Sentences with phrase «judgment at common law»

In order to recognise and enforce a judgment at common law, the party seeking enforcement (the claimant) must commence a new claim (by issuing a Claim Form) as one would for any other claim.
Pursuant to section 24 (1) of the Limitation Act 1980, the limitation period to commence a claim to enforce a foreign judgment at common law is six years from the date of the foreign judgment sought to be recognised and enforced.

Not exact matches

However, on 5 December, the Court of Appeal led by Chief Justice Pereira JA agreed that a purposive interpretation of Part 7.3 (5)(b) should be deployed and that the provision should be read as granting permission to enforce any judgment or arbitral award made «by a foreign court or tribunal and amenable to be enforced at common law».
Judgments from jurisdictions including the USA, Canada, and most European countries are registrable only at common law and not under Part 72 and therefore, it was previously thought, service out could not be granted for enforcement claims based on such jJudgments from jurisdictions including the USA, Canada, and most European countries are registrable only at common law and not under Part 72 and therefore, it was previously thought, service out could not be granted for enforcement claims based on such judgmentsjudgments.
The defendants contended that what the publication complained of occurred on an occasion of qualified privilege at common law, that the claimant had no real prospect of showing the publication was malicious and that, accordingly, summary judgment should be given for them.
It was common ground that, in terms of the judgments regulation, Art 5 (1)(b) the English courts did not have jurisdiction unless, according to English law, the cider was «delivered» in England, in particular on shipment at Liverpool.
Critical to the decision of the Court of Appeal was the wording of cl 1 of the lease which set out the term granted in the following way: «from and including 1 January 2003 to 28 September 2004 (hereinafter called «the term» which expression shall include any period of holding over or extension of it whether by statute or at common law or by agreement)...» Rimmer LJ, who gave the only substantive judgment in the case, referred to the words in brackets in this clause as «the words of extension».
The Supreme Court adopted the Court of Appeal's description of the position under standard contract law (see Lord Clarke's judgment at para 20): ordinarily where the terms are in writing and there are no oral terms then the written terms will, prima facie, represent the whole of the parties» agreement; the parties are bound by the written terms when they sign the contract; the written terms will stand unless they do not accurately reflect what was agreed because of a mistake (generally common to the parties); and no terms which conflict with the express terms can be implied into the contract.
Accordingly under these two Acts, as well as at common law, non-money judgments and interim orders, including injunctions, are not enforceable.
As noted above, in order for a foreign judgment to be recognised and enforced at common law, it must be final, binding and conclusive.
I don't even understand the claim (basic 1L lesson — at common law and in equity, courts make policy judgments), so I'm curious what motivates it.
Bankruptcy petitions — individual voluntary arrangement — setting aside judgment for fraud — estoppel — HMRC's duty of care towards taxpayer under statute and at common law in assessing tax — misfeasance in public office.
It is useful to quote key observations by Stadlen J [at paras 126 - 129]: «In my view, notwithstanding the absence in the FTPP proceedings of some of the statutory and non-statutory safeguards which apply to criminal proceedings... [I] n deciding whether it would be fair to admit the hearsay evidence, the requirements both of Article 6 and of the common law obliged the FTPP to take into account the absence of all those [safeguards]... [I] n my judgment, no reasonable panel in the position of the FTPP could have reasonably concluded that there were factors outweighing the powerful factors pointing against the admission of the hearsay evidence... The means by which the claimant can challenge the hearsay evidence are... not in my judgment capable of outweighing those factors... The reality would appear to be that the factor which the FTPP considered decisive in favour of admitting the hearsay evidence was the serious nature of the allegations against the claimant coupled with the public interest in investigating such allegations and the FTPP's duty to protect the public interest in protecting patients, maintaining public confidence in the profession and declaring and upholding proper standards of behaviour... However, that factor on its own does not in my view diminish the weight which must be attached to the procedural safeguards to which a person accused of such allegations is entitled both at common law and under Article 6... The more serious the allegation, the greater the importance of ensuring that the accused doctor is afforded fair and proper procedural safeguards.
In cases such as Pham, where citizenship was at issue, it is quite possible that an applicant will be able to claim EU - law rights (to which the doctrine of proportionality applies), Convention rights (to which proportionality also applies, subject to the additional limitation of the «margin of appreciation» at the European level and, perhaps, to a «discretionary area of judgment» domestically [2]-RRB- and the protection of the common law (certainly Wednesbury unreasonableness and, in some circumstances, the principle of legality [3]-RRB-.
Second, to add belt to braces, the judgment goes on to consider in some detail the decision of the court of Appeal in the leading case of Jones v Tower Boot Co [1997] 2 All ER 406, [1997] IRLR 168, which held that a purposive interpretation is to be given to the general vicarious liability provisions in the discrimination statutes in order to achieve their aim, even at the cost of going further than the normal common law rules; this was held to be equally applicable to the parallel provisions on agency.
The US has had at least a common - law action for intrusion upon seclusion for a long time, yet none of the class actions brought as a consequence of a data breach has resulted in a judgment, and the overwhelming majority have been dismissed early on because no damages have been demonstrated.
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