Sentences with phrase «judge accepted the evidence»

But in his will, the man blamed the lack of communication with his daughter for his decision to leave her nothing, reports the Sun, noting the judge accepted the evidence of a friend who said she was written out of his will because of her pregnancy.

The trial judge accepted the evidence of the employee that he was «induced» to work for the employer on the understanding that acceptance of the job would ultimately lead to permanent employment.

In the court's decision, the judge accepted the evidence of D.C. and found serious concerns with the complainant's evidence including the implausibility of her allegations.

The judge accepted her evidence that she was «dumbfounded» and «shocked».

The Judge accepted this evidence and, accordingly, determined that the 1999 will had not been validly executed, with the consequence that the 1982 Will was her last valid will.

Not exact matches

'' The great trouble with religion — any religion — is that a religionist, having accepted certain propositions by faith, can not thereafter judge those propositions by evidence.

Is it appropriate to judge someone who ignores all of the accepted evidence and claims that the earth is flat?

Judge Denise Casper didn't accept that argument, but she also didn't prevent them from returning to court with their allegations later, says Paul Rothstein, a professor of torts, evidence, and civil litigation at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C. «The court is plainly telling these people to raise all their arguments in the administrative proceeding that is still ongoing,» he says.

«The judge felt that at this very early stage she could not accept the documentary proof we put forward destroying any evidence of fraud and we look forward to the day when those documents can be considered by the court.»

It found that the Appellant had not identified any basis upon which it could be said that the judge misapprehended the evidence, and accepted as reasonable the chambers judge's conclusion that the absence of recent occurrences of disruptive behaviour was due to the injunction itself.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, and accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against conviction dismissed — Although trial judge did not address analytical steps in order, he properly analyzed evidence and concluded that injuries sustained by victim were not accidental and could not have occurred in any other fashion than as stated by victim — Having provided reasons for accepting victim's evidence, trial judge was entitled to reject accused's evidence — Trial judge's reasoning, though skeletal, permitted accused and appellate court to determine how and why finding resulted.

9 The trial judge accepted Ms. Miller's evidence that there was some kind of pushing.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against sentence was allowed — Trial judge erred in concluding that discharge was not appropriate in circumstances, especially given conclusion that accused did not deliberately attempt to injure victim — Trial judge found that there was no need for either specific deterrence or general deterrence; prime concern was need for denunciation of her conduct — Section 730 of Criminal Code permits discharge in cases of this nature, provided that it was in best interest of accused and not contrary to public interest — Accused was responsible individual with no record whatsoever, she held position as counsellor and social worker for 25 years — Trial judge did not find that conviction would definitely affect her employment, but possibility existed, and such conviction would necessarily result in criminal record — There was no likelihood of re-offending — Conditional discharge would not be contrary to public interest.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed against order to provide DNA sample — Appeal allowed — Order was issued to destroy DNA sample that was taken — Trial judge erred in failing to exercise discretion not to order DNA sample — Accused was first time offender, in circumstances that resulted in serious injuries, but with no intention of causing those injuries — Accused had otherwise been exemplary citizen, and likelihood of re-offending was remote.

15 I agree with the position of the Crown that the trial judge refused to accept the evidence of Ms. M., as was his right.

«I haven't seen that before, where a judge is accused of misconduct and the inquiry committee isn't able to make a finding that the misconduct is proven to the necessary degree of certainty and yet didn't accept the evidence of the judge and felt that his evidence justified a removal from office in itself,» he says.

In her lengthy decision, the trial judge accepted essentially all of the plaintiff's evidence and his argument that harassment can be a cause of action in Ontario.

[40] A trial judge is not bound to accept uncontradicted and cogent evidence, although it is incumbent on the judge to provide reasons for rejecting such evidence: see Savinkoff v. Seggewiss (1996), 25 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1 at paras. 17 - 21 (C.A.).

This type of phrase has been litigated many times, where a party tries to swoop in at the last minute and accept an offer - particularly the question of when does the trial really commence (answer: most judges have held that it starts once actual evidence is called).

The trial judge accepted the expert evidence of the contractor that the over-deflection, cracking of the slabs and bending of the rebar was not caused by defective design.

In these circumstances, it was incumbent on the trial judge to explain that difference to Mr. Watterson [emphasis mine], to explain that the court could not treat the Defence as evidence, and that if he did not call a witness, or testify himself, the court would have no basis upon which to accept, as proven, the facts which the defendants had set out in their Defence.

If the trial judge's summary of the evidence is accurate, and it was open to the judge to accept the plaintiffs» experts» evidence — no misapprehension, nothing else that amounts to a palpable and overriding error, nothing else that amounts to a relevant error of law on the admissibility of evidence — then the result is supported by the evidence and is not (supposed to be) subject to appellate intervention.

On the facts of this case, the only «principle of causation» the trial judge needed, assuming he needed it at all given the evidence he accepted, was Snell's «causation need not be determined by scientific precision».

The fact of this evidence, given that the trial judge accepted it, eliminates the need to resort to the Snell robust and pragmatic, common sense approach.

That is assuming one even has to go to the robust and pragmatic approach, which is questionable given that the trial judge accepted the plaintiffs» evidence that the negligence of the nurses was probably a cause.

When K.B. testified, the judge while rendering his reasons for the verdict accepted the evidence of K.B..

Sir Philip accepted that this cost was reasonable, having heard evidence from a broker, James Blick of The Judge.

This is a finding that the respondent can not presently work, and a finding that was reasonably available based on the evidence that the trial judge accepted, and was entitled to accept.

Ultimately, I believe judges should emulate Justice Knazan the next time they are faced with a case that centres around Twitter (or Facebook, snapchat, kik, WhatsApp, LinkedIn, tumblr, instagram, Tinder, etc...) and put it to the participants in the matter to explain how the platform works, why the evidence should be accepted and what relevance any of it has to the legal issue before the court.

It was not accepted that the trial judge had failed to appreciate the difference between stress and stress - related illness and that the evidence was strong enough to conclude that O2 had received a clear indication of impending illness.

«Judges accept, with little or any discussion, the submissions or evidence that identifying class members is «cost - prohibitive,»» it states.

The judge may not accept some or all of the evidence presented by a witness or in a document, for a variety of reasons, including that...

If the judge rules that your evidence can not be presented because it is not relevant and / or reliable you must accept that ruling and move forward.

The Trial Judge did not agree that the pursuer was fundamentally dishonest, but accepted that the pursuer's evidence had not been entirely credible and reliable.

The ONCA held it was open to the motions judge to accept «essentially unrefuted» expert evidence that in the hypothetical but - for world Health Canada would have issued Apotex its Notice of Compliance as of its patent hold date and that Health Canada would not have suspended or revoked the Notice of Compliance in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

the judge accepted that NHS's evidence that Ms. Bolibruck's new responsibilities were of critical importance to the hospitals and that her new role would be high profile.

The Town led evidence suggested several applications of sand / salt mixture was applied to Rankins Corners but the trial judge was clearly reluctant to accept that evidence, as the Town's key witnesses had little or no independent recollection of their actions on the relevant day.16

Although the judge accepted Gyorffy's evidence about his pre - and post-accident conditions, he found that the Plaintiff could not provide the corroborating evidence required by the Regulations to meet the threshold and therefore granted the Defendant's motion dismissing the action.

I also note Ruman v. Ruman, [1998] A.J. No. 1447: 18 Ground 12 reads as follows: The learned Judge erred in accepting hearsay as evidence.

Despite this, and despite some reliability concerns the trial judge raised with the Plaintiff's evidence, the Court accepted the Plaintiff sustained real injury.

With respect to (1), the ONCA noted that it was open to the trial judge to accept the wife's evidence that the property was not ordinarily occupied as the family residence at the time of the parties» separation.

There was certainly nothing unreasonable about trial counsel's alleged failure to call corroborating evidence on these issues when the proposed evidence did not relate to material issues but only to facts the trial judge accepted... In the result, we did not find any error in the reasoning of the trial judge and also find that trial counsel did not act unreasonably by deciding not to call corroborating evidence on the issues of his relationship with Ms. Peters and physical condition as the evidence on these matters had already been accepted by the trial judge (at paras. 11 - 12).

Contrary to the submission of the Appellant, the Court of Appeal found the Trial Judge was entitled to accept witness evidence (including from those not trained as veterinarians); it was ``... unreasonable to suggest that a device that is designed to deliver a meaningful shock to an animal many times larger than the dogs in question would not cause unnecessary pain or suffering...» (See para. 16).

The trial judge accepted Mr. Hordyski's testimony however, rejected the evidence raised a reasonable doubt concerning his intention to steal the items in question (at paras. 9 - 10).

However, at trial, the appellant provided an «insufficient factual underpinning» to ground compensation for loss of earning capacity; the Court of Appeal found this part of the claim failed because the judge found the appellant did not meet the burden described in the Perren decision — the trial judge simply did not accept the appellant's evidence of his limitations and anecdotal evidence from other witnesses did not shore up his testimony.

In short, the trial judge's reasons fail to satisfy the second purpose articulated in F.H. v. McDougall: that is, they fail to explain why the trial judge accepted Sagl's evidence as to her loss in the light of the myriad problems with her credibility and reliability.

The trial judge did, however, accept the evidence that packers had brought the roping issue to the employee's attention on three occasions during their shift.

Although he found the complainant credible, and accepted her evidence that she said «no» on three occasions and was afraid, the trial judge nonetheless did not take «no» to mean that the complainant did not consent.

The trial judge indicated that she had a reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt even without accepting the evidence of the accused with respect to the conduct of the police officer.

The trial judge did not accept the employee's evidence that he had carried out regular checks of the line and had instructed members of his team to do the same, nor his denial that the 1,500 defective camshafts had been produced during his shift.