Perhaps prof. Grove might have paid more attention to what the principle of
judicial independence means — and, for instance, to whether it actually requires restrictions on legislatures» ability to limit courts» jurisdiction.
Not exact matches
It's also
meant to ensure it doesn't «give the appearance of compromising
judicial impartiality and
independence (including
independence from the political process)» while keeping a judge from taking a position on issues that might ultimately wind up before the courts, he argues in the memo.
I regard this as a blot on
judicial independence which should not be tolerated, and it speaks loudly of the misconception that the governmental authorities, who are responsible in this matter, have of the
meaning of
judicial independence.
This
means that legal questions might be settled beyond the reach of
judicial review by tribunals not only lacking all the (admittedly generous) trappings of
judicial independence granted to courts, but indeed existing for the purpose of implementing government policy.
Over the past year I've written about the Emoluments Clause; the No Religious Tests clause; limits on presidential power as defined in the steel seizure case; the
meaning of the oath of office; how the Appropriations Clause constrains lawsuit settlements involving the federal government; how and whether gerrymandering by race and for partisan advantage affects constitutional rights;
judicial independence; the decline and fall of the Contracts Clause; the application of Obergefell to issues of public employees and birth certificates; Article V procedure for calling a new constitutional convention; and too many First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment controversies to list.