Sentences with phrase «judge erred»

The motion judge erred in concluding otherwise.

... In my view, the chambers judge erred in law by calculating the respondent's income based on an average of his previous three years» annual income, when his income was increasing over that period of time.

While the trial judge erred in saying both parties were unrepresented, her error in this regard is not material.

As the sentencing judge erred by applying the incorrect test, Anthony - Cook's negotiated sentence was imposed by the court.

Even reviewing the Agreement on a standard of correctness, the Court not hold that the trial judge erred in her interpretation.

Stanley submits the trial judge erred in not attributing income to Sandra from her LIRA in calculating the amount of support she awarded in her February 2015 judgment.

The appellant argues that the motion judge erred in denying the request for a second adjournment of the respondent's motion for summary judgment.

After hearing from both parties, it was the Court of Appeal's view that it was unnecessary to determine whether the motion judge erred in making the order in question.

[12] Turning to the question of the maintenance for the children, it is my view that the learned trial judge erred in fixing Mr. Bell's income at a figure far in excess of what he was earning.

In finding that the motion judge erred in concluding that there was no consideration for the termination clause and that therefore the clause was invalid, the Honourable Justice Sarah E. Pepall wrote the following on behalf of the Court of Appeal:

With a big hat tip to CAAFlog, it appears that CAAF last Friday granted review in Ali, and the first of three issues presented is the constitutional elephant in the room, i.e.,» [W] hether the military judge erred in ruling that the court had jurisdiction to try [Ali] and thereby violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by refusing to dismiss the charges and specifications.»

The defendant appealed his conviction, alleging that the trial judge erred in excluding the expert witness.

The appellants also submitted the trial judge erred in instructing the jury to disregard the brakes issue because: (i) common sense suggests that brake linings might create an issue with brake function and (ii) such an instruction ignored the reverse onus placed on Vicentini and Ford Credit by s. 193 (1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8.

The plaintiff appealed on two grounds: that the motion judge erred in i) interpreting the scope of the forum selection clause and ii) staying the action against the defendants who were not party to the... Read More

Marjolein submitted that the application judge erred by requiring her to establish undue influence rather than simply demonstrate that the relationship of the parties gave rise to a potential for undue influence.

The appellants contended that the motion judge erred in failing to find that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed as to whether 111 had made a valid equitable assignment to Nadeau of an October 19, 2011 promissory note executed by Caparelli and another in favour of 111 (the «Note») and guaranteed by 229.

Although Shtaif broadly submitted the trial judge erred in finding him liable, he did not point to any palpable and overriding error of fact in the trial judge's deceit findings.

The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in emphasizing and repeating in her charge the evidence of De Los Rios, specifically: «[De Los Rios] noted Vicentini was travelling 32 kilometres an hour and his brakes operated properly because he left skid marks on the road which indicates that the wheels locked.»

Batson argues that the judge erred in its ruling.

Shtaif challenged that conclusion, not on the ground that the trial judge erred in her findings of fact, but on the basis that the respondents failed to plead unlawful conduct conspiracy «with any precision or particularity».

«The judge erred, therefore the Crown appeal should stand and I agree with that ruling,» Sibbert told the Star.

The court rejected Stanley's argument, that in making her order for support, the trial judge erred by failing to consider the factors she was required to consider under the Divorce Act or by considering only certain factors in isolation.

The Appellant alleged several grounds of appeal, including that the judge erred in his analysis of the child's habitual residence, in concluding that the Respondent had not acquiesced in the child's relocation, in failing to respect an order of the Montana court that it had no jurisdiction over the child's custody, and in failing to give effect to Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention, which allows a court to refuse to return a child where there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.

«The trial judge erred in law by holding that the common law defence of duress was not available to persons charged as parties to a murder,» says the appeal ruling in R. v. Aravena.

The Appellant argued that the trial judge erred in concluding that the parties had reached an agreement in 2001.

«The Superintendent submits that the CCAA judge erred in concluding that no wind up deemed trusts arose during the CCAA Proceeding,» wrote Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Eileen Gillese in setting out one of the key issues in Grant Forest Products Inc. v.

The Respondent cross-appealed, contending that the judge erred in making orders that had not been applied for, and in not awarding him costs.

While the summary trial judge erred in principle when he failed to apply s. 17 of the Divorce Act in considering variation of the spousal support order, it was clear that there had been a material change in circumstances and the Court agreed with the judge's conclusion that arrears should be cancelled.

Moreover, the s 212 exercise is (as has often been said in the past) to be one (exceptionally) based on hindsight: «The judge erred in failing to take a decision from the standpoint of the end of the second contract and to look back».

Although the Court of Appeal finds the «mainstream industry» agreement was binding, it does not accept that the Trial Judge erred in refusing to find an agreement for the «adult industry» stream.

On the second ground, the majority of the Court of Appeal found the appellant failed to establish the trial judge erred in assessing the claim for loss of future income earning capacity.

[13] In my opinion, the judge erred in articulating the test for an application to vary a support order.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge erred in finding liability based on the IPO - related statements because the respondents did not plead or argue at trial that such statements amounted to fraudulent misrepresentations.

The Appellant raises one ground with respect to his breach of trust conviction: that the trial judge erred in finding the only reasonable inference to be drawn from his running a Canadian Police Information Centre («CPIC») check on the licence plate of his accomplice and fellow police officer was that he made the search to evade detection and / or determine to what extent law enforcement was aware of their activities.

R. v. Vokurka, 2014 SCC 22 (35510) Abella J.: «The dissenting judge was of the view that the trial judge erred in failing to adequately consider and explain why, in her view, the «equally plausible explanation» supporting the defence of accident was not accepted.

On appeal, the Appellant submits the Chambers Judge erred by, inter alia, characterizing the termination order as a final award.

Paciocco J.A. finds that a «Prosper warning» is required, that the Trial Judge erred in finding Mr. Fountain had waived his right to consult counsel without delay, and that the Trial Judge erred in finding a police caution would be an adequate substitute for the warning.

In Hilton J.A.'s view, the trial judge erred in not admitting in evidence out - of - court statements made by one of the victims and in giving the jury an instruction, the content of which was also erroneous, with respect to the fabrication of an alibi even though sufficient evidence had not been adduced to link the appellant to the fabrication of an alibi.

The palpable and overriding error of mixed fax and law was that the application judge erred in finding that the waiver had been revoked when in fact it had not been properly revoked by reasonable notice.

The trial judge erred in finding that a new contract is formed with every subsequent renewal of a credit card.

For the Court of Appeal, the substantial question was whether the trial judge erred in rejecting the appellant's evidence; whether the assessment was based upon a misapprehension.

C.A. and argued the trial judge erred by 1) admitting three agreed statements of fact, and 2) providing the jury with an inadequate Vetrovec warning concerning the testimony of unsavoury witnesses.

The trial judge erred in assessing the claim for loss of earning capacity on the basis that the appellant's earnings had not actually diminished after the accident.

The 15th page of the 19 - page decision noted that Lewie's attorney, Matthew Hug, argued the trial judge erred by not removing a female juror who had sent an «odd and inappropriate» note during deliberations.

The Crown appealed the acquittal to the Alberta Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in his ruling concerning spousal privilege meriting a new trial.

[27] We are of the view that in so concluding, the trial judge erred in law.

The Director appealed the decision to the B.C.C.A and argued the judge erred in his application of the legal test that governs when a wiretap packet can be unsealed for a non-accused person.

The trial judge erred in law in instructing the jury that the complainant's consent on a previous occasion could be used to support a finding of honest but mistaken belief in consent on this occasion.

(3) that the motion judge erred by not holding a «hearing» in connection with the CAS motion to withdraw pursuant to s. 47 (1) of the CFSA and then further erred in finding that the children were not in need of protection;

(2) The trial judge erred in allowing the respondent wife to deduct certain notional costs of disposition from the valuation of the property;