It will just make
the judge question your judgment, and your motives.
Not exact matches
Part of the problem the way the
question is posed is by assuming that we can abstract an ethical ideal from one part of scripture and use it to
judge the actions of God in another part of scripture, as though scripture were given us so we could form such dehistoricized abstract ethical
judgments!
Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, who
judge this inchoate NGO uprising as presently «the only force we see that can break the global gridlock,» finish their important study with a
judgment about its high stakes: «The great
question of our age is whether people, acting with the spirit, energy, and urgency our collective crisis requires, can develop a democratic global consciousness rooted in authentic local communities.
The interviewers try to divine the answer by asking
questions that would test in some way the principles of
judgment, or the understanding of «jurisprudence,» that command the respect of the
judge.
Now when the guilty are so numerous it is not humanly possible to do this, therefore one must give the whole thing up, one perceives that there can be no
question of any
judgment, they are too numerous to be
judged, one can not make them or in any way manage to make them individuals, so one must give up holding
judgment.
The lowest form of offense, that which, humanly speaking, is the least guilty, is to let the whole
question about Christ remain undecided and to
judge in this fashion: «I do not presume to pass any
judgment; I do not believe, but I pass no
judgment.»
In his parable of the last
judgment, the
questions asked of those who are being
judged have to do only with this.
Manhattan federal
judge Valerie Caproni reserved
judgment on Silver's motion, but signaled with doubting
questions that Silver shouldn't expect a lifeline from her.
Judges may
question your
judgment if you show up in the freezing cold with nothing on your legs but sheer / nude stockings.
Unlike oral reading, which had to be tested individually and required that teachers
judge the quality of responses, silent reading comprehension and rate could be tested in group settings and scored without recourse to professional
judgment, (only stop watches and multiple choice
questions were needed).
[1] The main
question on this appeal is whether a trial
judge's decision should be set aside because his reasons for
judgment incorporated large portions of the plaintiffs» submissions.
The
question is whether the evidence presented by the party challenging the
judgment convinces the reviewing court that a reasonable person would conclude that the
judge did not perform her sworn duty to review and consider the evidence with an open mind: Teskey.
The
question is whether the evidence presented by the party challenging the
judgment convinces the reviewing court that a reasonable person would conclude that the
judge did not perform her sworn duty to review and consider the evidence with an open mind.
Moreover, videos can ultimately hurt litigants — a
judge might
question a party's
judgment in posting a video and hold it against him in ruling on the case.
Lady Justice Arden said: «As to the
question of law, in my
judgment, the
judge was correct for two reasons.
I moved for
judgment of acquittal, and the
judge then turned to the prosecutor to start asking some
questions.
The very
question posed for
Judge Sumner sitting in Wandsworth County Court in Miss Sam (Sales) Ltd v River Island Clothing Co Ltd where he gave
judgment on 17 February 1994 which is not being appealed.
The roundtable raised the
question of whether that leadership has extended to its
judgments, or whether to some extent the Court is acquiescing in the government's willingness to let participants function without the benefit of counsel, even where
judges view counsel as essential.
Given that expression of public sentiment, which it is submitted is an obvious one, the Supreme Court's
judgments in Morse must raise real
questions of the ability of appellate
judges who are far removed from the day - to - day world of ordinary New Zealanders to interpret and apply statutes that are said to embody New Zealand values.
The
judge in
question adopted 321 paragraphs of his 368 paragraph
judgment «almost word - for - word» from the respondent's written closing submissions and did not acknowledge the borrowing.
The central
question is under what circumstances can a trial
judge adopt and incorporate submissions of a party, without attribution, into a
judgment.
Coordination of civil actions sharing a common
question of fact or law is appropriate if one
judge hearing all of the actions for all purposes in a selected site or sites will promote the ends of justice taking into account whether the common
question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; the convenience of parties, witnesses, and counsel; the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or
judgments; and, the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.
The Appellant Dr. James objected to the procedure followed by the Motion
Judge on the basis that the common issue question was devised by the motion judge himself without the benefit of submissions from counsel and after the conclusion of the hearing of the summary judgment mo
Judge on the basis that the common issue
question was devised by the motion
judge himself without the benefit of submissions from counsel and after the conclusion of the hearing of the summary judgment mo
judge himself without the benefit of submissions from counsel and after the conclusion of the hearing of the summary
judgment motion.
Applying the authorities, the
judge made the following finding at para [245] of the
judgment: «The
question is whether there was something which would reasonably cause the claimants to start asking
questions about the advice they had been given, not when they first knew they might have a claim for damages but when each of them first knew enough to justify setting about investigating the possibility that [the defendant's] advice was defective.»
Can anyone imagine untenured Canadian legal academics undertaking a study whose
question is: why do motion and trial
judges write
judgments?
The important
question of how much latitude
judges have in Ontario to avoid trials by granting summary
judgment under Rule 20 is scheduled to come before the Supreme Court of Canada in March in two appeals involving an alleged investor scam.
The
Judge considered the new test set out by the Supreme Court in Hryniak v. Mauldin, stating that «The overarching
question to be answered is «whether summary
judgment will provide a fair and just adjudication».»
In sum, I
questions the assertion that federal
judges «should not make policy
judgments» at sentencing because: (1) such
judgments seem inevitable and are clearly made by prosecutors in every criminal case, and (2) a fair reading of the text of 3553 (a) suggests that Congress has ordered federal
judges to make individualized policy
judgments in each and every sentencing.
That is a great
judgment but it would seem
Judge Hess was undone by his spell - checker: surely the act in
question was tortious, while the arguments in favour of the claim were tortuous.
The
question was whether or not the District
Judge had been right to grant possession on mandatory Ground 8 where the landlord had a regular money
judgment for rent arrears far in excess of two months» rent but the tenant disputed rent arrears and had applied to set the
judgment aside.
Justice Brown encouraged
Judges to use the tools given to them, namely the Rules of Civil Procedure and the inherent jurisdiction of the court, to drill down and
question whether certain summary
judgment motions are appropriate, given the nature and progress of the particular lawsuit.
While it is true that
judgments based on statutes will be binding only while the relevant parts of that statute is in force, I suppose my
question deals with the scenario where
judges would prefer to rule in a certain way, however are unable to do so because of statutes that haven't been amended to reflect changing community values, and they do not want to set a precedent in the meantime.
The
judge went on to conclude: «Although I accept that a good number of purchasers will buy the T - shirt without giving the
question of authorisation any thought at all, in my
judgment a substantial portion of those considering the product will be induced to think it is a garment authorised by the artist... They will recognise or think they recognise the particular image of Rihanna, not simply as a picture of the artist, but as a particular picture of her associated with a particular context, the recent Talk That Talk album.
In deciding if these powers should be used to weed out a claim as having no chance of success or be used to resolve all or part of an action, the motion
judge must ask the following
question: can the full appreciation of the evidence and issues that is required to make dispositive findings be achieved by way of summary
judgment, or can this full appreciation only be achieved by way of a trial?
Bearing in mind that appeals are from the evidence and the
judgment, not the reasons — assuming the reasons are an adequate explanation of the
judge's analysis — those of you who are litigators (and care to look at what the
judge wrote) should look at paras. 54, 60 - 64, 66, of the Smith reasons and ask yourself this
question: assuming the evidence is as the
judge wrote, is there a snowflake's chance in a very warm place of a successful appeal by either side?