Sentences with phrase «judicial supremacy as»

Lincoln, in contrast, viewed judicial activism as illegitimate, judicial precedent as problematic, and judicial supremacy as despotic.

Not exact matches

The occasion for Lincoln's declaration of implacable opposition to judicial supremacy had been a decision which, above all others, stained the Court's reputation as an institution dedicated to, as it says above the entrance to the Marble Temple in Washington, D.C., «equal justice under law.»

In Jefferson's letter of September 28, 1820 to William C. Jarvis, from which I quoted earlier his line about judicial «despotism,» he explained his opposition to judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation as follows:

In office, Lincoln gave effect to his position against judicial supremacy by consistently refusing to treat the Dred Scott decision as creating a rule of law binding on the executive branch.

What we object to is, first, the judicial manufacture of constitutional law to displace without constitutional warrant the duly enacted judgments of the people and their elected representatives, and, second, the idea of judicial supremacy that treats the executive and legislative branches of the federal government as impotent to do anything but bow down before unconstitutional exercises of judicial power, however blatant and destructive of the constitutional order.

I believe that thanks to the national constitutional doctrines on the «conditional» primacy of EU law (on the «conditional supremacy» of EU law in the UK, see the post by Garner on this blog) as well as to the corresponding EU provisions — the constitutional identity clause in Article 4 (2) TEU and the authorisation to apply higher national standards of fundamental rights in Article 53 CFR — national constitutional or apex courts can provide necessary checks and balances on the ECJ enormous judicial power.

However, it occurs to me that if, as has been hinted today by the Prime Minister, section 53 (2) of the Freedom of Information Act were redrafted so as to attempt to confer wide powers of Ministerial override of judicial decisions, such a provision might plausibly be considered to fall into that category — if it exists at all — of legislation so constitutionally egregious as to test the courts» commitment to the absolute supremacy of Parliament.

Rather, I suggested that there may exist a category of statutory provisions — including provisions permitting the executive branch to override judicial decisions — that are «so constitutionally egregious as to test the courts» commitment to the absolute supremacy of Parliament».

With its surprising subsequent history taught as part of the case, Cooper works better as a demonstration of how complex the constitutional system can be, rather than as a demonstration of the supremacy of judicial interpretation.

Judicial review is then usually presented, both by its detractors and by its more or less enthusiastic supporters, as a clash between the people's representatives, between democracy and «black - robed supremacy.»

To describe such cases as being only about judicial and popular or legislative supremacy is to miss this clash of two popular wills.