In Jefferson's letter of September 28, 1820 to William C. Jarvis, from which I quoted earlier his line about judicial «despotism,» he explained his opposition to
judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation as follows:
It was that the decision threatened to undermine the basic principles of republican government precisely by establishing
judicial supremacy in matters of constitutional interpretation.
The idea of judicial supremacy — or the idea that the supremacy of the Constitution entails
judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation — has come to be so widely held not only in the legal profession but also by the public at large that today it seems unremarkable.
Not exact matches
Granting the Supreme Court
supremacy in conducting discourse about values through the mechanism of
judicial review disempowers the people from full participation
in their government and their communities.
It provides a good warning to conservatives against falling into the trap of defending the idea of «
judicial supremacy»
in their critique of the president's statement about a «group» of unelected people striking down a congressional law.
It provides a good warning to conservatives against falling into the trap of defending the idea of «
judicial supremacy»
in their critique of the president's statement about a «group» of unelected people striking down....
The occasion for Lincoln's declaration of implacable opposition to
judicial supremacy had been a decision which, above all others, stained the Court's reputation as an institution dedicated to, as it says above the entrance to the Marble Temple
in Washington, D.C., «equal justice under law.»
It is ironic that the declaration of
judicial supremacy made by the Warren Court came
in the context of the Court's efforts to enforce a ruling
in the cause of racial equality and civil rights.
In office, Lincoln gave effect to his position against
judicial supremacy by consistently refusing to treat the Dred Scott decision as creating a rule of law binding on the executive branch.
Lincoln,
in contrast, viewed
judicial activism as illegitimate,
judicial precedent as problematic, and
judicial supremacy as despotic.
I believe that thanks to the national constitutional doctrines on the «conditional» primacy of EU law (on the «conditional
supremacy» of EU law
in the UK, see the post by Garner on this blog) as well as to the corresponding EU provisions — the constitutional identity clause
in Article 4 (2) TEU and the authorisation to apply higher national standards of fundamental rights
in Article 53 CFR — national constitutional or apex courts can provide necessary checks and balances on the ECJ enormous
judicial power.
Like Volokh, Tribe says, he sees
in the concurrence «more of the seeds of an imperious and self - aggrandizing, evin if unintended, assertion of
judicial supremacy.»