Sentences with phrase «judgment of certain people»

But it's also an accurate judgment of certain people.

Not exact matches

«I think if we change that step and really become students of each other's narratives and ask questions about why people perceive certain things in a certain way instead of jumping to judgment, then I think we'll be better equipped to have more diversity in local churches.»

For how else are we to carry a certain idea of justice or goodness to extremes if not by conforming our judgment of eminence to the testimony given outside of us in history by the words, the deeds, and the lives of certain exceptional people who are not necessarily famous, but who testify by their excellence to that very way of eminence that reflection attempts to reproduce in itself and for itself?

Each of the arms of government can check each other but not in the way of the President or any other person saying after a court of law has delivered a judgment and set free an accused person on bail, after looking at the various factor for the grant of bail, including severity of the punishment, including the weight of the alleged crime, including whether the accused person would jump bail or not, including whether you would produce surety or not, including whether he has health challenges or not, and the court has finally weighed all these and decided that the accused person must go on bail upon fulfillment of certain condition of bail.

In a series of studies that looked at people's intuitive moral judgments and empathic responses, the researchers found that certain situations could trigger instant moral and empathetic assessments, even when they were directed to counteract those feelings.

«I don't understand how others can sit around casting judgments on people because they have different religions and a certain point of view.»

In the real world, if someone purports to be an expert, they tell you that they have special knowledge of a subject, that you should rely on their judgment that certain claims are true, and they turn out to have no clue whatsoever about said claims, that person is no longer considered reliable or trustworthy.

What «tort reform» aims to do is to issue, by government decree, that individuals and classes of people should not be able to bring civil actions in certain instances and / or should be limited in the amount they are able to recover by a predetermined structure as opposed to the judgment rendered by a jury of their peers.

A couple of provinces — NB and BC, if I recall correctly — have excluded from the deemed acceptance of jurisdiction certain kinds of judgments affecting people in the province thought to be less likely to be able to contest the jurisdiction in the court of origin — such as consumers or, in NB, employees of NB businesses in employment - related claims.

«I have seen examples of people who were more willing to accept judgment of the court if the court interacted with them in a certain way.»

Mr. Sirota offers quite a bit to chew on in just over 1000 words, but his argument, as I understand it, boils down to the following propositions: 1) Judges must generally apply the law as written and should work to foster stable legal doctrine, 2) In applying the law, judges can not avoid making moral and value - laden judgments; and 3) Judicial moralizing is, to a certain extent, desirable due to «democratic process failures,» meaning that the legislative process is not properly responding to the changing will of the people (Mr. Sirota also discusses briefly the circumstances in which courts should be permitted to overrule precedents.

While stereotyping is normal, it can result in snap judgments that reinforce negative preconceived notions about certain groups of people, exacerbating the impact of bias on our judgment and decision - making.

On 27 July 2011, the UK Supreme Court handed down a judgment which clarified concerns raised by the earlier Court of Appeal decision regarding the ability of parties to exclude certain categories of person from appointment as arbitrators.

The courts allow a certain amount of latitude for «mere puffery», because a reasonably alert person is not justified in placing reliance on a mere statement of opinion, judgment, expectation or conjecture, all of which may be expressed in an uncertain and hazy way.