Sentences with phrase «judicial power as»

This is not only the most natural reading, it's the only one that doesn't lead to an absurd result: if it defined the state judicial power as well, then no court would have jurisdiction over a lawsuit between two residents of the same state under state law.

The General Assembly may vest in administrative agencies established pursuant to law such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for which the agencies were created.

Not exact matches

Among them are the rights to: bullet joint parenting; bullet joint adoption; bullet joint foster care, custody, and visitation (including non-biological parents); bullet status as next - of - kin for hospital visits and medical decisions where one partner is too ill to be competent; bullet joint insurance policies for home, auto and health; bullet dissolution and divorce protections such as community property and child support; bullet immigration and residency for partners from other countries; bullet inheritance automatically in the absence of a will; bullet joint leases with automatic renewal rights in the event one partner dies or leaves the house or apartment; bullet inheritance of jointly - owned real and personal property through the right of survivorship (which avoids the time and expense and taxes in probate); bullet benefits such as annuities, pension plans, Social Security, and Medicare; bullet spousal exemptions to property tax increases upon the death of one partner who is a co-owner of the home; bullet veterans» discounts on medical care, education, and home loans; joint filing of tax returns; bullet joint filing of customs claims when traveling; bullet wrongful death benefits for a surviving partner and children; bullet bereavement or sick leave to care for a partner or child; bullet decision - making power with respect to whether a deceased partner will be cremated or not and where to bury him or her; bullet crime victims» recovery benefits; bullet loss of consortium tort benefits; bullet domestic violence protection orders; bullet judicial protections and evidentiary immunity; bullet and more...

A complex modern democracy is at a serious disadvantage in dealing with autocratic states as well as in expeditiously conducting its own internal affairs, unless it possesses strong executive powers which are not hedged about in matters of detailed policy and administration by legislative and judicial agencies.

Or since it is a political affair that must be somewhat like a judicial proceeding, we might think of it as a mix of legislative and judicial power, but one only exercised by the legislative branch.

Criticism of the scope of judicial power is often perceived by its partisans as, in effect, attacking the independence of the judiciary or even the ideal of judicial independence.

So, the contemporary constitutional scholar Robert Lowry Clinton argues that it is a mistake to read the case as claiming a judicial power to tell the President or Congress what they can or can not do under the Constitution.

Now, I daresay that to us — living in the aftermath of an expansion of judicial power that may, perhaps, more properly be conceived as having been expressed and ratified, rather than created, by the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron — this language is quite shocking.

What we object to is, first, the judicial manufacture of constitutional law to displace without constitutional warrant the duly enacted judgments of the people and their elected representatives, and, second, the idea of judicial supremacy that treats the executive and legislative branches of the federal government as impotent to do anything but bow down before unconstitutional exercises of judicial power, however blatant and destructive of the constitutional order.

He has a proper understanding of the appropriate tension between the executive and the judiciary and he's got a good record fighting against cuts to citizen's legal powers, such as on judicial review and legal aid.

Soon after the new IPAct was introduced, Liberty, a British organisation concerned with human rights protection, requested a judicial review to the High Court.Liberty argued that some powers protected by the Act such as the interception of communication, acquisition of communication history and the creation of bulk personal datasets breached the public's rights.

It warns of «a constitutional disaster» if a detailed statute sets out the relative powers, as this would open the whole relationship to judicial review.

«The implication of the above is that the power of removal is shared between the President and the National Assembly in much the same way as the power of appointment is shared between the President and the National Judicial Institute (NJI).»

In all the other Cases before mentioned [within the judicial power of the United States], the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.»

In their judgement (http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2013/20.html) they say that the law does not «create a duty» to disclose these changes in circumstance effective 2000, and then apparently decline to address «is section 66A of the Administration Act invalid, insofar as it has retrospective effect, because it infringes the separation of judicial and legislative powers mandated by the Constitution?»

As as the Dutch Supreme Court confirmed in 2003 («Waterpakt» case»), EU states have a separation of executive and judicial powerAs as the Dutch Supreme Court confirmed in 2003 («Waterpakt» case»), EU states have a separation of executive and judicial poweras the Dutch Supreme Court confirmed in 2003 («Waterpakt» case»), EU states have a separation of executive and judicial powers.

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

Firstly, the lower courts have the same «judicial power» as the Supreme Court.

As former Court of Appeal judge Sir Stephen Sedley noted last year, he described «a statutory surveillance scheme shrouded in secrecy, part of a growing constitutional model that raises the question as to whether the tripartite separation of powers, legislature, judicial and executive still holds good&raquAs former Court of Appeal judge Sir Stephen Sedley noted last year, he described «a statutory surveillance scheme shrouded in secrecy, part of a growing constitutional model that raises the question as to whether the tripartite separation of powers, legislature, judicial and executive still holds good&raquas to whether the tripartite separation of powers, legislature, judicial and executive still holds good»

«Silver, by the power he amassed as speaker and all the power he has — he's gotten people jobs in the courthouse — also had sway at the judicial conventions because the delegates from his Assembly district and sometimes adjoining districts was able to dictate, on occasion, who would be a judge,» Flacks said.

clauses (2) and (3) of the 1992 Constitution, the Judicial Council had a constitutional obligation to specifically advise the President as to which specific person (s) is / are suitable for appointment to serve as Justice (s) of the Superior Courts of Judicature, in accordance with which advice the President is mandatorily required to exercise his powers of appointment.

The government's exact motives are unclear, but most scientists see it as one more power grab, following replacement of many judicial and military officials with political appointees in the past year.

The decisions of public bodies, such as the Secretary of State (and therefore of RSCs where they assume the powers of the Secretary of State), local authorities and schools can be challenged by way of judicial review and other appropriate proceedings in the High Court.

I believe that thanks to the national constitutional doctrines on the «conditional» primacy of EU law (on the «conditional supremacy» of EU law in the UK, see the post by Garner on this blog) as well as to the corresponding EU provisions — the constitutional identity clause in Article 4 (2) TEU and the authorisation to apply higher national standards of fundamental rights in Article 53 CFR — national constitutional or apex courts can provide necessary checks and balances on the ECJ enormous judicial power.

But at Volokh, Orrin Kerr views Ginsburg's oral dissents as politics; and indeed, as so political they affect the balance of power between the Executive and Judicial branches.

How safe is the framework of separation of powers and the critical concepts it protects, such as judicial independence, if so much of the citizenry does not even know the system exists — or what its role is?

We should see the occasional tug of war between national constitutional courts and the ECJ regarding the primacy of national constitutional or EU law not as a pathological condition but as a desirable, deliberative mechanisms aimed at balancing judicial power.

In my view, this saga illustrates a positive side to the «conditional» acceptance of EU law primacy by national constitutional courts as the latter provide checks and balances on the ECJ's enormous judicial power.

«They have vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress shall establish «the judicial power of the United States.»»

«The dignity and stability of government in all its branches, the morals of the people, and every blessing of society depend so much upon an upright and skillful administration of justice, that the judicial power ought to be distinct from both the legislative and executive, and independent upon both, that so it may be a check upon both, as both should be checks upon that.

The legislation, which limits judicial discretion to grant extra credit for pre-sentence custody, restricts judges» power to address certain inequities in the administration of justice, such as -LSB-...]

Members have acted for claimants and defendants in judicial review challenges to the exercise of powers both within the NHS, and as between the NHS and other bodies such as social services.

Todd & Weld filed suit on behalf of Judge Kendall in federal court challenging the removal proceedings as unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds as an illegal encroachment by the legislative and executive branches of government on the inherent right of the judicial branch of government to monitor and review judicial conduct.

For example, a casual perusal of the online legal research service Westlaw reveals that «mumbo jumbo» appears at least 251 times in judicial opinions.8 «Jibber - jabber» shows up just seven times (although surprisingly used by parties, rather than in statements from the court), while the more prosaic «gobbledygook» has 126 hits in the legal database.9 Believed to have been coined in 1944 by U.S. Rep. Maury Maverick of Texas, «gobbledygook» has been used by everyone from political figures referring to bureaucratic doublespeak (for example, President Ronald Reagan's stinging 1985 indictment of tax law revisions as «cluttered with gobbledygook and loopholes designed for those with the power and influence to have high - priced legal and tax advisers») to judges decrying the indecipherable arguments and pleadings of the lawyers practicing before them.

It may be that a person is set up and hounded for no other reason than the «system» as in judicial power elite and their brokers are annoyed and will go to the ends of the physical earth to put an end to the career (s).

Whereas the sources of Ofsted and the secretary of state's powers make their decisions plainly amenable to judicial review by Shoesmith, it is less clear that judicial review is available as a remedy against her employer.

Are the CJEU's interventions in cases such as Somali Pirates II and H v Council legitimate exercises of judicial power or examples of judicial overreach and activism?

The Court was in this case probably not really confronted with an «uncontrollable centre of power» considering the procedural and substantive checks and balances imposed in the regulation as well as the possibility of judicial review by the Court and therefore did not see the need to annul a regulation that itself tried to curb an uncontrollable centre of power: the financial markets.

I have to reluctantly concede the uncomfortable truth of her fundamental allegation: we undermine our legal system through our own arrogance, and particularly in how we create, encourage and reinforce judicial power, unaccountability and — at the end of the day — judicial conduct that can be fairly described as arrogant.

Recognizing the critical importance of judicial tenure, both in substance and appearance, Congress provided special protections for administrative law judges, even as it afforded due deference to the constitutional powers of executive agencies to render final agency decisions.

In France or in Ireland (where according to the Constitution «all powers, legislative, executive and judicial derive, under God, from the People»), the Sovereign can plausibly be thought of as the source of all powers.

Nigel regularly deals with applications under the Arbitration Act 1996, such as applications to stay legal proceedings, for the appointment / removal of arbitrators, for the exercise of judicial powers in support of arbitral proceedings, and for the correction of awards, as well as appeals from arbitration awards on points of law and challenges to awards for want of jurisdiction or on grounds of serious procedural irregularity.

The Ontario Judicial Council (OJC) has similar powers under the Courts of Justice Act as the CJC to make a complaint, investigation, hearing and disposition or conduct a hearing for provincially appointed judges.

As noted in Part I, the notion of transparency has long been entangled with the integrity of the justice system, as the democratic legitimization of judicial power flows from the public's collective confidence in the legal system as an impartial and independent arbiter of rightAs noted in Part I, the notion of transparency has long been entangled with the integrity of the justice system, as the democratic legitimization of judicial power flows from the public's collective confidence in the legal system as an impartial and independent arbiter of rightas the democratic legitimization of judicial power flows from the public's collective confidence in the legal system as an impartial and independent arbiter of rightas an impartial and independent arbiter of rights.

Such privative or ouster clauses have often been treated with a degree of contempt by the courts particularly if they are seen as an attempt to exclude the supervisory powers by way of judicial review of the superior courts over administrative action.

A Singapore court that grants a judgment of divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage, has the power to order division between the parties of any matrimonial asset or the sale of any such asset and the division between the parties of the proceeds of the sale of any such asset «in such proportions as the court thinks just and equitable.»

As it relates to s. 1, it is worth noting, that its impact on judicial power has been mitigated because as with every section of the Charter, the operational meaning of s. 1 was subject to judicial definitioAs it relates to s. 1, it is worth noting, that its impact on judicial power has been mitigated because as with every section of the Charter, the operational meaning of s. 1 was subject to judicial definitioas with every section of the Charter, the operational meaning of s. 1 was subject to judicial definition.

Mr. Sirota sees «democratic process failures» as providing judges with «the reason» to invoke the power of judicial review, and suggests that the presence of a failure could obviate the need for judicial deference.

A libel case, like all lawsuits, involves the government's judicial branch using its coercive power to make you pay money as a result of your speech, based on a law requiring you to pay money for certain kinds of speech.

Moreover, in the rather recent ESMA case, the Court «mellowed» the Meroni doctrine and allowed the delegation of discretionary powers as long as this was followed by judicial control.