Sentences with phrase «judge in the case concluded»

Acknowledging the issues were novel, the motions judge in the case concluded that the defendant / accused had breached the deemed undertaking of confidentiality when he used for his criminal defence the plaintiff's documentary productions from the civil case without first seeking directions from the court as to whether and how he could do so.

Not exact matches

On this basis the trial judge concluded that (para 298) «if Franklins was in the relevant market with Metcash (as the Commission clearly contended), it must be the case that the major supermarket chains, which his Honour found to be a closer competitive constraint than Franklins, must be included in that market.»

The Hon. Judge was said to have granted the ex-parte order on 19th April, 2016, three days to the swearing - in ceremony and adjourned the case to 21st April, 2016 when the ceremony had been concluded.

They also note that a judge, in the 1990s, dismissed an indictment in an election law case after concluding Mr. Adler, the case's special prosecutor, had erred in his conduct.

A postponement of the case is warranted until insider trading prosecutions of the company, as well as Steinberg and Martoma, are concluded, Assistant U.S. Attorney Micah Smith told U.S. District Judge Richard Sullivan Wednesday in Manhattan federal court.

In one of the longest cases — lasting almost five years — in the history of the U.S. federal courts, Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, Judge Earl R. Larson concluded in the 1973 verdict that Eckert and Mauchly's patent for the ENIAC was invaliIn one of the longest cases — lasting almost five years — in the history of the U.S. federal courts, Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, Judge Earl R. Larson concluded in the 1973 verdict that Eckert and Mauchly's patent for the ENIAC was invaliin the history of the U.S. federal courts, Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, Judge Earl R. Larson concluded in the 1973 verdict that Eckert and Mauchly's patent for the ENIAC was invaliin the 1973 verdict that Eckert and Mauchly's patent for the ENIAC was invalid.

A review of those cases has concluded that «Most trial judges have heeded the Supreme Court's admonition to act as gatekeepers, and their review of admissibility is generally more detailed and in depth than in pre-Daubert cases» (Bert Black.

It is concluded that application of the glycemic index in isolation to judge the role of white vegetables in the diet and, specifically in the case of potato as consumed in ad libitum meals, has led to premature and possibly counterproductive dietary guidance.»

The trial judge in the case erroneously concluded that five provisions of state education codes violated the constitutional rights of all students in California, particularly those who are poor and minority.

In the case of water on the floor, there are many variables that might lead a judge or a majority of jurors to conclude a policyholder was negligent or not.

The judge concluded that the celebrity's own ongoing civil claims of sexual assault in a separate proceeding posed a possible bias in the case at hand, which involves serious criminal charges of a sexual nature.

Accused went to cottage of JC with whom she previously cohabited — Accused found JC with victim, another lady, in sauna — Angry words were exchanged between accused and JC — Victim testified that accused pushed her following verbal exchange, as a result victim lost balance and ended up against stove, thereby sustaining serious burns to body — Trial judge accepted victim's evidence that there was some kind of pushing — Accused convicted on one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sentenced to two - year term of probation and $ 1,000.00 fine, accused was also ordered to provide DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.04 of Criminal Code — Accused appealed — Appeal against sentence was allowed — Trial judge erred in concluding that discharge was not appropriate in circumstances, especially given conclusion that accused did not deliberately attempt to injure victim — Trial judge found that there was no need for either specific deterrence or general deterrence; prime concern was need for denunciation of her conduct — Section 730 of Criminal Code permits discharge in cases of this nature, provided that it was in best interest of accused and not contrary to public interest — Accused was responsible individual with no record whatsoever, she held position as counsellor and social worker for 25 years — Trial judge did not find that conviction would definitely affect her employment, but possibility existed, and such conviction would necessarily result in criminal record — There was no likelihood of re-offending — Conditional discharge would not be contrary to public interest.

In giving a pass to dishonest employees, this case forced judges and arbitrators in summary dismissal cases today to conclude that the misconduct must show that «the employment relationship could no longer viably subsist.&raquIn giving a pass to dishonest employees, this case forced judges and arbitrators in summary dismissal cases today to conclude that the misconduct must show that «the employment relationship could no longer viably subsist.&raquin summary dismissal cases today to conclude that the misconduct must show that «the employment relationship could no longer viably subsist.»

The Judge hearing the case concluded that the restrictive covenant in question was «manifestly too wide» and that the arguments advanced by A via its lawyers were simply «wrong».

Acknowledging the issues were novel, the motions judge in SC v. NS concluded that the defendant / accused had breached the deemed undertaking of confidentiality when he used for his criminal defence the plaintiff's documentary productions from the civil case without first seeking directions from the court as to whether and how he could do so.

The motions judge in SC v. NS concluded that the act of one lawyer for a client sharing the opposing party's compelled discovery evidence — in this case, documents — with another lawyer representing the same client in another related proceeding constitutes prohibited «use» of the evidence.

The trial court judge in Michelle's case ruled against her because, the court concluded, the foreman was not her supervisor.

The Judge concluded the case by pointing out that the dispute demonstrated the range of possible outcomes when parties are calculating Close - Out Amounts, and the wisdom of ISDA making the changes that it did in the 2002 Agreement — NPC illustrated the type of outcome that a party given the role of decision maker and limited only by a requirement of rationality might press for, regardless of the fact of an actual replacement transaction.

Reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal and restoring the determination of the trial judge (upheld in the High Court on appeal) the Supreme Court concluded that the facts in the present case did give rise to an inference that the intentions of the parties (to own the property in equal beneficial shares, consistent with their legal ownership) did change when Mr Kernott acquired his own property independently of Ms Jones.

This argument was not made by any of the parties in this case and the Advocate - General used the international law argument to conclude that EU - law was not applicable at all, whereas the CJEU — in my view — stays quite cryptic about how to fit in the interplay between EU - law and international law in its framework / criteria of judging free movement cases.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the judge was entitled to conclude that it was a normal characteristic for the horse to rear up in the particular circumstances of the case because it was «natural» for horses to do so in certain circumstances from time to time, even if such behaviour was not «usual».

Noting that the Tax Court had not previously addressed the issued of technology assisted review tools, Judge Buch concluded that the use of predictive coding in this case would provide a «happy medium» that would address both parties» concerns.

Overturning the first instance judge's finding, the Court set out three principles drawn from previous case law, and concluded that the judge «did not attach sufficient weight to the character of the invention as claimed in each of the claims in issue, the contribution that its disclosure has made to the art and the need to confer a fair degree of protection on the patentee».

In concurring to grant rehearing en banc in a criminal case, Judge Allen explained that he did so because he'd concluded that one of the judges on the original panel should have recused himselIn concurring to grant rehearing en banc in a criminal case, Judge Allen explained that he did so because he'd concluded that one of the judges on the original panel should have recused himselin a criminal case, Judge Allen explained that he did so because he'd concluded that one of the judges on the original panel should have recused himself.

«If the decisions below stand,» he writes, «Canadians may regrettably conclude that it is the state — in this case, through its statutory agent the Law Society of Upper Canada — and not the trial judge [that] has the final say on how a criminal or civil trial is conducted.»

Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy concluded that a campaign donation of $ 3 million in this case had a «significant or disproportionate influence» on the judge and created a serious, objective risk of bias that required recusal.

In considering the application of the Guidelines to the facts of this case, the court concluded that it was open to the motions judge to find, as she did, that the husband's spousal support obligation should terminate effective March 31, 2018.

In the Godard case, the Motion Judge and the Court of Appeal both agreed concluded that, since separation, the mother had engaged in behaviour that tried to limit or terminate the father's access to his daughteIn the Godard case, the Motion Judge and the Court of Appeal both agreed concluded that, since separation, the mother had engaged in behaviour that tried to limit or terminate the father's access to his daughtein behaviour that tried to limit or terminate the father's access to his daughter.

Having considered the above - noted cases with respect to the issue of self - represented litigants, the judge in Watterson thereby concluded:

But, the new DA disagreed with the legal analysis and / or position taken in the case by the old DA and the trial judge, and concluded that the sentence was invalid and that she would lose on appeal (the issue concerned the application of a recidivist sentencing statute in Colorado to cause a minor offense to have a very long sentence).

In concluding that the word «liability» in cl 4.5 did not mean legal liability the judge had relied on the colloquial use of the words «debtor» and «creditor» by Lord Nicholls in para 31 of that casIn concluding that the word «liability» in cl 4.5 did not mean legal liability the judge had relied on the colloquial use of the words «debtor» and «creditor» by Lord Nicholls in para 31 of that casin cl 4.5 did not mean legal liability the judge had relied on the colloquial use of the words «debtor» and «creditor» by Lord Nicholls in para 31 of that casin para 31 of that case.

Or, one will see cases in which the judge refers to a long list of cases — some appellate, some co-ordinate, all of which deal with the point in issue — and concludes with the line that since neither counsel cited the binding authorities, let alone any, nobody gets costs.

Viscusi concluded that judges exhibit the same biases as jurors when reasoning, but are more sensitive to details of the cases being judged, more coherent in their reasoning about probabilities, gains, and losses; and more accurate than jurors.

In this injury case the trial judge was in the best position to assess the reasonableness of the claimant's conduct at the time of the offer and the judge considered the information available to the plaintiff at the time the offer was made and concluded that it was not unreasonable for her to have rejected the offeIn this injury case the trial judge was in the best position to assess the reasonableness of the claimant's conduct at the time of the offer and the judge considered the information available to the plaintiff at the time the offer was made and concluded that it was not unreasonable for her to have rejected the offein the best position to assess the reasonableness of the claimant's conduct at the time of the offer and the judge considered the information available to the plaintiff at the time the offer was made and concluded that it was not unreasonable for her to have rejected the offer.

In a case where the prosecutor has been responsible for «unreasonable delay», the judge may conclude, depending on the nature and reasons for the delay in conjunction with all of the other factors in s. 515 (10), that continued detention is not justified and the accused should be releaseIn a case where the prosecutor has been responsible for «unreasonable delay», the judge may conclude, depending on the nature and reasons for the delay in conjunction with all of the other factors in s. 515 (10), that continued detention is not justified and the accused should be releasein conjunction with all of the other factors in s. 515 (10), that continued detention is not justified and the accused should be releasein s. 515 (10), that continued detention is not justified and the accused should be released.

However, decisions on similar facts have gone the other way, famously in O'Kelly v Trusthouse Forte plc [1984] QB 90, [1983] 3 All ER 456, Carmichael v National Power plc [1999] UKHL 47, [1999] 4 All ER 897 and more recently in Shaha v Viewpoint Field Services Ltd (UK / EAT / 0116 / 13 / DM) when Judge Shanks concluded the case by saying that «there can be no doubt that this is an area which is crying out for some legislative intervention».

Justice Little found that in this case, the trial judge's conduct — which included interrupting Ms H's counsel and limiting her time to examine her client, helping Mr B cross-examine Ms H, leading the direct examination of Mr B, and limiting Ms H's counsel's cross-examination of Mr B — led to the conclusion that «a well - informed person viewing the trial would conclude that consciously or unconsciously, the trial judge did not decide fairly.»

The Divisional Court had held that that Parliament had recently examined the issue following the Supreme Court decision in the 2014 Nicklinson case, and two out of three judges concluded that it would be «institutionally inappropriate» for a court to declare that s. 2 (1) of the Suicide Act was incompatible with the right to privacy and autonomy under Article 8 of the ECHR.

With respect to (2), the ONCA accepted the trial judges» determination of the parties» incomes but engaged in a thorough review of the case history, concluding that spousal support should terminate as of January 2012 (not 2006) and child support for the son should cease as of December 2010 when he began receiving ODSP payments.

In the second case concluded earlier this year before the same Judge, the Honourable Ed Kinkeade a jury awarded nearly $ 0.5 billion.

Green J. reviewed the caselaw on the issue, and concluded that in that case, where the intention of the judge was to impose two years (24 months) and not twenty - five months incarceration, and where the error, although not clerical or administrative in nature was «an error, a slip of the tongue or clerical change rather than a substantive change,» he concluded he still had jurisdiction to make the necessary amendment to the sentence.

11 Accordingly, notwithstanding the principle (which I do not doubt) that questions of apportionment are generally questions of fact with which we should interfere only in exceptional cases, I would conclude that the issues I have referred to are ones of law and that the learned trial judge erred in law in placing too high a standard on the plaintiff and in failing to consider the assumptions she was entitled to make.

In the case before me there is an affidavit from Dr. Reebye setting forth a basis for the examination sought, although ultimately what Dr. Reebye may regard as purely responsive may be different from that which the trial judge eventually concludes to be so.

On the merits of the injunction case, the Judge concluded that the Council was acting in bad faith and making an abuse of process.

The trial judge concluded that, although the ADA does limit transgender people's abilities to sue for disability discrimination in certain situations, this employee's gender dysphoria case was not prohibited by the statute.

In this case, the learned judge essentially concluded that, because defence counsel believed they had a reasonable opportunity of beating the plaintiff's offers, they were not offers that ought reasonably to have been accepted:

The Utah federal magistrate judge handling Mitchell's case concluded in April that the Utah Supreme Court hadn't clearly answered the question of whether lawmakers could revive expired claims.

The judge wrote: «Since the parties were not able to point me to any case which had considered the issue of the existence of a duty of care by a volunteer in circumstances where the volunteer's act allegedly had caused, or contributed to, damage to the property of the person to whom he was volunteering his services, I conclude that the question of law raised by this case is a novel one, or at least one in which the case law has not been fully settled.»

However, the context in this case it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the statement was not recognizable as comment, and even then, the defence of fair comment would fail,

In the words of the dissenting appeal judge, if the court concludes that those Family Division cases were wrongly decided this presents «an open road and a fast car» to the money maker in big money matrimonial caseIn the words of the dissenting appeal judge, if the court concludes that those Family Division cases were wrongly decided this presents «an open road and a fast car» to the money maker in big money matrimonial casein big money matrimonial cases.