legal sources.72 A short Standalone E-memo assignment provides an ideal opportunity to move beyond the traditional sources of law in first - year legal writing courses —
judicial opinions and statutes — and branch out
into different sources of enacted law.
For those interested in embedding
opinion content
into existing theories of
judicial decision making... consider Yonatan Lupu & James Fowler's paper recently posted to the SSRN.
Moreover, doctrinal entrenchment is particularly problematic in the FISA courts, where secrecy and institutional context indicate that outside efforts at doctrinal reform are less likely to be effective than they are with courts that publish their
opinions.35 Unlike published
opinions, secret
opinions can not provoke the public
into lobbying for a legislative override36 or
judicial overruling37 — two important paths of legal reform.38 Perhaps to hedge against the risks of limited external oversight, FISA limits FISC and Court of Review judges to non-renewable, seven - year terms, 39 a provision suggesting that Congress envisioned a FISA court whose membership would be responsive to shifting factual circumstances and policy priorities.40 Stare decisis, which requires judges to adhere to interpretations of law that they might otherwise reject as unjust or unpersuasive, constrains these judges» ability to adapt to such factual and policy shifts.
Defenses of stare decisis usually fall
into one of three categories: 1) it promotes the rule of law; 41 2) it promotes the appearance of the rule of law; 42 or 3) it expresses
judicial deference to the legislative branch by allowing Congress to correct interpretations of law it finds faulty.43 A closer examination of each of these justifications reveals their basic inapplicability to secret
opinions.
I must have read too many Judge Posner
opinions before starting my
judicial clerkship for a judge serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, because early on I added
into a draft
opinion a passage that would have ordered an attorney to show cause for violating an important rule.
The routine conversion of
judicial citations to electronic pathways out from the text and targets for citator links
into opinions has a direct bearing on optimal citation placement or so it seems to me.
In a recent
opinion piece, ACLU legislative counsel Neema Singh Guliani argues that the CLOUD Act sidesteps oversight from both the legislative and
judicial branches, granting the attorney general and the state department too much discretion in choosing which governments the U.S. will enter
into a data exchange agreement with.