The reintegration of science, metaphysics and theology lies in the direction of showing that observation gives rise to questions that science answers, but that these themselves raise questions that call for metaphysical responses, and that these in turn point to a different
kind of explanation which, though ultimate, is also personal.
*************** «
The kind of explanation which explains things away may give us something, though at a heavy cost.
Many processes which we now regard as quite natural and logical were mysteries to medieval man and consequently offered a ready seedbed for
all kinds of explanations which depended upon intervention by some supernatural force.
Not exact matches
@ total non sense Perhaps we're splitting hairs here, but I was trying to be
kind by implying that rather than treating religiosity as a mental disability, for
which the supposedly clinically sick can receive insurance benefits and evade personal actionable responsibility by claiming illness, it would be better to treat religiosity as a societal functional disorder
which can be addressed through better education and a perceptional shift towards accepting scientific
explanations for how the world works rather than relying on literal interpretations
of ancient bronze age mythologies and their many derivations since.
In general, skepticism about a complete
explanation of creativity is based on the notion that a creative act issues in an outcome that is new in
kind,
which was unpredictable, and
which has a definite character that is neither reducible to the sum
of its elements nor exhaustively traceable to its antecedents.
Whitehead, for example, seems to have been in two minds about the viability
of the idea
of God as «personal», largely because he felt that as commonly used the term was overtly anthropomorphic and did not provide adequate
explanation of that
kind of experience
which stresses the sheer «given - ness»
of process.
This is not because such words are supposed to have some
kind of vitalistic tinge
which will redeem what we have to say from apparent mechanistic suggestions, but because they are in fact required for any genuine understanding
of the world and any sound
explanation of how things come to be.
That
kind of circular argument even goes back to
explanations of the origin
of the universe — according to the big bang theory (
which I don't really have a problem with in the «big picture»).
Just as with color perceptions, time also seems to belong to those objects
which constitute a
kind of limiting case in the domain
of possible
explanations.
Whereas in Schleiermacher and Dilthey «interpretation» means Verstehen understood as a
kind of empathy with the writer, Ricoeur is in search
of a theory
of interpretation in
which «understanding» seeks help in objective «
explanation» and returns deepened and enlarged.
For him Whitehead implicitly works with two different
kinds of explanation: the «causal» or «ordinary»
kind of explanation appealing only, in agreement with the ontological principle, to actual entities, and an «ultimate
explanation,»
which appeals to the principle
of creativity and not to specific actual entities (221).18
Now that
kind of thinking about God
which looks for evidence
of His activity in phenomena
which have no natural
explanation is often referred to as a belief in the «God
of the gaps».
All economic and sociological
explanations dash themselves in vain against the appearance
of this
kind of gratuitous act for
which there are neither roots nor rational
explanations.
What in an older
kind of philosophy would have been called the chain -
of - cause - and - effect is here seen as being very much richer; it is a congeries
of occasions, events, pressures, movements, routes,
which come to focus at this or that point, and
which for their
explanation require some principle that has brought and still is bringing each
of them, rather than some other possible occurrence, into this particular concrete moment
of what we commonly style «existence».
Using these as an
explanation would only risk doing what John Dewey urged us to renounce — the
kind of pseudo-
explanation that «only abstracts some aspect
of the existing course
of events in order to reduplicate it as a petrified eternal principle by
which to explain the very changes
of which it is the formalization» (4:11).
You may be misdiagnosed with other issues and you know, maybe then you find out it's a parasite issue but your doctor maybe doesn't wan na test you for parasites
which is where somewhere like — someone like you would come along in functional medicine who is more open to
kind of thinking out
of the box and accepting that, you know, sometimes we need to look beyond the tip
of our nose for an
explanation and but you know, so the — the information that I share in my post on parasites for example, you know, touches upon different ways
of treating them.
Once the covetous pair realize the true
explanation, they turn on Mary and insist that she reveal where she found the Witch's Flower, sparking a big finale in
which they kidnap Peter and attempt to transform him into the
kind of malevolent shape - shifter so often encountered in the third act
of anime films (such as «Akira's» all - consuming atomic mass).
The biological
explanations are left to Meredith (Jane Levy), Tripp's biology tutor, who ends up helping and has a crush on Tripp (He's the
kind of guy who's not smart enough to go for the cute science nerd,
which leads to an uncomfortable joke about her not needing to worry about walking home alone).
This is not the first instance in
which regulations have required this
kind of individual, direct communication by institutions with consumers about Federal aid: Section 454 (a)(2)
of the HEA authorizes the Department to require institutions to make disclosures
of information about Direct Loans, and Direct Loan regulations require detailed
explanations of terms and conditions that apply to borrowing and repaying Direct Loans.
The truth is defined contribution plans and group RRSPs often don't get the credit they deserve (for an
explanation of both, see
Which kind of plan do you have?).
While the game suggests there is some
kind of plot, this is never covered in - game - you simply run through the battles, fight the last boss (
which has no
explanation), and then whoever gets the last blow on the boss gets a rather story un-related ending consisting
of a couple
of bits
of artwork and text, usually with cameos from various other Capcom / Marvel characters in unusual situations.
The truth is the long (and til now quite useful)
explanation of how marketing works via images in the mind and so on is not the
kind of theory
of behaviour
which stacks up very well within any emprical science outside marketing nowadays.
«It is not sufficient in an art
of pure composition to appeal to sensation: the work
of art must evoke a response at a deeper level, the level we now call unconscious; and «the vibrations
of the spirit» that then take place are either personal, in that they effect some
kind of mental integration, or perhaps supra - personal in that they assume the archetypal patterns into
which mankind projects an
explanation of its destiny.»
The back - radiation
explanation of the greenhouse effect that people used to prefer until recently is less satisfactory because it has the
kinds of problems I pointed out 16 months ago in an article on this blog,
which was received at the time with only slightly more enthusiasm than Galileo's heliocentric account
of planetary motions: at least no one suggested I be placed under house arrest for it!
Bohm noted
of prevailing views among physicists: «the world is assumed to be constituted
of a set
of separately existent, indivisible and unchangeable «elementary particles»,
which are the fundamental «building blocks»
of the entire universe... there seems to be an unshakable faith among physicists that either such particles, or some other
kind yet to be discovered, will eventually make possible a complete and coherent
explanation of everything» (Bohm, 1980, p. 173).
With regard to future research, more research is needed that specifies the conditions under
which children with chronic illnesses show elevated levels
of psychological distress and that provides empirically supported
explanations as to why some
kinds of illness seem not to cause elevated levels
of depressive symptoms.